


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REFERENCE / STUDY MATERIAL

For

M. A. SOCIOLOGY

TITLE : MODERNITY, CULTURE & SOCIETY

SEMESTER - IVth

UNIT : I-IV

COURSE NO. : 401

LESSON NO. 1 - 17

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**Syllabus of Sociology M. A. IVth Semester for the examination to be held in the year
May 2017, 2018 & 2019**

Course code : 401	Title Modernity, Culture & Society
Credits : 4	Maximum Marks : 100
Duration of Examination 3 hrs.	a) Semester Examination (External) : 80 b) Session Assessment (Internal): 20

Objectives : This course is designed to grasp how institutions have come to shape the individuals and organise an image of what is meant to be a modern. It tends to explore the tensions between the promise of modernity as personal freedom and autonomy and its unintended consequences. This course would reflect upon the functional and cultural differentiation as reflexive traditions of modernity to make sense of multiple forms of modernities.

Unit - I Conceptualising Modernity : Intellectual Background and Core Themes; Sociology Making in the Modern Age : Marx, Weber and Durkheim; Eurocentricism; Institutional Dimensions of Modernity

Unit - II Crisis and Transformation of Modernity : Tradition and Modernity; Trust, Risk and Modernity; Reflexive Modernisation; Post-Modernity; and Multiple Modernities.

Unit - III Culture and Modernity : Colonialism and Modernity, Culture-religion and Modernity; Globalisation and Modernity; Unfinished Project of Modernity; Alternative Modernity

Unit - IV Sociologies of Indian Modernity : Relativising Indian Modernity; New Intelligentsia : Gandhi, Nehru, Ambedkar and Iqbal; Critical Engagement with Modernity : Partha Chatterjee and Ashish Nandi.

NOTE FOR PAPER SETTING :

The question paper will consist of three sections A, B and C

Section A will consist of eight long answer type questions, two from each unit with internal choice. Each question carries 12 Marks. The candidate is required to answer any four questions selecting one from each unit. Total weightage will be of $12 \times 4 = 48$ Marks.

Section B will consist of eight short answer type questions - two from each unit with internal choice. Each question carries 6 marks. The candidate is required to answer any four questions selecting one from each unit. Total weightage will be of $6 \times 4 = 24$ marks.

Section C will consist of eight objective type questions - one mark each. The candidate is required to answer the entire 8 questions. Total weightage will be of $1 \times 8 = 8$ marks.

Prescribed Readings :

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2. Beck, Ulrich, Anthony Giddens, Scott Lash. 1994. *Reflexive Modernization : Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*, California: Stanford University Press.
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INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND AND CORE THEMES

Structure :

1.1 Objectives

1.2 Introduction

1.3. Process of Modernity

1.4 Enlightenment

1.5 Aspects of Modernity

1.6 Contextual Background

1.1 Objectives

After going through this chapter you will be able to

- ❖ understand the concept of Modernity.
- ❖ its process of modernity.
- ❖ aspects and contextual background

1.2 Introduction

Generally, the meaning of modernity is associated with the sweeping changes that took place in the society and particularly in the fields of art and literature, between the late 1950s and the beginning of Second World War. There is, however, no clear demarcation by date, and although the term 'postmodern' is increasingly used to describe changes

since the Second World War, there are some who argue that modernity persists, and others who see its demise as having occurred much earlier. When modernity is explained in terms of history, it is said that the world first experienced renaissance, and then, enlightenment and thereafter modernity and postmodernity. As a matter of fact, there is much disagreement on the precise dates of the beginning and end of modernity. There appears to be general consensus on its meaning and social formations. In a broader way, modernity is associated with the following :

1. Industrialization and urbanization.
2. Development.
3. Democracy.
4. Capitalism.
5. Superiority of power.
6. Free market.
7. Optimism.
8. The search for absolute knowledge in science, technology, society and politics.
9. The idea that gaining knowledge of the true self was the only foundation for all other knowledge.
10. Rationality.

A discussion on modernity in social sciences is considered to be fashionable today. India witnessed modernity during the British rule. Before this we had feudalism of ancient and medieval periods. Our country has suffered enough at the hands of feudal rulers and colonial exploitation. Though modernity has been introduced in this country soon after the downfall of Mughal empire, we got democracy despite having industrialization and urbanization after the attainment of independence and the promulgation of constitution. It is reasonable to ask the question : how are we so much interested in the theory and process of modernity ? It is certain that the European countries experienced modernity in

the aftermath of enlightenment, and India after the operation of constitution. But, why are people so much involved in modernization after the lapse of such a long span of time ? It is not difficult to analyze the answer to this question. There are a large number of factors, which explain our concern for modernity. Before we attempt to define modernity, let us look at the intensification of its processes.

1.3 Intensification of the processes of modernity

Modernity is that distinct and unique form of social life, which characterizes modern societies. Modern societies began to emerge in Europe from about 15th century, but modernity in the sense used today could hardly be said to exist in any developed form until the idea of the 'modern' was given a decisive formulation in the discourses of the enlightenment in the 18th century. In the 19th century, modernity got identified with industrialism and the sweeping social, economic and cultural changes associated with it. In the 20th century, several non-European societies - for example, Australia and Japan - joined the company of advanced industrial societies. Today, modernity has become a progressively global phenomenon.

In this section we discuss some of the important process, which led to the development of modernity.

1.4 Enlightenment : The age of reason

Enlightenment is described by the historians as the age of reason. It was premised upon a belief in the universality of reason and the universal character of scientific explanation. Modernity emerged out of this scientific nature of human society. It became clear to social scientists that if nature can be explained in terms of reason, why not society be explained scientifically. It discouraged traditional understanding of society.

The emergence of modernity thus traces back to enlightenment. Enlightenment was renaissance, humanism and the recovery of classical thought in the city states of Italy from 15th and 16th centuries. Modern science, therefore, came through enlightenment and it was during this period that the tradition of theology was questioned by scientific reasoning. The hegemony of traditions was so strong in Europe during this period that it

received its first blow from modernity. It was in 1732 that Voltaire in his *Philosophical Letters* took a pleasure in mocking the conventional system of his French compatriots :

In Christian Europe people gently aver that the English are fools and madmen : fools because they give their children smallpox to keep them, from having it, madmen because they light-heartedly communicate to these children a disease that is certain and frightful, with a view to preventing an evil that may never befall them.

The scientific shift to modernity was given by Voltaire whose model was Isaac Newton. It was the beginning of empiricism in modernity. It all took place in Britain. In Europe, a reverse process had taken place in the methodology of modernity. Here, rational systems of thought had taken precedence over empirical science.

All these developments in the structure of enlightenment influenced the emergence of modernity. In fact, not only economic factors were responsible for the appearance of modernity, the phenomena of empiricism and rationality also accounted for it.

Modernity has had a long span of life. It started with the enlightenment and passed through a number of intensive process. The last stroke, which came in the event of 1989-90, gave a decisive character to modernity. Modernity, therefore, today is characterized by capitalism, democracy and secularism. At this stage of our discussion, we should also mention that modernity is multi-dimensional. Its form, which is found in America or Europe, is not the same as in Asia or Australia. Quite like its form, modernity has its consequences also which vary from society to society.

1.5 Meaning, definitions and aspects of modernity

The meaning and definitions of modernity are controversial. There are theorists who argue that the contemporary society is a modern society.

It is bureaucratic-rational-secular and democratic-capitalist. There is no alternate to it. There are also theorists who contemplate that there have been substantial changes in recent years and that we have moved into a new postmodern world.

Modernity was also a subject matter of classical theorists. They had experienced it, and also lived in it. And, then, there are contemporary thinkers such as Habermas and others who have also witnessed the new forms of modernity. The classical thinkers, namely, Marx, Weber, Durkheim and Simmel, though disagreed on the perspectives of modernity, agreed on the core features, which constituted it. Before we define and analyze the meaning of modernity as is taken by contemporary theorists, we first deal with the classical theorists who used the concept of modernity.

1.6 Contextuality of modernity

The contemporary world in the wake of globalization is passing through dramatic changes. Traditions gradually got weakened at the hand of modernity. Religion and religious practices received the first blow, followed by the death of monarchy and feudalism. In the traditional society where there was low level of technological development, a large number of people worked on the land. All this has changed. Describing the economic profile of industrial or modern society, Anthony Giddens writes :

A prime feature of industrial societies today is that a large majority of the employed population work in factories, offices or shops rather than in agriculture. And over 90 percent of people live in towns and cities, where most jobs are to be found and new job opportunities are created.

It is for the first time in traditional societies that the importance of cities increased. There were cities in these societies but they were the centres of administration and pilgrimage. Industrialization now became a generator of job opportunities. The largest cities in the wake of modernization became more impersonal and anonymous than before. These cities became nucleus of large-scale organizations, such as business corporations or government agencies. These organizations influenced the lives of virtually everyone.

Historically, modernization came with the processes of urbanization and industrialization. In course of time, modernization also brought a change in the political system. The new political system differed substantially from the traditional form of political regime. In societies, the political authorities, namely, monarchs, emperors and kings had

little direct influence on the customs and habits of most of their subjects, who lived in fairly self-contained local villages.

In our country, when industrialization came with the British colonial rule, the people at the village level lived with their customary life. They were as reported by Sir Henry S. Maine and Charles Metcalffe - the colonial administrators-turned-sociologists - *little republics*. It is said that the princely rulers, round the year, waged war against each other, and the people lived a smooth life. They did not show any concern with the monarchs and their administrative agencies. The villages of northern Indian ploughed their fields singing the *chopais* of the Hindi poet Tulsidas. All this soon became a situation of the past with the increase in industrialization and urbanization. In fact, modernization declares the passing of tradition.

The coming of industrialization revolutionized production. It also facilitated transportation and communication. In the west, industrialization created new fields of social life, which were non-economic in content. Now, there emerged nation-states which increasingly became political communities divided from each other by clearly delimited borders rather than the vague frontier areas that used to separate traditional states. In the context of nation-states resulting from industrial economy, the new governments assumed extensive powers over many aspects of citizen's life, framing laws that apply to all those living within their borders.

Anthony Giddens, who has written extensively on modernization and its consequences, says that the process has not only influenced the traditional economy but has also given new dimensions to some of the sensitive areas of power concentration. He elucidates his observation as below :

From the earlier phases of industrialization, modern production processes have been put to military use, and this has radically altered ways of waging war, creating weaponry and modes of military organization much more advanced than those of non-industrial cultures. Together, superior economic strength, political cohesion and military superiority account for the seemingly irresistible spread of western ways of life across the world over.

There is yet another perspective of modernity besides urban, industrial and democratically created nation-states, transport and communication. This perspective is of development and progress. If renaissance and enlightenment stand for social justice and equality, modernization denotes progressive evolution. The founding theorists of sociology are the production of industrialization and modernization. Emile Durkheim (1858); Max Weber (1864) and Karl Marx (1841) belonged to the same European generation. They all had witnessed the consequences of modernity. Explicitly it appears that all these theorists were optimistic about the historical process of industrialization in which they lived. But, as Roymond Aron observes in his *Main Currents in Sociological Thought*, the situation is far from being optimistic. All three, albeit in different ways, were of the opinion that European society was in crisis.

Durkheim, Weber and Marx reacted differently to the emergence of industrial-urban society. Durkheim in his argument says that in the long run modernity would create differentiation in society. And this differentiation would help the mechanical society to transform into organic society. Social density and social contract, in the long run, would hold the society together. In other words, modernity would lead to society's development. Weber has a different interpretation for industrialization and modernity. To him, the industrial society would be a bureaucratic-rational society. Weber considers societal progress through rationality only. Marx examines the process of industrialization in terms of production relations. His argument is that the enhancement of capitalism entails its own death. The ultimate progress lies in the attainment of socialism.

The key word, which helps to analyze modernity, is development. From the 17th to the early 18th century, the western countries came to be known as developed countries. They had substantial development in the fields of industry, democracy and capitalism. In their maturity, they established colonies in numerous areas previously occupied by traditional societies, using their superior military strength and capital resources. Although these colonies have now attained their independence, the process of colonization was central to shaping the social maps of the globe as we know it today. Thus, in the beginning, development was considered as the key feature for the identification of a nation. Giddens tries to characterize the nations on the basis of development. To him, development is modernity

and modernity is development. He argues:

The societies which are not fully developed are referred to as developing world. Such societies include China, India, most of the African countries (such as Nigeria, Ghana and Algeria) and countries in South America (for example, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela). Since many of these societies are situated south of the United States and Europe, they are sometimes referred to collectively as the *south* and contrasted to the wealthier, industrialized *north*.

Modernity, thus, is identified with industrialization. Second, it is also clubbed with capitalism. The north of the world is industrialized, that is, it is wealthy; and the south is lesser modernized and therefore it is developing, that is, lesser wealthier. There is yet another mark of modernity. It is political power. The thesis runs like this: industrializations result in development, development proceeds to capitalism and capitalism leads to superiority in power. The first world countries are the industrialized and modernized states of Europe, U.S., Australasia (Australia, New Zealand, Tasmania and Malaysia) and Japan. Nearly all first world societies have multi-party, parliamentary system of government. The first world countries are, therefore, industrialized, developed and capitalist democracies.

The second world societies meant the communist societies of what was then the Soviet Union and of Eastern Europe including Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany and Hungary. These societies had centrally planned economies, which allowed little role for private property or competitive economic enterprise. They were also one-party states, as the Communist Party dominated both the political and economic systems. The communist leaders believed that a collectively owned system of production would become more prosperous than the western free market system. Thus, the first world society was a capitalist-democratic society dominated by free market, whereas the second world society was a socialist society, having one-party rule and collectively owned economic system.

With the disorganization of Soviet Russia and the ending of cold war, the second world of socialism has effectively disappeared. The modernity has now a free play in the

market. With the disappearance of the second world, there are now two worlds or societies - developed and developing. In other words, in the paraphrase of modernity, there are modern societies and modernizing societies. Modernizing societies are located in areas that experienced the colonial rule. These societies include Asia, Africa and South America. The modernizing societies live in a traditional way of life. They are actually developing countries, which differ from other forms of traditional societies. Their political systems are modelled on systems first established in the societies of the west - that is to say, they are nation-states. While most of the population still lives in rural areas, many of these societies are experiencing a rapid process of city development. Although agriculture remains the main activity, crops are now often produced for sale in world markets rather than for local consumption. Developing countries are not merely societies that have 'lagged behind' the more industrialized areas. They have been in large part created by contact with western industrialism, which has undermined earlier, more traditional systems.

Industrialization which came in 18th century Europe is the forerunner of modernity. Certainly, modernity did not emerge over night. It took about two centuries to develop. The attributes of modernity took multiple processes. Industrialization transformed the agricultural-traditional society into modern-bureaucratic-rational capitalist society. There was consensus among social thinkers that modernity ultimately led to progress and development. Admittedly, modernity started with an economic thrust, it finally took to a political shift, which divided the world into modern and modernizing and developed and developing. Modernization is both a theory and a process. As a theory it has given place to the condemnation of a large number of traditions; as a process it has landed itself to postmodernity, which is, in fact, hypermodernity or late modernity. And again, postmodernity is not a theoretical product, it is like any other theory, a processual practice. And, the processes keep the theory and discipline alive.

1.7 Sum Up

The change in society has brought a shift in the structure of theory. In the economic

field three was extension of trade and market. Modernization brought about a shift in the structure of sociological. theory.

SOCIOLOGY MAKING IN MODERN AGE

Structure :

2.1 Objectives

2.2 Introduction

2.3 Classical Theorists

2.4 Emile Durkheim

2.5 Karl Marx

2.6 Max Weber

2.7 Sum Up

2.1 Objectives

After going through this chapter you will be able to :

- ❖ classified theorists regarding modernity.
- ❖ making sociology in modern age.

2.2 Introduction

2.3 Classical Theorists

The classical theorists are those who are foundational theorists - they are the pioneer thinkers. Among them are included Marx, Weber, Durkheim and Simmel. Though these thinkers have not taken the concept of modernity in a formal way, their works

indicate that they are concerned with the processes of modernization. In their own way, they have comprehended it. Here, we take up their approach to modernity.

Karl Marx: It is commodification

Marx's concern with modernity was in terms of production relations. It was the objective of the capitalist class to increase its production. More production means more profit. Capitalism, for him, was ultimately profiteering. Marx, therefore, argued that for capitalism everything is a commodity. Dance, drama, literature, religion, in fact, everything in society is a commodity. It is manufactured and sold in the market. Even, religion and rituals are also items of commodity. Alienation, exploitation and oppression are all due to commodification. Quite like the economic items, the non-economic items are also things of commodification. Modernization, therefore, according to Marx, is nothing but a commodity, a thing to be brought and sold, and an item for trade and commerce. In a word, modernity is commercialization.

Max Weber: It is rationality

Weber is credited to have developed the thesis of Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. He argues that Calvinism - a sect of Protestant religion - has certain ethics, which develop the spirit of capitalism. Religion, though a spiritual order, is run on the norms of rationality. Weber scans a huge literature on domination, religion and other wider areas of life and comes to the conclusion that rationality is the pervading theme, which characterizes human actions. He has, therefore, defined modernity as rationality. For him, on one word, modernity is synonymous with rationality.

Emile Durkheim: It is differentiation

Durkheim had a very intimate encounter with industrialization and urbanization. He was scared of the impact of modernization. His studies of modern society brought out very interesting and exciting data. He was a functionalist. He very strongly believed in the cohesion of society. For him, society is above everything else. It is par excellence. It is God. Despite all this, society is never static. It is evolutionary. Durkheim was a product of 19th century. Like any other sociologist, he was also an evolutionist of his times. He

traced the origin of society. In its evolutionary stage, the society had mechanical solidarity. Conscience collective, collective representations and repressive laws held the mechanical society together. In course of evolution, the mechanical society attains the stage of organic solidarity. In this society, there is differentiation - multiple of occupations, plural ethnicities and varying people. This functional-organic structure of society is held together by social density and contractual relations.

Durkheim defines modernity in the context of social solidarity. His thesis is: more there is differentiation, more there is modernity'. Modernity creates functional dependence. In a modern society, the people depend on one another and this keeps the society in a state of solidarity. Differentiation does not create disorganization; it creates dependence. And, therefore, for Durkheim, modernity is differentiation, it is stratification. More is a society stratified, greater is the level of modernity.

Georg Simmel: City and economy make modernity

Frisby in his recent work (1992) observes that of the founding fathers "Simmel is the first sociologist of modernity". Ritzer accounts for his modernist status as under:

Simmel is seen as investigating modernity primarily in two major interrelated sites: the city and the money economy. The city is where modernity is concentrated or intensified, whereas the money economy involves the diffusion of modernity, its extension.

Thus, for Simmel, modernity consists of city life and the diffusion of money. Simmel has put his ideas about modernity in his book *Philosophy of Money*. Foggi elaborates the money criterion of modernity in these words:

The first is that modernization brings with it a series of advantages to human beings, especially the fact that they are able to express various potentialities that are unexpressed, concealed and represented in premodern society Second, Simmel deals with the powerful effect of money on modern society. Finally, there is Simmel's concentration on the adverse consequences of money for modernity, especially alienation.

When we carefully analyze the definition of Simmel as interpreted by Foggi, the following points emerge:

1. Modernity is the process through which the hidden potentialities of men are ventilated. In other words, it gives opportunities to men to realize their power.
2. Money is substantial in human life. It gets manifestation through modernity.
3. Modernity is not without its bad effects. It alienates men from the vital processes of human life.

All the above four founding fathers who have defined modernity had opportunities to experience it in their life too. Whatever they have identified as elements of modernity can be presented in the following capsule:

Marx : Modernity is commodification.

Weber : Modernity is rationality.

Durkheim : Differentiation, i.e., stratification.

Simmel : City life and money economy.

The concept of modernity has been defined by all the founding fathers of sociology. The definitions are diverse and varying. Despite diversity in their comprehension and perception, the fact remains that they have touched upon all the major formations or manifestations of modernity. It can therefore be safely concluded that these classical theorists have done very well in doing sociology of modernity.

By 1920 all four of above classical sociological theorists were dead. As we have now entered the 21st century, it is obvious that the world would be very different than it was in 1920. While there is great disagreement over when the postmodern age began (assuming for the moment that it did), no one puts that data before 1920. The issue is whether the changes in the world since that time are modest and continuous with those associated with modernity, or are so dramatic and discontinuous that the contemporary world is better described by a new term — postmodern. Our guess is that in most of the

parts of world, modernity is still a continuing process. Habermas, the German modernist, argues that the project of modernity, which started after enlightenment, is still an incomplete project. And, then, postmodernity is multi-dimensional. It is never uniform. There are parts of a society, which are postmodern and still parts, which are simultaneously modern. We now turn to the definitions of modernity given by contemporary social theorists.

2.4 Emile Durkheim Theory of mechanical-organic solidarity: A shift towards modern society :

We have referred earlier to the conceptualization of modernity given by Emile Durkheim. Here, we discuss his theory. It falls within- the realm of classical theories of modernity. Durkheim is said to be one of the founding fathers of sociology. His theory in essence is a foundational one. He is a classical theorist whose work has enduring significance for sociological theorizing. Durkheim, in his *Division of Labour in Society* (1893), asked: “How does it come about that the individual, whilst becoming more autonomous, depends ever more closely upon society?” Throughout Durkheim’s writings, he consistently focused on the problem about the evolution of society from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity. In other words, with the coming up of industrialization and capitalism, the society instead of becoming disintegrated, gets cohesive and integrated. It is the modernity, which keeps people held together. In 1896, Durkheim was appointed a full professor of social science. As a professor he wrote three of his most important sociological works: *The Division of Labour in Society* (1893), *The Rules of Sociological Methods* (1895), and *Suicide* (1897).

Durkheim’s promotion of sociology was not simply academic and theoretical; he also stressed its practical importance. As he remarked in his first book, *The Division of Labour*, although sociology aims to study reality, it does not follow that “we should give up the idea of improving it”. On the contrary, “we would esteem our research not worth the labour of a single ounce if its interest were merely speculative”. Indeed, Durkheim was a witness to urbanization, and industrialization, which had come as a result of industrial revolution. He argued that the emergence of individualism would not disintegrate the society, on the other hand, there would be increase in the social solidarity of society. More there

would be division of labour, more there would be social solidarity. Differentiation or stratification holds society together. He insisted that industrialization does not disintegrate society, it rather holds society together.

Durkheim's theory of modernity is laid down in his book, *Division of Labour in Society*. Here, he has demonstrated how the division of labour and the development of autonomous individuality affect social solidarity. He gives here arguments in support of solidarity :

- (1) Determination of the function of the division of labour, that is, "the social needs to which it corresponds".
- (2) Determination of the "causes and conditions upon which it depends".
- (3) Description of 'normal' and 'abnormal' forms of the division of labour.

Types of solidarity: Mechanical and organic

Durkheim identified two types of social solidarity: *mechanical* and *organic*. *Mechanical solidarity* is like an inanimate solidarity, the parts of which cannot operate independently if the harmony and cohesion of the whole are to be maintained. For example, a clock cannot work if one of its parts malfunctions. *Organic solidarity* has an analogy with a living body, in which harmony and cohesion are produced by the interdependent operation of the parts. For example, the loss of a limb is a misfortune but not life threatening. Durkheim used these two terms to describe the function of the division of labour in a society, but they are purely conceptual. That is, they do not refer to any actual or specific society.

Mechanical solidarity

It is precisely a primitive or tribal society, in which the division of labour is minimal and individuality is zero. In this society, the individual does not belong to himself, but he is subordinate to society in all respects. The common consciousness in this type of society is primarily religious. Religion pervades the whole of social life which is made up almost entirely of common beliefs and practices. In this society, the resources - whatever they

are — are owned by the community as a whole. According to Durkheim, in mechanical society, the general cohesion of the people swallows up the individual within the group. The collective personality is the only one, and therefore, property itself is inevitably collective. Property can only become private property when the individual frees himself from the mass and becomes a personal, distinctive being as is the case in the organic societies. Thus, in a mechanical society, there is absence of modernity because of the following characteristics:

- (1) Individual is fully subordinate to his group and society.
- (2) Community resources are owned collectively by the community itself. There is no personal property. There is existence of only collective property.
- (3) *Collective conscience*: There are beliefs and sentiments held in common. Such a conscience keeps the tradition-bound society together. A criminal act does not shock the common consciousness because it is criminal but it becomes criminal when it offends the collective consciousness.
- (4) *Repressive law*: It is based on moral grounds. The sanctions in mechanical society consist of some injury, or at least some disadvantage imposed on the criminal with the intention of doing harm to him through his fortune, his honour, his life, his liberty or to deprive him of some object whose possession he enjoys.
- (5) *Restitutive laws*: These laws are embodied in civil law, procedural law, and administrative and constitutional law. They do not necessarily produce suffering for the criminal but consist in restoring the previous state of affairs.

To conclude, we would say that no society is static. It is always changing. The society which existed in Europe before the onset of industrialization was a mechanical or traditional society. Traditions and the form of collective conscience, repressive law and restitutive sanctions held this society together. It was communism where the individual was at a minimum.

Organic solidarity

When there emerged modern industrial society in Europe it was regarded by many that it will give rise to excessive individualism and there would be disruption, disintegration and even anarchy in the traditional society. The specialization which industrialism brought threatened social harmony and cohesion. Durkheim did not share this view. In *the Division of Labour* he put forward his thesis and said that the new emphasis on specialization did not, however, mean that social cohesion must be forfeit. On the contrary, the greater the individual autonomy and specialization, the greater the individual's dependence on society.

Durkheim's thesis is quite clear: when industrialization comes, inevitably there is specialization, that is, elaborate division of labour. For each job, there is an expert, a specialist. Specialization creates social stratification and stratification in this respect, means, functional interdependence. The dependence of individual despite his being autonomous, depends upon society and thus the society becomes integrated and cohesive. Division of labour, therefore, does not mean disintegration, it positively means cohesiveness and harmony.

In fact, the central question in the *Division of Labour* is, therefore, to find out how can the individual whilst becoming more autonomous depend even more closely upon society? Durkheim's finding is that modernity creates social solidarity and harmony. He observes :

In modern society the division of labour becomes the source - if not the sole, at least the main one - of social solidarity.

As people fulfil specific roles within modern, capitalist, industrial society - the mechanic, doctor, merchant, street sweeper, student, and so on - they become more dependent on others within society for the goods and services that they themselves do not have the time or the means to produce.

Characteristics of modernity

Durkheim has mentioned the following characteristics of modernity:

- (1) Specialization in different jobs and occupations, that is, social differentiation.
- (2) Elaborate social stratification.
- (3) Individuality.
- (4) Relations of contract.
- (5) Social density.

By offering final comments of Durkheim on modernity we would state that he was basically concerned about what he, as well as others, saw as the crisis of French culture, and modern European culture in general. This crisis, which characterizes many societies today, revolved round the pathologies of modern industrial society, including increased suicide rates, family and marital disruptions, economic dislocations and conflicts, and social injustice. He considered socialism and even communism to be expressions of concern about this social malaise, but not solutions. However, he was optimistic about the coming of modern industrial, capitalist society. In such a society harmony and cohesion were all the more important. To attain such a state of modern society individual rights need to be protected. It is in this context that he defines modernity as social differentiation and social stratification. In a word, social stratification is modernity.

2.5 Karl Marx :

Classical conflict theory

In the series of classical theories of modernity, Karl Marx has defined modernity as capitalist economy. He recognized the advances brought about by the transition from earlier societies to capitalism. However, in his work, he restricted himself largely to a critique of that economic system and its deformities such as alienation, exploitation and dehumanization. Marx is known for his theory of dialectical and historical materialism. While putting forward his dialectical materialism, Marx rejected the theory of Hegel who talked about metaphysical dialectics. Hegel's dominant philosophy at that time was that thought and mind were real and not the material world. He further argued that in our enquiry truth was sought, but never grasped, in that metaphysical world, that is, the world

of ideas. Hegel believed truth-seeking required the dialectic method, or the resolution of contradictions through struggle. This struggle was between being and non-being, but its resolution was seeking and becoming not arriving or completing. Thus, Hegel propounded that truth is pursued through negation, through becoming, and through the reconciliation of ideas.

Marx denied Hegel's proposition. For him, the real human life was, as he called, materialism. Our thoughts are derived from the material world in which we live. As there is dialectics in ideas, there is likewise dialectics in materialism. Marx put forward the thesis of dialectical materialism. It is the process of change in the real world of material, physical existence. Marx said that freedom and slavery are empirical realities and therefore "believe what you will, but work to change your material conditions, because they are the only reality". This is, in short, the crux of dialectical materialism.

Alienation

It is essential to refer to alienation when we discuss Marx's theory of modernity. As a matter of fact, any aspect of Marx cannot be discussed without mentioning his dialectical and historical materialism and alienation. Man's starting point of modernity is labour. It is essential to humanity. Marx argues that productive labour separates human beings from the lower members of the animal kingdom. There is an owner-worker-product-consumer syndrome and it explains man's alienation from his work and his product. The alienation of worker in his product means not only that his labour becomes an object, an external existence but that it exists outside him, independently, as something alien to him and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him. It means that the life which he has conferred on the object confronts him as something hostile and alien. Thus, the capitalist owners as well as the workers are alienated. In first place, capitalists regard the goods and services produced by the workers merely as things to sell and sources of profit. Capitalists do not care who makes or buys these items or how the workers who make them feel about the product of their labour, or how buyers use them. The capitalist's only concern is that items are produced, bought and paid for.

Capitalist economy

The crux of Marx's theory of modernity rests on capitalist economy. The strongest pillar of modernity is capitalism. Marx rejects the theory of capital economy and argues that there cannot be any harmonious relations in this economy. In this economy, the owner is the user of surplus value. And, this ends up in profiteering. There is enough accumulation and waste in capitalist, that is, modern societies. To summarize Marx's views on modernity, it could be said that modernity results from owner-worker-product-consumer relationship. It is profiteering. It is concerned with means of production, economic exploitation, money, commodification, and labour and surplus value. If we are asked to define modernity in a simple word, we would say that it is commodification.

2.6 Max Weber :

Theory of rational-bureaucratic society: Weber's classical theory of modernity

In the series of classical theories of modernity, there is Max Weber's theory of rational-bureaucratic society. The social thinkers of this period were concerned with the nature of modern, industrial society. They also deplored the social disorder that seemed to accompany modernization. Weber (1864-1920) was the product and witness of modern industrial society. He responded to the challenges given by his era. The central theme in his work was his concern with the problems of western civilization, especially the rationalization and demystification of all aspects of modern social life - "the disenchantment of the world". He was concerned with the radical transformations in social life that distinguished modern from traditional society.

Weber analyzed modern capitalism and explained its features in his works. He argued that ideas, especially religious ideas, played an important part in the formulation of modern rational capitalism. His views on modernity are also reflected in his analyses of the nature of power and authority, the characteristics of bureaucratic organizations, the nature and form of western art, the characteristics and importance of city development, and the nature and importance of world religions. He concluded that modern society was increasingly a place in which the transcendental world of gods was giving way to science

and the rational calculation of social actions.

Weber labels the modern society as a capitalist-bureaucratic society. The chief characteristic of this society is rationality which is based on mathematics and exact and rational experiment. According to him, modernity is rationalization. His views on western economic rationalization are found in his two-volume book, *Economy and Society* (1925) compiled by his wife, Marianne Weber and Johannes Wincklemann. Defining modernity with reference to rationalization of modern capitalism, Weber observes:

Rationalization means the process of making life more efficient and predictable by bringing out individuality and spontaneity in life.... Rational capitalism is the most fateful force in our modern life.

Weber further noted in the *Protestant Ethic and the Capitalism*

(1904-5) that the “pursuit of wealth stripped of its religious and ethical meaning” produced “specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart”. Weber was conscious of the fact that capitalism had existed in a number of societies in various historical periods, but he claimed that the “sober bourgeois capitalism” of the west had developed “types, forms, and directions which had never existed elsewhere”. What is special about Weber is that he contested Marx and argued that ethics played an important role in the development of capitalism instead of “material factors”.

Weber’s methodology was a combination of sociology and psychology. He pleaded for the development of a social science, which would be empirical science of concrete reality. For him, sociology studied the interpretative understanding of social action. He called such an understanding as *Verstehen*. He tried to explain the modern capitalist society by ideal type and pursued to find out the role of rationality. He constructed ideal type of social action, domination and bureaucracy. In all these ideal types, bureaucracy played the determining role.

It is in his classical theory of modernity that Weber has developed a framework which helps us to understand and analyze modern capitalism. The core value of modernity, for Weber, is rationality. It is on the basis of rationality that the modern society is

characterized as bureaucratic. Formal domination is also due to rationality. While defining and characterizing modernity, Weber calls modern capitalism as bourgeois capitalism. He writes:

It is only in the modern western world that rational capitalistic enterprises with fixed capital, free labour, the rational specialization and combination of functions, and the allocation of productive functions on the basis of capitalistic enterprises, bound together in a market economy, are to be found.

Thus, the main features of Weber's classical theory of modernity are as under:

1. Rationality is the most fateful force in modernity.
2. Western capitalism is bourgeois capitalism.
3. Modern capitalism is rational capitalism.
4. Religious ideas (ethics) and not material factors explain not only capitalism but every aspect of social reality.
5. Modernity abandons transcendental world and gives dominance to science and rational calculation of social action.
6. In modernity, politics comes in direct competition with religious ethics. *Sermon on the Mount* says: *Resist no evil. And the state commits evil.*
7. Western capitalism depends on science especially based on mathematics and rational experiment.
8. Rational pursuit of gain is spirit of capitalism.
9. Capitalism is profiteering and work is a moral warning.
10. Modernity is essentially a market economy.

2.7 Money exchange and alienation theory of Simmel Zygmunt Bauman (1987) has defined modern age, taking into consideration the available literature on the theories of modernity, as below :

The modern age defined itself as, above all, the kingdom of reason and rationality.

Bert N. Adams and R.A. Sydie have made an interesting comparison between theories of modernity of Max Weber and Georg Simmel :

Max Weber defined modernity as rationalization. Georg Simmel, a contemporary, compatriot, and friend of Weber's had a similar opinion. Both theorists pointed out that the benefits of rationalization and industrialization, embodied in science and technology, were offset by the environmental and military excesses that scientific and technological 'progress' allows. Furthermore, modern life produces a great deal of alienation and anomie among individuals. Thus, these two German sociologists questioned the idea that rationality has triumphed in all areas of social life.

Quite like Weber, Simmel propounded the theory of modernity in terms of the hegemony of rationality in human life. He also argued that modernity is not always beneficial. It has its gloomy side too. There is alienation in industrial society; there is anomie among individuals. But this is just a simplistic way of looking at modernity and rationalization. The basic tenets of modernization theory consists of money and exchange relations.

Georg Simmel (1858-1918) was a Jew by religion. He was a German sociologist. He was party to Max Weber and Ferdinand Tonnies for the establishment of sociology in the German university system. For him, sociology was the study of social interactions. The modes of interactions take different forms. And, thus, sociology is concerned with the separation of form and content in exchange relationships. Frisby (1984) has analyzed Simmel's theory of modernity with reference to latter's major work, *The Philosophy of*

Money (1900). Simmel says that social relations are transformed by modern money economy. And social interaction is exchange. For him, exchange is the sociological phenomenon *sui generis*, an original form and function of social life. Money, according to him, is a means, a material or an example for the presentation of relations in the most profound currents of individual life and history.

Money makes modern society. It is a concrete expression and representation of the economic value of things. Money is, therefore, only valuable because it is the means for the acquisition of values. Exchange based on money has two basic benefits:

- (1) It contributes to self-sufficiency and individual freedom. By making exchanges and interactions more impersonal, money decreases individual dependency on others. For example, Simmel suggested that the wage labourer has more freedom than the peasant.
- (2) Money allows exchanges between individuals located at distances from one another and thus extends the number of social interactions. Simmel argues that the importance of money for the development of individuality is thus very closely related to the importance it possesses for the enlargement of social groups.

Modernity, therefore, has its powerful ingredient of money and exchange. The second ingredient of modernity lies in the city life. The city is where modernity is concentrated or intensified. Weber also observed that the beginning of modern society is from the city. In his book, *The City* (1921), he analyzes the main traits of modern society. Simmel finds all the traits of a modern society in the city life. It is here that there is frequent exchange of money and total absence of barter. It is in the city that the individual experiences modernity. He remarks :

The tumult of metropolis gave rise to a mania for traveling. The wild pursuit of competition and... the typically modern disloyalty with regard to taste, style, opinions and personal relationships. The excitement of metropolitan existence was tied inextricably to the anomie and alienation that he perceived in modern life.

Simmel's theory of modernity has, therefore, the following features :

- (1) Modernity has its cradle in city life.
- (2) Money is the medium through which exchange relationship is established. Exchange, therefore, is a *sui generis*.

- (3) Rationalization is defined as modernity by Simmel.
- (4) Market is the place where most of the economic exchanges take place.

2.7 **Sum Up**

To this point we have examined the classical theories of modernity propounded by the founders of sociology. These early sociological theorists struggled to outline a new discipline in the world witnessing the era of reason, social justice, French Revolution and above all industrial revolution. It was also an era of the rise of individual automation and fall of feudalism. As a response to the challenge, the classical theorists constructed theories of modernity. They also established several basic schools of thought that are still influential in sociology. The pioneers' theories were evolutionary and functional which propagated status quo. They claim that society is good, self-corrective and consensual like an organism. Because these theories were produced within western capitalist societies, they justify capitalism. However, these theorists have also to say something bad about modern society. They have referred to situations of anomie and exploitation. Among these classical theorists, as Frisby says, Weber, Durkheim and Simmel have been called the sociologists of modernity.

EUROCENTRICISM

Structure :**3.1 Objectives****3.2 Introduction****3.3 Conceptual Frame Work****3.2 Introduction**

Europe, Modernity, and Eurocentrism allows modernity to present itself not only as innocent but also as a solving the blame of its own victims.

In this manner, modern reason is transcended not as denial of reason as such, but rather as denial of the violent, Euro-centric, developmentalist, hegemonic reason. What is at stake here is what I have called “transmodernity,” a worldwide ethical liberation project in which alterity, which was part and parcel of modernity, would be able to fulfil itself. The fulfillment of modernity has nothing to do with a shift from the potentialities of modernity to the actuality of European modernity. Indeed, the fulfillment of modernity would be a transcendental shift where modernity and its denied alterity, its victims, would mutually fulfill each other in a creative process. The transmodern project is the mutual fulfillment of the “analectic” solidarity of center / periphery, woman / man, mankind / earth, western culture / peripheral postcolonial cultures, different races, different ethnicities, different classes. It should be noted here that this mutual fulfillment of solidarity does not take place by pure denial but rather by subsumption from alterity.

All of this implies that what is at stake here is not a premodern project that would

consist of a folkloric aformation of the past, nor is it an antimodern project of the kind put forward by conservative, right-wing, populist or fascist groups. Finally, it is not only a postmodern project that would deny modernity and would critique all reason, thus falling into a nihilist irrationalism or a pure aformation of difference without conne nsurability. This is a trans modern project that would emerge by real subsumption of the rational emancipatory character of modernity and itsdenied alterity (the other of modernity) by way of the denial of modernity'ssacri?cial mythical character (which justifies modernity's innocenceover its victims and, by this token, becomes irrational in a contradictory manner). It is true that the culture that will subsequently produce moder-nity formally developed in certain medieval European cities, especially inthose of the Renaissance quattrocento. However, modernity only truly began when the historical conditions of its real origin were met: in1492, whena real worldwide expansion took place, when the colonial world became organized and the usufruct of its victims' lives began. Modernity really began in 1492: that is my thesis. The real overcoming of modernity (as sub-sumption and not merely as Hegelian *Aufhebung*) is then the subsumptionof its emancipatory, rational, European character transcended as a world-wide liberation project from its denied alterity. Transmodernity is a new liberation project with multiple dimensions: political, economic, ecological, erotic, pedagogic, religious. Thus there are two contra dictory paradigms: that ofamere Euro-centric modernity, and that of a subsumed modernity from a postcolonialworldwide perspective, where it achieved an ambiguous double functionas an emancipatory project and as a mythical culture of violence. Theful?llment of the second paradigm is what I have called a process of transmodernity; it should be noted here that this second paradigm is theonly one that includes the modernity/alterity of the world. In TzvetanTodorov's.

Nous et les autres (1989), the "us" refers to the Europeans and the"others" refers to the peoples of the peripheral world. Modernity de?ned itself as an emancipatory project with respect to the"us,"but did not realizeits mythical-sacri?cial character with respect to the "others." In a sense,one could say that Montaigne (1967, 208) somehow perceived this when hewrote, "Thus, we can call them barbaric with respect to the standards of our reason, but not with respect to ourselves, given that we surpass them inall kinds of outrages."

Five hundred years after the beginning of modern Europe, the *Human Development*

Report 1992 (35) issued by the United Nations reveals that the wealthiest 20 percent of humanity (principally Western Europe, the United States, and Japan) consume 82 percent of the world's resources.

Meanwhile, the poorest 60 percent (the historical periphery of the world-system) consume only 5.8 percent of these resources. This amounts to an accumulation never before seen in the history of humanity, a structural in-justice never imagined on a world scale. Is this not the offspring of modernity, of the world-system started by Western Europe

Hegel :

During the colonial era, the naïve assumption of Western superiority was given authority by thinkers such as Hegel, who developed a “universal” theory of history, which was, in essence, a theory of European history in which the rest of the World was taken to be objects rather than subjects. For Hegel, as Said has pointed out, Asia and Africa were “static, despotic, and irrelevant to world history.”¹ Hegel's view of history was highly influential, on both Marxist and humanist historiography. His rather extreme ethnocentrism should thus not be swept under the rug, but analyzed as a central aspect of his thought. Since Hegel, Ethnocentrism has often blinded the West to the parochialism of its supposed “universals”.

Particularly egregious are the attempts by thinkers such as Hegel to define as universal features that are, in fact, quite culturally specific. This includes his “universal history”, which saw Europe and America as the pinnacles of human evolution. Hegel wrote, for example, “universal history goes from East to West. Europe is absolutely the end of universal history. Asia is the beginning.”

This idea was clearly a justification of Western colonial exploitation. But Hegel took the idea even further. Since his “history” is solely defined in Eurocentric terms, any act committed by the Europeans, no matter how reprehensible, is justifiable as a necessary step in human evolution. Hegel wrote that :

“Because history is the configuration of the Spirit in the form of event, the people which receives the Spirit as its natural principle... is the one that dominates in that epoch of world history... Against the absolute right of that people who actually are the carriers of the world Spirit, the spirit of other peoples has no other right.”

Hegel saw the evolution of human history as a unified totality, proceeding via the evolution of the “world spirit”. The “world spirit”, for Hegel, was Western, with other cultures subsumed to the dustbin of history, forced either to adapt to the West or be trampled underfoot by this “world spirit”, which in Hegel’s writing appears as a complex metaphor for the reality of Western aggression. Even within the West, Germany occupies a special destiny. Hegel writes :

“The Germanic Spirit (germanische Geist) is the Spirit of the New World (neuen Welt), whose end is the realization of the absolute truth, as the infinite self-determination of liberty that has for its content its proper absolute form. The principle of the German Empire ought to accommodate the Christian religion. The destiny of the Germanic peoples is that of serving as the bearer of the Christian principle.”

All non-Europeans are mere objects in the hands of the Europeans, under this theory of history. When applying his theories to Africans, Hegel arrived at the following blatantly racist conclusions :

“It is characteristic of the blacks that their consciousness has not yet even arrived at the intuition of any objectivity, as for example, of God or the law, in which humanity relates to the world and intuits its essence. ...He [the black person] is a human being in the rough.”

Colonialization was the teleological imperative by which consciousness in the form of the superior Europeans must appropriate the others. He wrote :

“By a dialectic which is appropriate for surpassing itself, in the first place, such a society is driven to look beyond itself to new consumers. Therefore it seeks its means of subsistence among other peoples which are inferior to it with respect to

the resources which it has in excess, such as those of industry. This expansion of relations also makes possible that colonization to which, under systematic or sporadic form, a fully established civil society is impelled. Colonization permits it that one part of its population, located on the new territory, returns to the principle of family property and, at the same time, procures for itself a new possibility and field of labor.”

Hegel also applied this “logic” specifically to his analysis of India. He depicted the British colonialization of India as an inevitable stage in his process of “evolution”. He wrote :

“The British, or rather the East India Company, are the masters of India because it is the fatal destiny of Asian empires to subject themselves to the Europeans.”

Reading through Hegel’s works, it is apparent that he based conclusions such as this on the rather warped assumption that India has no history. His clearest statement to this effect occurs as follows :

“If we had formerly the satisfaction of believing in the antiquity of the Indian wisdom and holding it in respect, we now have ascertained through being acquainted with the great astronomical works of the Indians, the inaccuracy of all figures quoted. Nothing can be more confused, nothing more imperfect than the chronology of the Indians; no people which attained to culture in astronomy, mathematics, &c., is as incapable for history; in it they have neither stability nor coherence. It was believed that such was to be had at the time of Wikramaditya, who was supposed to have lived about 50 B.C., and under whose reign the poet Kalidasa, author of Sakontala, lived. But further research discovered half a dozen Wikramadityas and careful investigation has placed this epoch in our eleventh century. The Indians have lines of kings and an enormous quantity of names, but everything is vague.”

This is an important passage for two reasons. First, this assumption has been very influential, and its consequences continue to be felt today. Secondly, Hegel gives this as the reason why he had lost respect for India’s cultural heritage. Yet his conclusion is

baseless, and can be critiqued on several points. Classical Indian astronomy was no more inaccurate than the classical Greek Ptolemaic system, which Europe followed until the seventeenth century, and in many respects the former was more accurate. Regarding the Vikramaditya era, it is true that there were several kings with that name in Europe (just as there were many kings named Louis, Charles, etc. in Europe), but it does not follow from this that the Indians confused them. There in fact never was confusion concerning the Vikramaditya era, starting 57 BCE, and Hegel is absolutely wrong that this era begins in the eleventh century. One might argue that there never was a king of that name who lived at that time, but one could also argue that there was no Christ born at the year zero, but such a critique would not “prove” that the West has no history; the history based on such a chronology would still be sound, regardless of the status of the legendary founder of the era. It is interesting that he takes this rather inconsequential reason for carte blanche dismissal of Indian wisdom, as if the contents of a text are false merely because it is misdated.

3.3 Conceptual Framework

Such mistaken views concerning Indian history (or lack thereof) are at the root of much of the dismissal of India and things Indian. Also, once it is established in the minds of an oppressed people that they have no history of their own, other than what has been gifted to them by the oppressors, then it also legitimizes (and glorifies) historical scholarship by the oppressors. In fact, many a Macaulayite today is grateful to the colonialists for having given him a sense of his own history which, the Macaulayites were programmed to believe, they never had of their own. As goes history, so go identity and values. This re-engineering is how Indians were conditioned to believe that their tradition requires them to be world negating, to leave materialistic progress to Europeans as it was against their own ethos. In fact, since giving up wealth could be seen as very pious, why bother if colonialists took it over?

Karl Marx :

The false perception that India was a stagnant, ahistorical land was further perpetuated by Karl Marx. Marx described India as being caught in what he called the

“Asiatic Mode of Production”. He posited that India was trapped in a stagnant, unhistorical economic state in which “Oriental despots” wielding absolute power governed unchanging, stratified villages. His analysis was flawed by a serious ignorance of the actual economic history of India, and of the numerous underlying causes of decline. (This is why to this day, Marxists do not wish to encourage scholarship on India’s Traditional Knowledge Systems, as the historical record clearly refutes the belief that there was no progress on the materialistic front from within the indigenous culture.) From a certain perspective, the greatest despots in India were not Oriental but Occidental, i.e., the British.

These words were written in “The Future Results of British Rule in India’ on August 8, 1853 in the concluding of a series of articles on India, that were published in the ‘New York Daily Tribune’. In a letter to Engels, Marx claimed that he had written these casual pieces primarily for financial reasons and that India was “not his department”:

“India, then, could not escape the fate of being conquered, and the whole of her past history, if anything, is the history of the successive conquests she has undergone. Indian society has no history at all, at least no known history. What we call its history, is but the history of the successive intruders who founded their empires on the basis of that unresisting and unchanging society... From the Indian natives, reluctantly and sparingly educated at Calcutta, under English superintendence, a fresh class is spring up, endowed with the requirements for government and imbued with European science. Steam has brought India into regular and rapid communication with Europe, has connected its chief ports with the whole south-eastern ocean, and has re-vindicated it from the isolated position which was the prime law of its stagnation.”

Max Mueller :

The predator-prey mentality of foreign rulers and scholars working on the ancient texts of India did not fail to influence the famous Max Mueller. This is reflected in one of the letters by Prof. Mueller addressed to the Duke of Orgoil, the then Secretary of State for India. Mueller wrote on 16th Dec. 1868 :

“The ancient religion of India is totally doomed and if Christianity doesn’t step in whose fault will it be.”

Furthermore, in a letter addressed to his wife in 1868, Prof. Max Mueller wrote :

“I hope I shall finish that work and feel convinced that though I shall not live to see it, yet this edition of mine and translation of Vedas will hereafter tell to a great extent on the fate of India and on the growth of millions of the souls in this country.”

In the same letter, he further observes:

“It [Veda] is the root of their religion and to show them what the root is, I feel sure, the only way of uprooting all that has been sprung from it during the last three thousand years.”

The text of his letters is self-explanatory to the fact that scholars like Max Mueller often started studying Sanskrit with ulterior motives. The modern condition demonstrates that he was more or less successful in his vision.

Monier Williams :

Monier Williams another important European scholar who was hard pressed by the Church. He wrote :

“When the walls of the mighty fortress of Brahmanism are encircled, undermined and finally stormed by the soldiers of cross, the victory of Christianity must be signal and complete.”

In his preface to his famous Sanskrit-English Dictionary, as the Professor of the prestigious Boden Chair at Oxford, Monier Williams reveals the objective of founding the Chair for Sanskrit studies by Col. Boden as to convert the natives of India into Christianity. He writes thus :

“I must draw attention to the fact that I am only the second occupant of the Boden Chair, and that its founder, Col. Boden, stated most explicitly in his will

(dated Aug. 15, 1811) that special object of his munificent bequest was to promote the translation of the scriptures into Sanskrit; so as to enable his countrymen to proceed in the conversion of the natives of India to the Christian Religion.”

Husserl

The prevalent view of most modern Western scholars is that European tradition is not simply one cultural tradition among others. The European self identity is predicated upon its distinct achievements in philosophy and pure theory, and as such, has a unique global mission to fulfill.

Husserl claimed: “Europe alone can provide other traditions with a universal framework of meaning and understanding. They will have to Europeanize themselves, whereas we, if we understand ourselves properly, will never, for example, Indianize ourselves. The Europeanization of all foreign parts of mankind is the destiny of the earth.”

Eurocentrism Today :

Enrique Dussel has written a remarkable book on Eurocentrism, focusing on the European conquest of America and the subsequent ‘construction’ of history to depict it as the miracle of European triumph. He writes :

“The traditional Eurocentric thesis, flourishing in the United States, modernity’s culmination, is that modernity expanded to the barbarian cultures of the South undoubtedly in need of modernization. One can only explain this new-sounding but age-old thesis by returning to medieval Europe to discover the motives which produced modernity and permitted its dissemination. Max Weber first posed the question of world history Eurocentrically :

“Which chain of circumstances has resulted in the fact that on Western soil and only there, cultural phenomena have been produced which, as we represent it, show signs of evolutionary advance and universal validity?”

Weber continues :

“Neither scientific, artistic, governmental, nor economic evolution has led to the modes of rationalization proper to the Occident.”

Europe possessed, according to this paradigm, exceptional internal characteristics which permitted it to surpass all other cultures in rationality. This thesis, which adopts a Eurocentric (as opposed to world) paradigm, reigns not only in Europe and the United States, but also among intellectuals in the peripheral world. The pseudo-scientific periodization of history into Antiquity, the Middle (preparatory) Ages, and finally the Modern (European) Age is an ideological construct which deforms world history. One must break with this reductionist horizon to open to a world and planetary perspective - and there is an ethical obligation toward other cultures to do so.

Chronology reflects geopolitics. According to the Eurocentric paradigm, modern subjectivity especially developed between the times of the Italian Renaissance and the Reformation and of the Enlightenment in Germany and the French Revolution. Everything occurred in Europe.”

INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF MODERNITY

Structure**4.1 Objectives****4.2 Introduction****4.3 Multidimensions****4.4 Dynanism****4.1 Objectives**

After going through this chapter you will be equip with

- ❖ Dimensions of Modernity
- ❖ Contemporary Theory of Modernity

It would be mistaken to believe that the whole of Europe and America have passed through the evolutionary process of modernization and the Asian countries continue to witness the situation of modernity even today. This is not the reality. There are contemporary theorists who establish that in the European countries, modernity is still a continuing process, an unfinished project. In India and other Asian countries, larger parts have the hegemony of tradition on the affairs of the people. However, it is argued by theorists like Anthony Giddens and Jurgen Habermas that in the late modernity some of the advanced countries have attained the status of postmodern society. In a larger way, the European-American countries are between tradition and modernity. It is never all

modernity neither all postmodernity.

In this part of the chapter we shall discuss some of the contemporary theories of modernity. There are several theorists who have provided a theoretical framework for modernity. Here, we shall confine ourselves to the theories of Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck, George Ritzer, Zygmunt Bauman and Jurgen Habermas only.

These contemporary theorists of modernity have in their own way, and within their own perspectives, explained the forms, and contents of modern society. For instance, Giddens talks about different stages of modernity, for him there being multiple modernities: radical modernity, high modernity and late modernity. He argues that today's modern world is quite different from the modern world of classical thinkers. It shows that modernity is not one, it is multiple. Beck theorizes modernity in its worse form - it is a risk society, full of dangers. Ritzer, on the other hand, defines modernity in terms of hyperrationality. Bauman's theory of modernity is similar to Beck's theory. Bauman labels modernity nothing less than a holocaust, i.e., total destruction of mankind. And, then, there is Habermas who argues that Europe has still to scale its share of modernity. It is an ongoing project, still unfinished. We discuss these contemporary theorists in the following paragraphs:

Giddens' theory of late modernity : It is multi-dimensional

Francis Fukuyama, in his essay "The End of History" (1989) tried to establish that there has been triumph of liberalism in U.S. and Europe. This has further been supported by the disintegration of Soviet Russia in 1989-90. These fateful evidences led Fukuyama to define the features of modernity. He argued that socialism is dead and liberalism is the sole remaining legitimate political philosophy. He also advocated that liberal democracy is the agent of progress and capitalism is the only viable economic system. And thus political ideological conflict was being steadily displaced by universal democratic reason and market-oriented thinking. Fukuyama's analysis or theory of modernity thus carries the features of liberalism, capitalism and democracy. There is yet another theorist of modernity, Callinicos. According to him, modernity is capitalist modernity. It is the capitalist nature of modern societies and states which gives them their distinctive character. Viewed from these theoretical variants, Giddens, drawing heavily from the thoughts of Marx among

others, does so in a critical way, emphasizing the multi-dimensional nature of modernity, its complex causal patterns and institutional logics and the inherently contingent qualities of political and social change.

In Giddens' view, modernity has multi-dimensions. It has four main institutional aspects: (a) capitalism (the system of production of commodities for markets, in which wage labour is also a commodity); (b) industrialism (the application of inanimate sources of power through productive techniques for the transformation of nature), (c) coordinated administrative power focused through surveillance (the control of information and the monitoring of the activities of subject populations by states and other organizations); and (d) military power (the concentration of the means of violence in the hands of the state). These four institutional dimensions of modernity are irreducible to one another, because the form and logic of each one are quite different from those of the others. The development and dynamics of military power and warfare, for example, affected the shape and structure of capitalist development as well as particular patterns of class and class conflict, and helped generate an alternative power system of nation-states.

In Giddens' judgement, each of the four institutional dimensions consists of a distinctive set of causal processes and structure. Taken together, however, they provide a framework for understanding some of the central features, developments and tensions in modern societies.

Giddens has produced 31 books, published in 21 languages, and more than 200 articles and reviews. He is better known than Luchmann not only in the English-speaking world, but in most of the scholarly world. He has been an alumni of London School of Economics. His first three books were on Weber, Durkheim and the major 19th century theorists including Marx. His best known theoretical contribution is on structuration. Structuration means to produce structure.

Besides structuration, Giddens' second major concern is what he calls *later modernity*. This has been his major interest since the beginning of 1990s. By modernity, Giddens refers :

to the institutions and modes of behaviour established first of all in post-feudal

Europe, but which in the twentieth century increasingly have become world-historical in their impact. Modernity can be understood as roughly equivalent to the industrialized world, so long as it be recognized that industrialism is not its only institutional dimension.

Kivisto (1998) has interpreted Giddens' definition of modernity and says that Giddens speaks of "late modern society, not postmodern or post-industrial society. By this means he emphasizes historical continuity and change, rather than disjuncture". In fact, capitalism is a highly competitive system of production with labour markets operating on a global scale. And, industrialism which refers to the use of *machine technology* to control and transform nature. Besides industry, the most recognizable feature of this late modern world is the nation-state. In addition, Giddens also refers to the importance of communication in tying the modern world together. The nation-state provides the opportunity for democracy, for individual agency within a complex world with such a framework of theory modernity bids farewell to gods and tradition and tries to attain a modern world for reflexive self-regulations. It means that by self-regulation we can make out our own history.

Giddens has described the modern world as a juggernaut. It is the advanced stage of modernity. Because of its advanced stage, he calls it late modernity also. Modernity is like a powerful machine. If it is not controlled meaningfully, it can be highly harmful to society. But, if taken up cautiously, it can be beneficial also. Here is the way Giddens describes the juggernaut of modernity :

Juggernaut is a runaway engine of enormous power which collectively as human beings, we can drive to some extent but which also threatens to rush out of control and which could tend itself asunder. The juggernaut crushes those who resist it and while it sometimes seems to have a steady path, there are times when it veers away erratically in directions we cannot foresee. The ride is not always unpleasant or unrewarding: it can often be exhilarating and charged with hopeful anticipation. But, so long as the institutions of modernity endure, we shall never be able to

control completely either the path or the pace of the journey. In turn, we shall never be able to feel entirely secure, because the terrain across which it runs is fraught with risks of high consequences.

Modernity does not provide a cakewalk to society. If it is highly beneficial for the people, it is equally dangerous. It requires proper handling. And, it is here that Giddens' theory of structuration fits well. If the actions of the individual are not rational, modernity could lead one to doom and holocaust.

Multi-dimensions of modernity

As mentioned earlier, modernity consists of four basic institutions: (1) capitalism, (2) industrialism, (3) administrative power, and (4) military power. *Capitalism* includes commodity production, private ownership of capital, propertyless wage labour and a class system derived from these characteristics. *Industrialism* involves the case of power sources and machinery to produce goods. These two characteristics of modernity given by Giddens are not new. Other theorists have also mentioned about these. However, the later two characteristics are special to Giddens. *Administrative power* gives state to supervise the activities of the subject populations. It is power of surveillance. It is to keep close watch on the activities of the citizens. The final institution of modernity is the *military power*. The nation-state controls the means of violence. The four institutions of modernity which constitute the theory of Giddens are presented in a tabular form as under :

Institutional Complexes of Modernity

<i>Institution of Modernity</i>	<i>Types of Functions</i>	<i>Objectives of Modern Society</i>
Capitalism	Production, Private ownership, wage labour, class system	Socialized economic organization
Industrialism	Use of power sources, science, technology	System of planetary care
Administrative power	Surveillance capacity	Co-ordinated global order
Military power	Peace	Transcendence of war

4.4 Dynamism of modernity: Distanciation, power, trust and risk

The broader framework of modernity consists of the four institutions discussed above. The late modernity has a few more characteristics, namely, distanciation, power, trust and risk, which also need to be explained as sub-parts of Giddens' theory. By its nature modernity is dynamic and the dynamism is maintained by these sub-parts :

- (1) *Distanciation*: Giddens argues that in the present age of fast communication "relationships are no longer tied to specific locale". It is distanciation - shortening of distance. In fact, distanciation is not new. Since the invention of morse code and airplane, the remote places were brought closer. But things are still faster in the late modern world. Computer has the wonder. Now, for the communicative world, the slogan is: *reach out and touch someone*. And in the age of e-mail it takes only a few seconds to touch someone in any part of the globe.
- (2) *Power*: In his theory of structuration Giddens has used the term 'agency'. Agency in this context means actors. Giddens argues that the actors in their practices produce and reproduce the structure. He employs his theory of structuration in

the analysis of modernity. The actor or the agency has power. And, this power gives the actor the capacity to make decisions and do things. Power, therefore, also has an important part. in modernity. While explaining the concept of power, Giddens writes:

Power is not a resource; the media are resources, and so are social connections. Power both constrains and enables. Power as constraint is not force, {t is restriction of choice. In other words, even without the power that goes with domination, individuals in the modern world still have a certain amount of power (or control) over the choices they make. Power, thus, is not only domination, but also informative capacity.

- (3) *Trust*: Another sub-part of modernity is trust. In the modern world we have a variety of institutions. A few of them are new to us. We cannot work in this new world without these institutions and therefore the only alternative left with us is to have trust in them. Giddens defines trust as “the vesting of confidence in persons or in abstract systems, made on the basis of a ‘leaf of faith’ which brackets ignorance or lack of information”.
- (4) *Risk*: Living in a society is never without risk. Even in the past there were always some risks in the society. But these risks are manifold today. There are, Giddens says, risks involved in politics, economics, technology and other aspects of life in a highly complex and differentiated society. He emphasizes that the individual power to make choice also lands him to risk. It is in this society that an individual takes several precautions to meet the risk in a successful way. People attempt to lessen risk through planning. A good example is health or life insurance. Giddens calls this as the colonization of the future.

Giddens lists four risks that are specific to the late modern world. These are: (1) state surveillance, (2) escalation of military power, (3) collapse of economic growth, and (4) the ecological and environmental limits that constrain capitalism.

We can summarize the Giddens’ theory of modernity in the words of Adams and

Sydie (2001) as under :

... the modern world involves both human agency and constraint, which together are close to the definition of structuralism. That world includes distanciation, power, trust, risk, and the created self.

Beck's theory of risk society

Ulrich Beck is the contemporary theorist of modernity. He is a German sociologist who has written extensively about risk and globalization. He argues that the risk which is inherent in modern society would contribute towards the formation of a global risk society. In a modern society, there is technological change. And technology produces new forms of risks and we are constantly required to respond and adjust to these changes. The risk society, he argues, is not limited to environmental and health risks alone, it includes a whole series of interrelated changes within contemporary social life such as shifting employment patterns, heightened *job* insecurity, declining influence of tradition and custom, erosion of traditional family patterns and democratization of personal relations.

What is particular about the modern risk society is that the hazards of risk do not remain restricted to one country only. In the age of globalization, these risks affect all countries and all social classes. They have global, not merely personal consequences. Similarly, many forms of manufactured risk, such as those concerning human health and the environment, cross-national boundaries. Beck's theory of modernity is presented in his book, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* (1992). Defining risk, he says :

Industrial society has created many new dangers of risks unknown in previous ages. The risks associated with global warming are one example.

In the present era of industrialization, the nature of risk has undergone tremendous change. Earlier, there was no absence of risk. But these risks were natural dangers or hazards. There was earthquake, there was epidemic, there was famine and there were floods. But, the risks in the modern society are created by our own social development

and by the development of science and technology. Sometimes, we fail to ascertain the risk involved in a particular aspect of technology. For instance, no one quite knows what risks are involved in the production of genetically modified foods.

TRADITION AND MODERNITY

Structure

- 5.1 Objectives**
- 5.2 Introduction**
- 5.3 Tradition and Modernity**
- 5.4 Specific Indian Society**
- 5.5 Tradition in Indian Society**
- 5.6 Debate on Tradition and Modernity**
- 5.3 Tradition and Modernity**

Yogendra Singh says that Indian society has entered into a new phase of development. There has occurred a phenomenal change in the institutions of kinship, marriage, caste, power and economy. The total social stratification has taken a new shape. Even, the tribal India, which was based on kinship and barter economy, has entered into the mainstream structure. Indian traditions have increasingly become modern. Some of the segments of society in advanced industrial cities have come to the threshold of postmodernity. The weaker sections scheduled tribes, scheduled castes and women - have now become extremely 'sensitive' and up in arms on any trivial provocation. A wakening has touched a point where these "wretched of the earth" are ready to commit any kind of mutiny.

There is enough research material on social and cultural change in India. Caste, family, kinship and village have kept our sociologists and anthropologists fully occupied with these institutions. Our ethnographic material is perhaps the richest in the world. We have also constructed a few concepts, which help us to analyze the trend of social change. But, the concepts are highly sectarian, oriented to the ideology of the majority groups or specific culture groups. In such a situation, when our focus of enquiry is on modernization and its impact on traditional Indian society, we are prompted to ask the question: Is the direction of social change towards building India a modern society? Or, does our massive social change lead us to develop a Hindu society dominated by caste, religion and culture region? It appears that the vast social change material is not subjected to any modernist analyses? We therefore propose to discuss the available research data with the perspective of modernization. In other words, modernization is the focus for our discussion in the present chapter. There are a few characteristics of modernity, which are universally accepted, and we shall see as to what extent these have been achieved by the Indian society.

The modernity, which the western countries witnessed, emerged from the social structure which characterized these countries. It must be observed that modernity is multidimensional and the social structure determines these dimensions. In western countries, there was feudal and the feudalism had its own variants. The feudalism of Eastern Europe was different from that of Western Europe. As a result of it Western Europe had capitalism earlier than Eastern Europe. And, further, the capitalism also varied according to the particular social structure of country. It is on this account that there is no single modernity; there are, in fact, multiple modernities.

Modernity, which has come to India, is specific to Indian culture. Before the emergence of modernity, European countries witnessed a few revolutions - French Revolution, American War of Independence and Bloodless Revolution of England. Besides, the industrial revolution of 18th century also appeared in England and later on diffused to other parts of Europe. There have been various factors for the emergence of modernity in Europe. The European traditions likewise were also specific to European social structure. All this did not happen in India. The modernity, which is

witnessed in India, is shaped and determined by its multiple traditions. We did not have any revolution of the kind of French or Russian Revolution. Nor, the industrial revolution took place here. However, we had a long struggle largely non-violent but occasionally violent also for the attainment of independence. Indian society has had its own history of ups and downs. Anchored by these historical and cultural upheavals, the modernity and its resultant capitalism have taken a specific pattern in our country. At this stage of our discussion it is important to raise the question: To what extent the Indian modernity carries universal characteristics of European modernity? We shall attempt to answer this question in the present chapter.

Specificities of Indian society

Indian society has its own particularities, its own identity. K.S. Singh has recently come out with the publication of *People of India* (PoI) project. It is a massive survey of the country as a whole carried out by the Anthropological Survey of India. It is a document, which carries enough ethnographic and social-cultural data about the country. According to PoI, there are 4,635 communities inhabiting our country. These communities are actually ethnic communities which include numerous castes, minorities groups scheduled tribes and scheduled castes. There are thus multi-ethnic groups in this country. When modernity was introduced in this country, the traditional structures challenged the inroads made by modernity. Our traditions are numerous. In a way, each caste or ethnic group has its own bogey of traditions. These traditions decide the fate of modernity. It is difficult to enlist all the socio-cultural traditions of our country; however, we mention some of the important institutions which are embodiment of traditions and which shape our behaviour. These institutions, therefore, determine the shift in modernity. Some of the particularities of Indian society in terms of its traditional-structural-institutional framework are given below:

Diverse culture zones

The PoI informs that there are 91 culture zones in India, almost each state having plural culture regions with the possible exception of Goa “which forms only single cultural zone”. Each culture zone has its traditions spread over to numerous

castes, minority groups and weaker sections. These zones are held together by the civilizational bonds of religion and caste practices of purity and pollution. The socio-cultural linkages, along with economic exchanges, have created functional dependence among the people. These culture zones also make up a comprehensive culture, which we identify as Indian culture.

Plural ethnicities

Iravati Karve, in her classical work *Hindu Kinship System*, says that if we want to understand the culture of India we must understand its family, village and linguistic groups. The study of these institutions indicates that there are several pluralities in this country. These ethnicities carry within their fold a larger number of traditions. The plural ethnicities sometimes also create situations of tensions. Modernity needs to establish compromise with these diverse ethnicities. With the passage of time, the ethnic composition of the country became increasingly complex. In today's India migration is a common feature of the movement of population. And, with the socio-cultural development, new ethnic groups are constantly being formed. For instance, there are Marwaris in north-east and Kashmiri Pandits in Delhi and Punjab who tend to form new ethnic groups. Modernity has a serious encounter with the ethnic groups at various local levels.

Language and dialects: Three-language family

India is a multi-language society. We have three language families, namely: (1) Indo-European (2) Dravidian, and (3) Austro-Asiatic. Indo-European language family has eleven languages, which cover all the languages of northern India such as Punjabi, Sindhi, Hindi, Gujarati, Marathi, etc. Dravidian language family consists of Tamil, Telugu, Kannad-and Malayalam. These are, in fact, languages of South Indian states. The-third language family of Austro-Asiatic is spoken by tribal groups of north-eastern India such as Munda, Bhumia, Santhal and Khasi.

There are thus 18 scheduled languages and a large number of dialects. According to Pol, there are about 16,752 dialects spoken by the people. It is said that in the north-east, among the Bodas, each village has its own dialect.

States in our country have been organized largely on the basis of language spoken by the people though there were other criteria also but they were of lesser importance. Marathi is the official language of Maharashtra, Gujarati of Gujarat, Kannad of Karnataka, Malayalam of Kerala, Telugu of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil of Tamil Nadu. It must be observed that there are a few languages which do not have their respective states. For instance, Sindhi and Hindi have no states of their own. Though Hindi is officially given the status of national language, official work in some states is still done in English. The encounter of modernity in these states is now very serious.

Multi-caste society

As stated above, there are 4,635 communities in India. These include castes, minority groups and weaker sections of the society. In 1931, as the census informs, there were more than 30,000 castes in the undivided India. K.M. Panikar and Iravati Karve argue that the castes are responsible for the disintegration of Indian society. M.N. Srinivas says that in today's India the person's identity is from his caste though caste has been legally denied its existence.

But there are arguments which say that it is because of the caste system that the country has managed its survival. The system encourages functional interdependence and the end-result of it is the organic integration of the society. Each caste has its traditions. And, these traditions differentiate one caste from another. The identity of the caste is maintained by its traditions. The traditions constantly wage war against the onslaught made by the interaction of modernity. The challenge given by the caste traditions is formidable.

Increasing regional consciousness and competing demands

We have been arguing that India has its certain peculiarities which make it different from European and American societies. The universal characteristics of modernity, namely, democracy, capitalism, state power and military power, when came to India, the response here in this country was varying. In the process of

interaction the traditions themselves are modernized, modified, weakened or strengthened. It is common to find that modernity has given new life to traditions. Caste has become stronger, religion has taken to fundamentalism and marriage ceremonies have become more pompous.

There was some consciousness about region in the past. During the struggle for independence, the feeling of regionalism was almost absent. We fought against the colonial power as one people. But, in contemporary India, regional self-consciousness has increased immensely. Writing the foreword to the *People of India*, M.N. Srinivas observes :

The first is the strength of regional identities in every part of India, which show themselves in language, material culture, food habits, folklore, rituals, local forms for religion, etc. Dr. Singh also mentions that about 83 per cent of the population of India lives within the linguistic-political boundaries.

In order to establish their identity, the regions miss no opportunity to press their demands for their ethnic and cultural identity. The new states of Uttranchal, Jharkhand and Chhatisgarh are the result of the demand for autonomous states. The plurality of the regions and cultural diversity stress their autonomy in different areas of life. K.S. Singh has identified the regional particularities which manifest themselves at various levels. For instance, there are the very large categories of communities including castes and minorities, and secondly, those that identify themselves through linguistic and cultural categories (such as, Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Rajasthani, Tamil, etc.) These communities are distributed in different regions and thus the regions have become manifestations of local cultures. It is because of it that the state and central governments are made out of coalition. Single-party rule in the country has become a thing of the past.

Secularism versus fundamentalism

Before the emergence of enlightenment and modernity, the European society

had traditional domination. In this society religion exercised power over the state. It was church which had domination over the state. Tradition or custom had legitimacy over the ruler. The establishment of democracy separated state from religion. And, since then, in these countries, there is no interference of religion in the working of the state. But, in the developing countries, despite a long standing of democracy, religion has interference in the government making. There has emerged a conflict between democratic secularism and religious fundamentalism.

One, very significant feature of Indian democracy is its traditional domination of religion and caste hierarchy. Communalism and not secularism has become the subject matter of the dominant discourse. What is happening today is that there is contradiction between the secular goal of the constitution and the growing communalization of the polity. Some of the social scientists, prominent among them are Ashis Nandy, T.N. Madan and M.N. Srinivas, who have condemned modernist nationalist historiography, argue that the remedy for the ills of Indian society is to return to genuine religion and the indigenous tradition of religious tolerance as the best means to preserve and maintain a pluralist and multi-religious Indian society. T.N. Madan is skeptical about the future of secularism in this sub-continent. He writes:

Under the prevailing circumstances, secularism in South Asia as a generally shared credo of life is impossible, as a basis for state action impracticable, and as blueprint for the foreseeable future impotent.

For Madan, modernity does not have a fair chance of development in South Asia. He says that “in multi-religious societies, such as those of South Asia, it should be realized that secularism may not be restricted to rationalism, that it is compatible with faith and that rationalism as understood in the west is not the sole motive force of a modern state”. M.N. Srinivas also considers belief in religion as a source of tolerance and as a powerful force meant to check the rise of *Hindutva*.

India has passed more than fifty years after the attainment of freedom and modernity has yet not taken its firm roots in the Indian soil. The challenges to modernity by traditions are in no way ordinary.

Village and joint family

Perhaps the strongest opposition to modernity comes from village India. Indian traditionalism is best exemplified in its villages. During the British Raj the villages were described as 'little republics'. Even today, tribal remote villages in north-east and north-west remain as encapsulated settlements. In the villages of the plains and open lands, social disputes are negotiated and settled by the caste panchayats. The identity of the individual merges with the village. Religion and superstitions are the idioms of village life. Some villages as S.C. Dube informs are known by their caste names such as Rajput village, Jat village, Bhil village, etc. Villages thus remain as the pillars of traditional India. They are basic to Indian civilization.

According to some sociologists, the institution of joint family is basic to India. I.P. Desai argues that family in India is essentially joint family. The study of joint family is a favourite theme of sociologists. The composition of joint family is relationship-specific. It has given continuity to Indian culture. But it has also discouraged the inroads made by individualism resulting from democracy. In all possibilities, excessive individualism is denied by joint family. Its breakdown in today's India indicates its anti-modernist stance.

Thus, India's traditions are manifest not only in religion but in its rituals, festivals, fasts, foodways and dress style. An individual is tied up with rituals right from his birth to death. Interestingly, the traditions are not universal all over the country. There is much diversity. Almost all the coastal states practise non-vegetarianism. It is a multi-religious society wherein there are a few ethnic societies, which have their distinct identity. We have here Parsi society, Muslim society and tribal society besides the large Hindu society. Indian society can never be identified as a society of one people (Hindus), one language (Sanskrit) and one culture (Hindutva). Before the coming of Aryans, the country was inhabited by the aboriginals, that is, original settlers *Adivasis*. Thus, there were Dravidians followed by Aryans and at a later stage there came Huns, Kushans and Mughals. During this long historical period, the country witnessed a large number of attacks and finally there came colonization by the British. It all

indicates the plural, diverse, multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, multi-traditional nature of Indian society.

On the strength of social and historical contextuality given above it could be safely drawn that the emergence and development of modernity is specific to a particular society. The coming up of modernity in Europe had a specific social background and there also it did not develop into a uniform pattern. The Western Europe developed into a capitalist society having rationality as its anchor. The development of modernity in Eastern Europe was in the form of a socialistic society. The differential form of development in modernity is explained by the forces and upheavals which affected it. The interaction between modernity and tradition decided the fate and form of the former.

The Indian situation has been specific to Indian society. In our country, caste, region, polity, economy, religion and above all history determine the structure of modernity. The modernity which we have in India is, therefore, different from the modernity of Europe and America. And, the form of modernity which we have in New Delhi, Chennai or Mumbai is different from what we have in our towns or villages. There are, therefore, several modernities. Similarly, modernity as Giddens would say is multi-dimensional - democracy, capitalism, state power and military power. These dimensions are also found in various forms in our country. For instance, in tribal society, the democratic dimension is weak while it is relatively strong in cosmopolitan cities; likewise, other dimensions of modernity also vary from society to society, community to community, and group to group.

The process of modernity in India systematically began during the British period. It came in the form of printing machine, newspapers, steam power and steam engine. Liberal education through the medium of English language also paved the way for the coming of modernity. What is striking in this respect is that modernity has become synonymous with social change. Any change in our traditions was considered social change. However, social change has hardly been analyzed with the perspective of modernity. The Britishers were not interested to bring any substantial change in our

age-old traditions for this would have affected their colonialism. In exceptional cases they enacted laws for the abolition of *sati* and child marriage. The sociologists also did not make any serious attempt to study modernity and its impact on society except that D.P. Mukerji and a few of his colleagues tried to analyze the meaning of modernity in the context of Indian traditions. We shall soon see that Indian sociologists are obsessed with traditions. They can hardly provide any meaning to modernity without reference to tradition. D.P., for example, suggests a mix of tradition and modernity for the development of Indian culture. It appears that modernity takes its roots in Indian society only with reference to its traditions. In the following section, therefore, we look at the meaning of modernity anchored in Indian society and its traditions.

5.5 Indian society and its traditions

In post-independent India, tradition and modernity came into close interaction. The Constitution of India is the best document of individual liberty, freedom and right of expression. It is also a manifestation of modern values and norms. The safeties and securities given to the weaker sections of society by the constitution presents a blueprint for the attainment of modern Indian society. Sociologists did not pay any serious attention towards the attainment of this goal. They kept themselves engaged in the study of caste, family, kin and village. There is a massive literature on these aspects of society. Though the institutions of family, village and caste establish organic relations between various segments of society, the sociologists have restricted themselves to the study of the institutions *per se*. It is only in the recently published Pol project that wider linkages are identified which present a unified picture of Indian society. No constructs have been made by sociologists towards the building of a modern nation-state.

However, there are a few studies which deal with the impact of modernity on Indian social structure. The beginning on this account was made for the first time by D.P. Mukerji (1894-1962) in the *Diversities* (1958). D.P. did not discuss tradition and modernity at any book-length level. He was basically a Marxist and was interested in political economy. History was also a favourable area of his interest. It is in this

context that he tried to provide a strategy for the integration of tradition and modernity in the building of an Indian culture.

Yet another study on modernity is by Yogendra Singh. It is a full book-length study on Indian society - its traditions and their interaction with modernity. *Modernization of Indian Tradition (1992)* is a classical theoretical work of the author. It is a comprehensive sociological study of the processes and problems of modernization in contemporary India. It refers to the vast range of changes that are taking place today in the form and functions of the Indian social structure and traditions. He argues that Indian society is changing and is undergoing adaptive changes towards modernization. In other words, the traditions maintain their continuity but at the same time they undergo changes also. There is in the process of change, modernization of traditions, that is, the traditions make adaptive changes while accepting modernity.

M.N. Srinivas, in his work *Caste in Modern India and Other Essays (1962)*, examines social change in caste system with reference to modernization. Earlier, he used westernization to explain the process of social change in the caste but at a later stage took to modernization. Modernization has not been a constant theme of occupation for Srinivas. His major concern is caste and its social change. Modernization is discussed by him in a casual or occasional way. As a matter of fact, social change for Srinivas is synonymous with modernization. Neither he characterizes western modernization in terms of its dimensional aspects nor discusses it in India's specificity. It is caste and social change only.

Dipankar Gupta, in his recent work *Mistaken Modernity (2002)*, has included an essay on modernity, which is a part of a series of articles contained in the book. The book carries articles which are written in a style that should appeal to non-academics. For him, "modernity is an attitude which represents universalistic norms, where the dignity of an individual as a citizen is inviolable and where one's achievements count for more than family background and connections. Once modernity is understood in this fashion, it is apparent that India still has a long distance to go".

Any study of modernity made with reference to Indian society would make it clear that its notion in India is different from western. There, modernity means rationality, industrialism, capitalism, democracy and state power. The Indian notion is different. We are a plural society having multi-castes, multi-languages and multi-ethnicities. In such a situation, each ethnic or social division has its own notion of modernity thereby denying the general accepted meaning of modernity. For instance, Gopal Guru in his article on “Dalits in Pursuit of Modernity” included in *India: Another Millennium*, edited by Romila Thapar says that the notion of modernity among the Dalits is different from other caste groups of the society. The Dalits have had their own history of struggles for their emancipation. Modernity has been perceived by them in this historical perspective. They derive the meaning of modernity in their society’s context. Gopal Guru makes his point as under :

For the Dalits, modernity is seen in the context of their being provided the language of rights of equality, freedom and dignity, self-respect and recognition. This new language grew out of the Dalit’s rejection of the language of obligation that entailed negative rights like the right over raw hide and flesh of dead cattle, leftover food and cast-off clothes. All these sought to humiliate the Dalits under the Hindu feudal order.


It is the Dalit history of social oppression and humiliation which has given specific definition to modernity. It is because of this that the Dalits reject the *Hindutva* paradigm and seek their inclusion into the opportunity structures provided by modernity, namely, new skills, abilities and excellence. For Dalits, the norms of equality and self-respect constitute the basic ingredients of modernity.

What applies to the Dalits is also true to different ethnic groups of the country. It is here that we come face-to-face with the impact of interaction between tradition and modernity. The interaction raises the basic question: What is Indian society and what are its traditions? India is multi-traditional. There are more than four thousand communities, ninety-one culture areas, eighteen scheduled languages, and more than five lakh villages. Each community has its own traditions, each linguistic group and in

this respect each village has its own traditions, which are followed from generation to generation. In such a complex heterogeneity, it is difficult to understand Indian society and its multiple traditions. Sociologists have however tried to explain the structure of society and its traditions.

Yogendra Singh on Indian society and traditions

Yogendra Singh, in his book *Modernization of Indian Tradition*, identifies three major streams of traditions in Indian society, namely, Hindu, Muslim and tribal. Though there are several ethnic communities in India, the three groups constitute major and primary traditions of the Indian society. All Indian social phenomena and realities get their manifestations in these three streams of traditions. Yogendra Singh has identified the key forces of modernization and analyzes their impact on Indian society and tradition. He has tried to bring out the changes which have come as a result of modernization. The sources of modernization are either internal or endogenous or from outside society. These two sources of modernization need to be analyzed both at the levels of social structures and traditions. The processes of modernization which result in social change are depicted in Figure 1.



Yogendra Singh makes his point very clear when he says that it is not necessary that the processes which bring social change in the society also bring change in the

traditions. And, on the other hand, the processes which affect change in traditions, also necessarily change the society. He writes:

The conceptual framework of most studies of social change in India is such that the focus is either on social structure (that is, society) to the exclusion of tradition or on the latter without proper treatment of the former.

Hindu traditions

According to Yogendra Singh, Hindu society consists of certain traditions which are in fact value themes. Before the emergence of modernization, the Hindu society was based on the following value components: (1) hierarchy, (2) holism, (3) *karma*, and (4) transcendence.

These value components are found ingrained in Hindu scriptures such as *Geeta, Mahabharata, Ramayana, Vedas, Puranas* and *Upanishads*. Louis Dumont has also emphasized the element of hierarchy in India's caste system. Castes are organized on the basis of inequality as against equality, which is the norm of European society. For a Hindu, the value of inequality is comprehensive and also includes occupational life cycles such as, *ashramas*, and moral duties of *dharma*. Thus, hierarchy is basically based on the value themes of *ashramas* and *dharma*.

Holism, yet another aspect of Hindu tradition, is manifested in the relationship between individual and group. The individual in Hindu society is not autonomous. He is constrained to abide by the norms and values of the society. It was the society which determined the behaviour of the individual. Yogendra Singh's analysis runs as under :

Holism implied a relationship between individual and group in which the former was encompassed by the latter in respect of duties and rights; what had precedence here was community or *sangha* and not the individual.

Holism has been a dominant value in India's caste society. In all circumstances an individual was subordinate to the caste, village and religious congregations. If the individual violated the *sangha* or caste and village traditions, he was subjected to

severe sanctions excommunicated, exiled and penalized. The subsumption of individual by collectivity persisted all along the line of traditional social structure, e.g., family, village community, caste and political territory or nation.

In the Hindi popular novel *Chitrlekha* by Bhagwati Charan Varma, the heroine - Chitrlekha gives an excellent performance of her dance. Bijgupta, the feudal ruler, who was also present among the audience got spellbound by the dance. He expressed to meet Chitrlekha personally but the latter replied that for her the individual did not exist separately, he never existed independent of society. "So the question of meeting individually does not arise." Individual has no autonomous existence.

After hierarchy and holism, the third value theme of Indian society is *karma* or continuity. The crucial element of Hinduism is the theory of transmigration of soul: it is the theory of rebirth which explains the continuity of Hindu society. Hindu society is considered to be eternal- *Shashavata*. And, its continuity is assured by the theory of *karma*. The soul- *Atma* never dies, it always takes rebirth.

The fourth tradition of Hindu society ~, transcendence. It is beyond the limits of possible experience and knowledge of the individual. According to the value of transcendence, the legitimacy of traditional values can never be challenged. Nobody can put a question mark to the hierarchy of caste system, none can challenge the superiority of collectivity; the panch, that is, the village council is like *Parmeshwar* - God. In such a schema of value components, there is no place for rationality. And, on the other hand, the core of modernity in western countries is the value of rationality. Right from Max Weber's rationality to George Ritzer's hyperrationality, modernity is characterized by these values. But, let it be noted, it is denied by traditional Hindu society. Yogendra Singh writes:

derived from the non-sacred or profane scales of evaluation. It formed a super-concept contributing to integration as well as rationalization of the other value themes of the tradition.

Whatever may be the society - Indian or western, there are a few traditions

which keep it held together. There have also been traditions in the western society. Before the beginning of modernity in the west, the occupational structure was considered to be an ethical duty. And if anyone abandoned his occupation, God looked upon such renunciation of worldly obligations as a selfish act. To live acceptably to God was to live in the world, fulfilling one's worldly duties. India's traditions are a little different from the traditions of the west. What is specific about India is that traditions have a 'unique' heritage, existential situations and historicity of circumstances.

Islamic traditions

The Islamic traditions are different from Hindu traditions. Muslims have been inhabiting India from the medieval period. As settlers to this country, they also have had encounter with the process of modernization. Modernization exhibits rational attitude towards issues which are specific to a community. Rationality evaluates the merit and demerit of issue from a universalistic and not particularistic viewpoint. In fact, modernization is rooted in the scientific worldview and has deeper and positive association with levels of diffusion of scientific knowledge, technological skill and technological resources in a particular society. But, what is essential to modernization is the commitment to scientific worldview. This means internalization of humanistic and philosophical viewpoints of science on contemporary problems and not merely the volume of technological advancement.

The Hindu society is essentially a hierarchical society. On the other hand, Islam is founded on a worldview which is apparently non-hierarchical. Welfred Cantwell Smith, an eminent historian, has made the status of tradition very distinct when he writes:

The Hindu, for whom ultimately history is not significant; the Christian, for whom it is significant but not decisive; the Muslim, for whom it is decisive but not final; the Marxist for whom it is all in all.

The traditions of Islam are revealed in its history. Its religion is proselytizing or converting others to their faith. But it is holistic and socio-centric in its orientation. Yogendra Singh, while identifying the Islamic traditions, writes:

In principle, Islam does not admit of any institutionalized role for priests: the *Vlema* are in no sense priests, rather, they correspond to the scribes in Judaism. Strictly speaking, Islam has no clergy, as any Muslim may lead a congregation in prayer. Similarly, in ideal-typical form, Islam has a more developed orientation towards the holistic principle in its conception of social order than Hinduism.

Islamic holism has elements of exclusiveness or insularity. It never accepts anything outside its own traditions. Its holism is based on the unity of the Muslim *umma*, the collectivity of the faithful. This unity in principle transcends the boundaries of territory and nation and is derived from the conformity of numbers to the religio-ethical codes and principles embodied in the *Qura* and/or *Sunna*, the *hadith* (various traditions) and the *Shariya* Qegal code-book of Islam). The conception of nation in the territorial sense is non-existent in the Quran, “which does not speak of a series of Islamic states but of one nation of believers - the *mil/at*. This holistic principle, which is embodied in the notions of *umma* and the *mil/at*, has unlike in the Hindu tradition a radical egalitarian. connotation”.

The kind of holism which characterizes Islam makes it quite assertive and exclusive religion. It makes it clear as to who belongs to the community of the *mil/at*, i.e., faithful and who is outside it. The faithful are declared as ‘Darul Islam’ and those outside are called ‘Darul Harb’. The Islam, if necessary, can declare *zihad* against those who belong to Darul Harb. In this way, Islam as a religion includes politics and social structure.

Despite the rigidity of Islamic traditions, it is found that the religion as a whole is favourable to the acceptance of modernity. In the case of the conversion of scheduled castes of India to Islam when the latter came as conquerors, most of the former’s cultural characteristics were included in the Islamic tradition. In today’s India (1991) the Muslims constitute 12.6 per cent to the total population. They are in India not a homogeneous community. Those Muslims who came to India from outside and settled here constitute the upper class. They belong to the social hierarchy of the Ashrafs, or

the four major immigrant groups of the Muslims called Sayyad, Sheikh, Mughal and Pathan. Out of these four groups, the Sayyads and Sheikhs belong to the nobility of Islam which has traditionally been occupying religious offices.

What is interesting to note here is that the upper hierarchy of the Muslims has very comfortably adopted modernity. Though this class of the Muslims is considered to be the custodian of the great tradition of Islam, it has taken to modernity without any discomfort. Mohammad Ali Jinnah had a Parsi wife and he did not hesitate to accept liquor in the open. However, a majority of Muslims got buried in their ancestral tradition. Even today, they remain illiterate and poor in a massive way. They are far away from modernity and continue to live in backwardness.

Tribal traditions

We have argued that the Indian society is very comprehensive. It is plural. Out of this plurality there are three major streams of traditions: Hindu traditions, Muslim or Islamic traditions and tribal traditions. According to Pol, the Hindus form 76.4 per cent and the Muslims 12.6 per cent of the total population of the country. The share of the tribal population to the total population is 7.8 per cent. They are spread in segments all through the country. They are found in all the states except Punjab and Haryana and over all the union territories except Chandigarh, Delhi and Pondicherry. Out of their total population in the country, 93.80 per cent have rural background, whereas only 6.20 per cent are urbanized. The largest concentration is in Madhya Pradesh (23.33 per cent), followed by Orissa (11.46 per cent), Bihar (11.26 per cent), Maharashtra (11.18 per cent), Gujarat (9.39 per cent), Rajasthan (8.10 per cent), Andhra Pradesh (6.15 per cent) and West Bengal (5.95 per cent). The largest tribes are Gond, Bhil, Santhal, Mina and Oraon.

The tribal traditions are different from Hindu and Muslim traditions. Each tribal group is endogamous. And, there is no hierarchy in the tribal society. It cannot be said, for instance, that the Gonds are at the top of the hierarchy or the Bhils are at the bottom. Each tribal group is autonomous and has its own identity. The social structure of the tribal community is egalitarian though the forces of modernization

have created stratification and new traditions. The tribals do not share any hierarchy among the various tribal groups, each tribe has its own class hierarchy. Pol informs that the “tribes have generally remained outside the *varna* system”.

The value component of the tribal society is rooted in its religion. The tribals do not have faith in the Hindu value of *moksha*, salvation. Nor do they believe in the concept of heaven or hell. What is important or which concerns them most is the ‘present’. They are a happy-go-lucky lot of people. If they have enough for today, they do not care for the future. Saving has no meaning for them. Pol reports that “all tribal communities except three are non-vegetarians, they eat pork (64.6 per cent), beef of cow (36 per cent) and beef of ox (30 per cent)”. The three vegetarian tribal communities are Toda, Rabari and Bharwad. They all are pastoral.

The tribals have their religious practices embedded in the offering of liquor. They offer liquor to their ancestral deities on occasions of birth, marriage and death. On all festivals they drink excessively. Sometimes liquor is also a cause of disputes and feuds. Yet, another tradition common to all the tribals is their habit of living in scattered habitations. The tribal village is not compact like the caste village. Their houses are surrounded by their fields. Living in segregation is their habitation pattern. Even in caste villages where the pattern of habitation is compact, the tribals erect their houses at a reasonable distance from the caste housing.

Traditionally, the tribals are described by anthropologists as animists. Recently, animism has gone in favour of Hinduism. According to Pol, the scheduled tribes are mainly the followers of Hinduism, 87.05 per cent of their total population being returned as Hindus. There are tribals who follow only one religion. However, many tribes follow more than one religion such as Hinduism and animism, Christianity and animism and the rest, Hinduism, Islam and Christianity. The core of tribal traditions lies in their tribal religion, that is, animism and ancestor worship. In this connection, the findings of K.S. Singh in Pol make interesting reading :

A major finding in terms of religion has been the continuance of the autonomy of the tribal religious system in spite of the tribes’ close interactions with

Christianity and Hinduism. The hierarchy of the clan and village deities is intact. There are more sacred specialists among the tribals from their own communities. There is only a very small number of sacred specialists from other communities. The calendar of festivals and festivities is also intact.

The unity of the tribal society largely rests on its traditions. Quite like the Hindu and Muslim societies, the tribal society is holistic in its nature. It is composed of interacting wholes that are more than simply the sum of their parts. A tribal may change to anything -an elite, an affluent, a community leader or an intellectual; he never parts with his traditions. Drinking liquor, an undying desire for polygyny, non-vegetarian dish, scattered living, concern for the present only and animism seem to be abiding idioms of a tribal's life. This makes their life holistic. This, however, does not mean that they are antagonistic to change and development. They always move in favour of accepting modernity. But, at the same time, they do not abandon the continuity of their tribal identity.

5.6 Debate on tradition and modernity

In the earlier part of this chapter we have observed that Yogendra Singh has discussed Indian traditions and modernization at a book-length level. He has defined Indian society and its traditions with reference to hierarchy, holism, transmigration or continuity and transcendence. He argues that the Indian society also contains traditions of Islam and tribals. Prior to Yogendra Singh, the preceding sociologists such as D.P. Mukerji, D.N. Majumdar, M.N. Srinivas, G .S. Ghurye, A.R. Desai, Milton Singer and others have also made efforts to provide an explanation to the meaning of tradition in Indian society. We have earlier observed that in the study of modernization in India, tradition has always been an obsession. During the 1950s, there was a hot debate in India on tradition and modernity. In the west also, when modernization began after enlightenment, there was a serious debate on religion, science, state and fundamentalism. Feudalism was challenged by rationality, capitalism and science. In India, modernity needs to be analyzed in the context of liberalism, democracy and capitalism. The Britishers had colonial power to exploit the Indian masses, but in

their effort they also wanted not to interfere in the traditional structure of Indian society. The princely rulers were highly antagonistic to modernity. Their survival depended on the continuity and strengthening of tradition. And, therefore, in Indian situation also, it is quite meaningful to discuss modernity in terms of India's traditions and hence the obsession.

D.P. Mukerji's anaLysis of tradition

Dhurjati Prasad Mukerji (1894-1961), popularly called as D.P., was one of the founding fathers of sociology in India. He was born in West Bengal but worked all through his life in Lucknow. He took his degrees in history and economics from Calcutta University. He was a Marxist but preferred to call himself a Marxologist, i.e., a social scientist of Marxism. He analyzed Indian society from the Marxian perspective of dialectical materialism. He argued that there is dialectical relation between India's tradition and modernity, British colonialism and nationalism and individualism and collectivity, i.e., *sangha*. His concept of dialectics was anchored in liberal humanism. He argued all through his works that traditions are central to the understanding of Indian society. The relations between modernization which came to India during the British period and traditions is dialectical. It is from this perspective of dialectics that, D.P. argued, we shall have to define traditions.

The encounter of tradition with modernization created certain cultural contradictions, adaptations and in some cases situations of conflict also. Describing the consequences of the tradition-modernity encounter, Yogendra Singh writes:

In D.P. Mukerji's writing we find some systematic concern with the analysis of Indian social processes from a dialectical frame of reference. He mainly focuses upon the encounter of the tradition with that of the west which, on the one hand, unleashed many forces of cultural contradiction and, on the other, gave rise to a new middle class. The rise of these forces, according to him, generates a dialectical process of conflict and synthesis which must be given a push by bringing into play the conserved energies of the class structure of Indian society.

The encounter between tradition and modernity, therefore, ends up in two consequences: (1) conflict, and (2) synthesis. Indian society as D.P. envisages is the result of the interaction between tradition and modernity. It is this dialectics which helps us to analyze the Indian society .

D.P.'s concept of tradition appeared for the first time in the year 1942 when his book *Modern Indian Culture: A Sociological Study* was published. His characterization of tradition in the context of Indian culture runs as below :

As a social and historical process... Indian culture represents certain common traditions that have given rise to a number of general attitudes. The major influences in their shaping have been Buddhism, Islam, and western commerce and culture. It was through the assimilation and conflict of such varying forces that Indian culture became what it is today, neither Hindu nor Islamic, neither a replica of the western mode of living and thought nor a purely Asiatic product.

Composition of tradition

Indian traditions are the resultants of certain historical processes. They actually construct the structure of Indian culture. These traditions belong to several ideologies such as Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, tribals and western modernity. The process of synthesis has, therefore, constructed these traditions. In this respect, it would be mistaken to believe that India's traditions are Hindu only. In fact, they combine traditions of various ethnic groups of the country. How the principles of various religious ideologies shaped the Indian traditions has been interpreted by T.N. Madan as below:

In this historical process, synthesis had been the dominant organizing principle of the Hindu, the Buddhist and the Muslim who had together shaped a worldview in which, according to D.P., 'the fact of being was of lasting significance'. His favourite quotation from the Upanishads was *charaivati*, keep moving forward. This meant that there had developed an indifference to the transient and the sensate and a preoccupation with the subordination of the 'little self' to and ultimately its dissolution in the 'supreme reality'.

D.P. tried to provide a classification of Indian traditions under three heads, viz., primary; secondary and tertiary. The primary traditions have been primordial and authentic to Indian society. The secondary traditions were given second ranking when the Muslims arrived in the country. And by the time of the British arrival, Hindus and Muslims had yet not achieved a full synthesis of traditions at all levels of social existence. There was a greater measure of agreement between them regarding the utilization and appropriation of natural resources and to a lesser extent in respect of aesthetic and religious traditions. In the tertiary traditions of conceptual thought, however, differences survived prominently.

Sources of tradition

Admittedly, traditions occupy a central place in any analysis of India's traditions and modernization. But D.P. has not given the contents of these traditions. The major sources of traditions are Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and western culture, but what traditions, for instance, of Hinduism or Islam constitute 'the broader Indian tradition has not been made specific by D.P. His weakness in this respect has been identified by T.N. Madan who says that the general make up of Indian tradition according to D.P. could be a synthesis of Vedanta, western liberation and Marxism. But, what about the synthesis of Islam and Buddhism? D.P. fails to provide any such synthesis of other major traditions. T.N. Madan comments on this failure of D.P. as under :

An equally important and difficult undertaking would be the elaboration and specification of his conception of the content of tradition. Whereas he establishes, convincingly I think, the relevance of tradition to modernity at the level of principle, he does not spell out its empirical content except in terms of general categories. One has the uncomfortable feeling that he himself operated more in terms of institution and general knowledge than a deep study of the texts. A confrontation with tradition through field work in the manner of the anthropologist was, of course, ruled out by him, at least for himself.

Indian sociologists have talked enough about tradition but little effort has been made to identify the sources and content of tradition. And, this goes very well when we talk about D.P. Mukerji. Let us see other sociologists who have also written about tradition.

D.N. Majumdar

Dhirendra Nath Majumdar (1903-1960) began his career as an anthropologist at Calcutta University, where he received his Master's Degree in 1924. He joined Lucknow University in 1928 and stayed there for the rest of his life. His initial interest at Lucknow was in ethnographic tradition. He studied the customs and beliefs of tribes and castes. His understanding of Indian traditions, therefore, came through his study of tribals. Close to his interest in tribal groups, he also conducted studies of Indian villages. As a social anthropologist, Majumdar's area of interest was culture. He tried to construct development of local cultures out of his study of tribal groups and villages. In this effort of his study, he was drawn to the central role of traditions in the development of culture. The content of his culture, naturally, was tradition. His statement in terms of the relationship between tradition and culture is given below :

The past must be understood in the context of the present, and the present will stabilize the future if it can find its fulfilment in the moorings of the past. There was no golden age, there can be none in the future. Life is a process of adjustment and in its unfolding, it has thrown out individuals who are misfits and the latter have both helped and hindered cultural progress; the misfits are misfits in the context of a dynamic setting, and if only, the misfits could be fitted into the structure of life, the process that is life will continue to unfold itself, adjust and march as to man's destiny through an integration and synthesis that constitute the core of the dynamics of culture change and culture crises.

Though the ideological perspectives of D.P. Mukerji and D.N. Majumdar are different - the former being a Marxist and the latter a functionalist, both agree to a synthesis of tradition and modernity. D.P. talks about adaptive changes to modernity whereas Majumdar argues that those who are misfits to modernity will be obliged to

fit themselves with the modernizing system. However, it must be noted that D.P. was much oriented to philosophy and economics and Majumdar was essentially a field worker. Because of his field experience, he referred to modernity in terms of ethnographic tradition belonging to customs and traditions of tribes, castes and villages.

G.S. Ghurye

Govind Sadashiv Ghurye (1893-1983) is considered to be one of the pioneers of sociology in India. He joined Bombay University's Sociology Department in the year 1924 and retired from there in 1959. He was born in a conservative Maharashtrian Brahmin family. This family conservatism remained with him all through his life. He was a voracious writer and had authored 32 books on a variety of themes. Ideologically, he was a doctrinaire Hindu and considered Hindu scriptures as the major source of his Indian society's analysis. During his creative period of writing Indian sociology was engaged in the debate on tradition and modernity. But Ghurye did not enter into this controversy. Nor he took up the issue of the role of traditions in Indian society. As an orientalist, however, he stressed the importance of Indian traditions, especially the Hindu ethnography.

Ghurye analyzed Hindu society as a part of wider Indian civilization. For him, tradition was a heuristic method for sociological analysis. Indian traditions are actually Hindu traditions and to understand Indian society one must know the Hindu traditions. This wider Hindu society consists of tribals and other non-Hindu groups. Traditions, he insists, are essentially Hindu traditions. Whatever group we may discuss in India, it has its origin in Hindu civilization. In his work, *Social Tensions in India* (1968), he argues that Hindus and Muslims are two separate and cultural distinct groups that can hardly have any chances of integration. His views on the integration of tribal groups are very clear. *The Aborigines: So-called and their Future* is his controversial book wherein he establishes that the scheduled tribes are backward caste Hindus and their future rests with the Hindu society. It would not be wrong to suggest that Ghurye created a special kind of Hindu sociology and the traditions which we have in India are Hindu traditions only. Despite Ghurye's prolific writings on issues pertaining

to Indian society, he has not defined traditions. Nor has he discussed the impact of modernity. His sole concern has been to establish that the core of Hindu society and, in this sense, the Indian society, is tradition and this tradition has its roots in its scriptures. Religious beliefs, *karma kand*, rituals and practices of this kind constitute the structure of traditions. Polity and economy hardly get any scope in Ghurye's discussion.

M.N. Srinivas

M.N. Srinivas considers village as the microcosm of Indian society and civilization. It is the village, which retains the traditional components of India's tradition. Srinivas (1916-1999) occupies an eminent place among the first-generation sociologists of India. He belongs to the galaxy of sociologists such as G.S. Ghurye, R.K. Mukherjee, N.K. Bose and D.P. Mukerji. He conducted fieldwork among the Coorgs and came out with his publication, *Religion and Society Among the Coorgs of South India* (1952). Dumont and Pocock consider the book as a classic in India's sociology. It is in this work that Srinivas provides a basic structure of India's traditions. T.N. Madan hails the publication in these words :

The strength of the Coorg lies in its being firmly grounded in a clearly defined theoretical framework which happened to be essentially the one developed by Radcliffe-Brown who suggested the theme of the dissertation to Srinivas. *Religion and society* is a very lucid exposition of the complex interrelationship between ritual and social order in Coorg society. It also deals at length and insightfully with crucial notions of purity and pollution as also with the process of incorporation of non-Hindu communities and cuits in the Hindu social order and way of life.

In *Religion and Society*, Srinivas was concerned with the spread of Hinduism. He talked about 'Sanskritic' Hinduism and its values. Related to this was the notion of 'Sanskritization' which Srinivas employed "to describe the hoary process of the penetration of Sanskritic values into the remotest parts of India. Imitation of the way of life of the topmost, twice-born castes was said to be the principle mechanism by

which lower castes sought to raise. their own social status”. Curiously, Srinivas did not take up for consideration the phenomenon of the persistence of the masses of Hindus of low or no status within the caste system. For him, the most significant aspect of the history of the Coorgs, worthy of being recorded and discussed, was the history of this incorporation into the Hindu social order. Srinivas thinks that the only meaningful social change is that which takes place among the weaker sections for attaining higher status by imitating values of twice-born. And those of the lower castes and tribal groups who fail in this race of imitation are doomed to remain backward. Srinivas spells the doom as below :

Splinter groups like Amma Coorgs are decades, if not centuries, in advance of their parent groups; the former have solved this problem by sanskritizing their customs entirely while the latter are more conservative.

What Srinivas spells out about the imitating lower castes seems to be the announcement of a new age. If we attempt to identify traditions of Indian society, according to Srinivas, these are found among the high castes - the twice-born. In other words, the traditions, rituals and beliefs which are held and shared by the Brahmins, the Baniyas and the Rajputs constitute Indian traditions. And, the beliefs of the lower sections of society, the untouchables and the tribals do not have any status as tradition. For him, Indian traditions are high-caste Hindu traditions, lower caste traditions are no Indian traditions. Obviously, Srinivas anchors tradition into sanskritization. Srinivas was actually interested in caste. He considered it to be the ‘structural basis’ of Hinduism. He was not fascinated by Hinduism in its holistic form. He looked for it in the caste system. Thus, his thesis of Indian traditions runs something like this: “Indian traditions are Hindu traditions, and Hindu traditions are found in caste system. Holistic Hinduism is beyond his scope of discourse.”

Besides caste, Srinivas looks for yet another source or manifestation of tradition. He found it in the notion of ‘dominant caste’. He first proposed it in his early papers on the village Rampura. The concept has been discussed and applied to a great deal of work on social and political organization in India. Srinivas was criticized

for this concept with the charge that it was smuggled from the notion of 'dominance' which emerged from African sociology. Repudiating the critique Srinivas asserted that the idea of dominant caste given by him had its origin in the fieldwork of Coorgs of South India. His fieldwork had impressed upon him that communities, such as the Coorgs and the Okkaligas, wielded considerable power at the local level and shared such social attributes as numerical preponderance, economic strength and clean ritual status. He further noted that the dominant caste could be a local source of sanskritization, or a barrier to its spread. Sanskritization and dominant caste are therefore representing of Indian tradition. And, in this conceptual framework, the traditions of the lower castes and Dalits have no place, nowhere in village India, the subaltern groups occupy the status of dominant caste.

Besides religion and caste, the third tradition component of Srinivas' study is village. Srinivas got the seed idea of studying India's villages from his mentor Radcliffe-Brown in 1945-46. When settled in India after his return from Oxford, he conducted the study of Rampur - a Mysore village - which gave him the concept of dominant caste. The study has been contained in the *Remembered Village* (1976). It is here only that Srinivas takes some time to discuss social and economic changes which have taken place in Rampura. He informs :

Technological change occupied a prominent place in the life of the people of Rampura soon after independence. Technological change, of course, went hand in hand with economic, political and cultural changes.

Here, in this part of the chapter, we are concerned about the meaning and definition of tradition in Indian context. The life mission of Srinivas has been to understand Indian society. And, for him, Indian society is essentially a caste society. He has studied religion, family, caste and village in India. He was a functionalist and was influenced by Radcliffe-Brown, Robert Redfield and partly Evans-Pritchard. These anthropologists were functionalists of high stature. Ideologically, they believed in status quo: let the Dalits survive as Dalits and let the high castes enjoy their hegemony over subaltern. Srinivas' search for the identity of traditions makes him infer that the

Indian traditions are found in caste, village and religion. For him, it appears that Indian social structure is on par with the advocates of *Hindutva* say, the cultural nationalism.

Srinivas though talks about economic and technological development, all through his works he pleads for change in caste, religion and family. Even in the study of these areas he sidetracks lower segments of society. They are like ‘untouchables’ for him. Srinivas has extensively talked about the social evils of caste society, he pleads for change in caste system and discusses westernization and modernization as viable paradigms of changes. But his perspective of change is Brahmanical Hinduism or traditionalism. In his zeal for promoting sanskritization, he has marginalized and alienated religious minorities. For him, Indian traditions are those, which are manifested in caste and village. His traditions are Hinduized traditions, and in no sense secular ones. Srinivas in a straightforward way rejects secularism and stands in favour of Hindu traditions. In his critique of Indian secularism which appeared in a short article in the *Times of India* in 1993, he finds secularism wanting because he believes that India needs a new philosophy to solve the cultural and spiritual crisis facing the country and that philosophy cannot be secular humanism. It has to be firmly rooted in God as creator and protector. Srinivas’ construction of sanskritization and dominant caste put him closer to *Hindutva* ideology of cultural nationalism. At this stage of our discussion on India’s traditions it can be said that any tradition emanating from caste system cannot be nation’s tradition as the constitution has rejected caste.

TRUST, RISK & MODERNITY

Trust, Risk & Modernity :

Obviously Giddens rejects that we have moved from a modern society to a post-modern or informational society. Rather he promotes that we are still in the modern age perhaps a “high modern society”. Giddens takes no small amount of time to discuss three conceptions regarding society and modernity. These three concepts are “institutional diagnosis of modernity”, “society as the primary focus of sociological analysis”, and “the connections between sociological knowledge and the characteristics of modernity”. Then proposes that in order to understand what makes modernity what it is we must not follow these concepts.

Rather Giddens says that what makes modernity what it is relates to three other “sources”: Modernity and ‘time and space’; ‘disembedding’ of social systems; and ‘reflexive ordering and reordering’ of social relations”.

Time & Space. Both pre-modern and modern society have time and space. With modernity became uniform and in the last decades has become coordinated. Space used to be closely connected with place, such as the act of going to work meant traveling from home to the office or company. Once there you were in the place fulfilling your function (space) at a given time. In the current age (ICTs) technology has enabled us to disjoin space and place. As Giddens mentions “advent of modernity increasingly tears space away from place by fostering relations between ‘absent’ others, locationally distant from any given situation of face-to-face interaction.... it becomes increasingly phantasmagoric” the society is enabled to be socialized through

sometimes quite distant points. This “distanciation” seems to me to relate to a concept of “virtual” reality which we have discussed earlier. Much like telework, telemedicine, and other such “distance” mediated activities, even a class conducted via Blackboard! This frees up opportunity to interact, allows organized society to connect in greater and newer ways, and world-wide associations are brought together at one time thereby allowing many different historical trends to converge into a new reality.

Disembedded Systems. Upon this concept of time and space is constructed the concept of disembedding of social systems. Two types of disembedded systems are proposed: symbolic tokens (things for exchange) and expert systems (ways to organize social environments or large amount of material). Giddens uses money as the example of the symbolic tokens process. Money has been taken out of the local realm of negotiation and exchanged purchase. Now money is more than simply a check or even a credit card. The Concept of money that allows an otherwise exchange of perhaps unrelated items or services may only be a “digital string of numbers”. The medium of exchange once recognized “currency” (commodity money or bank money) is no longer needed in order to allow people to consummate a transaction. Now those who may never meet, nor physically exchange currency may come together in hyper-text and consummate a deal or purchase a product on e-bay (money proper).

Money is one example, but the crux of the thought is that for the disembedded mechanism to function there must be trust and faith (a type) within the institutions of modern society. Institutions are of course “abstract” social concepts that assist society to flow and function properly.

Expert systems are ways to organize and manage. Expert knowledge is integrated into the society so that it is continuous and ever present . Examples are OSHA safety rules, Housing Inspections, Building Codes, Judicial System, Utility Companies, the transportation system, communications system, our pay check, insurance, and other daily services and regulations we normally do not think of each day of our lives. We have faith that these things exist and will assist our lives. In other wise we respect a concept of “authority” or superior construct that makes sure

our world turns each day. We accept and rely on this social order although we never perhaps are able to actually define the processes.

Trust. Faith leads to trust and trust bridges the gap to confidence. Trust is associated with absence of space and time. There is a definitive definition of trust at page 34. Trust and risk are associated.

Social disorientation (risk) that accompanies so called post-modern times is due to new circumstances we don't understand and that are beyond our control (3). Modernity is marked by discontinuity from traditional order. Current times have seen intensification of interconnection (over last 300-400 yrs), and acceleration of the pace of change. Against evolutionist thinking (even in those like Marxism that note discontinuity) Giddens's is a project that - whilst similar to Lyotard's deconstruction of the grand narrative - retains a confidence in discerning episodes of historical transition.

Thus the emergence of sociology in the form of a Marx, stripped as a theorist of alienation/ exploitation/ power, Durkheim and Weber, optimistic and pessimistic theorists of industrial society, war, totalitarianism all operating within the institutional parameters of modernity. Durkheim and Weber are used to criticise idea that modernity is 'capitalistic', Durkheim because it governed by industrialism, and Weber because it is institutional/ bureaucratic. Giddens cluttered point is 'modernity is multidimensional on the level of institutions.'

The book moves to talk of time/ space distan(c)iation and disembedding. The separation of time and place, due to 'empty time' (mechanical clocks, date time) and the 'lifting out' (uprooting) of the local both correspond to growth of different types of movement and institution away from traditional order. Money is one such social form that allows 'disembeddedness' to occur. A man need not be in the same place as his possessions, which can circulate independently from him, money is a 'symbolic token' (Keynes, Simmel, Marx used). Money, a central aspect of modernity, involves relations of trust. Trust is a major aspect of social life which does not require definite knowledge, such as trust in the architect that house won't fall down &c. Risk

is a complementary development representing a replacement of the concept of fate (cosmological) with human created contingencies, trust is connected with events that can not be anticipated, we respond to risk with trust and confidence. Here Giddens talks un-problematically of the individual and his/ her choice of actions. Trust is a necessary feature of disembedded societies that are not transparent.

Stuff now on reflexivity, situatedness of human behaviour in modernity in the very system of social reproduction. Tradition is no longer repeated unless it can be qualified by the new, the past holds no power to discipline the reflexive processes of the present – this disqualifies knowledge from certitude. Practices of social science are ‘more deeply implicated’ in modernity as their knowledge fashions its institutions reflexively. Yet make no mistake Giddens is not referring here to the techniques of authority and order, he is marking the bizarre point that the economic transformations associated with capital could only come about by people understanding!!! the concepts of ‘capital’ ‘market’ ‘investment’ and so on! “Modern economic activity would not be as it is were it not for the fact that all members of the population have mastered these concepts...” This is a ridiculous idea and deserves little comment, except to point out that this is a typical academic replacement of the concept with reality, and then the adjustment of reality to fit the concept – it shows further the completely the manner that sociology tends to de-politicise capitalism and view it in completely technocratic, functionalist and institutional ways. This book is appalling twaddle really, but onward:

Not only does our knowledge of its concept drive modernity forward, ‘Modernity is itself deeply and intrinsically sociological’.

The following pages show how entwined sociological knowledge is involved in social practices like marriage but and even though Giddens acknowledges that this occurs in circumstances where there are power differentials and sectional interests, he seems on the whole to see sociology in terms of a neutral domain of enquiry, which is subsequently manipulated though this manipulation does not in anyway mould the objectives and intentions of the science. Because there is no transcendental rationalist

basis to social values, they are open to question and revision; a total knowledge is not possible because we can not necessarily foresee (hence an implicit attack on predictive social science) the outcomes of our intervention. And finally, the point is “not that there is no stable social world to know, but that knowledge of that world contributes to its unstable or mutable character.”

As an aesthetic movement postmodernism differs from post-modernity – the latter represents a qualitatively new social order not yet arisen. Giddens rejects that post-modernity signals the end of systematic knowledge of society. Nietzsche and Heidegger are the points of reference for an anti-foundationalist critique of the Enlightenment. But post-modernity is problematic, because it appears itself to be a narrative, so the author prefers to understand post-modernism as modernity’s coming to understand itself. The critique of truth claims of the enlightenment (which replaced divine law with the certainty of reason and experience) opens up the enigmatic and reflexive nature of modernity itself. Rather than being superseded, modernity has been radicalised, through globalisation its institutions have spread. This radicalisation is partly due to the critique of its own foundations in the past, evolutionism and certainty and confidence in reason.

Four institutional sectors of modernity are outlined; capitalism is a sub system of industrialism and is treated in relative autonomy from it, capitalist society is part of the nation state that has centralised military power, exercises control over its dominions and is accompanied by a surveillance system that predominantly controls information. (Foucault, Clausewitz & c). Again although Giddens plays lip service to radical critiques of the power structures of these institutions, his concern is to build a general framework - for instance it is noted that capital depends on the property-less wage-labourer, but none of the other institutional parameters are configured in respect to this fact, the reasons for the development of ‘total war’ & are never laid out. Both surveillance and war are connected to industrialism, but only in the sense that the technical developments and its organisation of space provide grounds for them to occur. Giddens is not interested in developing this any further.

Inherently globalising, modernity implicates the affairs of the local with the global or other localities, this interconnection complicates the role of nation state, whole areas can be affected by changes outside of them, and beyond their control. International relations is criticised because by treating the sovereign state as actor it fails to identify agency that cross cuts them. Like Giddens, Wallersteins world system approach problematises this idea of society as a bounded space. The world system is economically based rather than primarily political and has more than one centre and is divided into the core, the semi-periphery and the periphery in shifting location. Here capital is seen as the driving force that undermines national boundaries. Giddens typically seeks to question this overemphasis on economic dynamics by reasserting the importance of political power in governing territoriality and its monopoly on violence; “No matter how great their economic power, industrial corporations are not military organisations...and they cannot establish themselves as political/ legal entities which rule a given territorial area”. Not supporting this remarkably naïve judgment (think of the Ogoni situation in Nigeria, or Berlusconi in Italy), Giddens proceeds to say that political control has its own autonomy, and dynamics between sovereign states reflexively determine the strength and effect of sovereign power. With all its talk of industrialisation of war, sophistication of weaponry and the truly global institutions, as well as people thinking globally, Giddens offers us a now familiar conclusion. The development of the means of communication allowed for the possibility of globalisation – globality would not have been possible without the ‘pooling of knowledge’ in the ‘news’! *Ma in che mondo vivi?*

Distinguished from traditional communities where a stranger is seen as a whole person in his strangeness, Giddens draws on Goffman to talk of modern societies where the ‘background noise’ of ‘social rhythms’ and trust lies in slight recognition of other agents but not fully fledged encounters between them – i.e. passing people in the street – this is termed ‘civil inattention’ - clearly these less direct encounters involve varying and situation specific degrees of trust. Giddens is more interested in the abstract systems of trustworthiness that for him are intrinsic to modernity. This involves the reflexive and open relations between expert systems, their representatives and lay-

people – these inescapable encounters mediated by their ‘access points’ in the real human operatives behind them, represent forms of assurance (Giddens’s favoured example is the air stewardess) and business as usual mentality in circumstances where there is risk. These mechanisms are part of the ‘re-embedding’ processes of social life, and characteristically involve a non-transparent expert knowledge base where various information is withheld from public consumption – important is the physical contact between participants in these mechanisms. A distinction is drawn between faceless and face-work commitments. Trust is necessitated by ignorance (one reason why information is withheld) but involvement with abstract systems is routinized and often unconscious.

So far these theses are common place. Yet when talking of ontological security, Giddens makes the most curious about turn. Suddenly the need for identity and coherence are qualities valid for pre-modern as well as modern societies. What follows is pretty much trash but here goes. Persons may feel dislocation of the self, indeed philosophers cannot either give certainty about the category of and the constancy of the self, schizophrenia etc are conditions of high sensitivity to the impossibility of gaining certainty about what one is, besides some ambivalent and equivocal sense of presence, of ‘being there’. In locating this lack of certainty in the world, in the fear of the real possibility of nuclear war, or paranoia about other people, Giddens needs to explain why normality does not become a whole bunch of screaming freaks. This is because trust mechanisms have been instantiated in childhood by our mothers. He now characterizes the normal mechanisms of the development of this infant relation, suggesting that aberrations occur in the face of hostile environments. He quotes Erik Erikson, of the object-relations school of psycho-analysis, where he outlines an idea of basic trust that holds the subject together against a sense of loss and dividedness of identity nurtured in a child by his parents. Trust thus develops because of absence; this absence is placated by habit that prevents existential crisis. Hence when these mechanisms are uprooted the self becomes dislocated. Or something like that. This really is hogwash because it reaffirms the idea that there are properly normal and abnormal responses to mechanisms of social inclusion. By explaining the disjunction

from the self in terms of an aberration or discontinuity of habit, Giddens gives away the fact that he is implicitly viewing what the social in terms of the law, or in terms of the general as Deleuze seems to argue in *Difference and Repetition*. As such sameness is a more fundamental ontological category than difference, no matter how much he talks of ontological insecurity. So for Giddens trust is the abstract system of societies foundations, (of its being normal) whilst angst and dread are the condition that break down of mechanisms that support trust would provoke. So trust works as some sort of social contract and existential angst the Hobbesian state of nature.

Having ripped apart his own construction of the fundamental difference between the modern and pre-modern, Giddens moves on to try to salvage the distinction from the never fully worked out implication of his 'psychology of trust which are universal, or near universal' (100). So in the whole history of mankind up to say 1700 J 'four localised contexts of trust' predominate. Kinship, local community, religious cosmologies (Freud), tradition (Levi Strauss)*. With the typical default of Giddens sociological grey matter set on the imagination that society is developed in response to more fundamental conflicts, these pre-modern and local modes of communication give harmony, place, stability and meaning in a world still governed by the ravages of nature and scarcity. This environment of risk is different in modernity where uncertainty and insecurity are heightened by being taken out of local contexts. The impregnation of the global into the local, and industrialisation change the face of risk, in modernity it is based on man made dangers even though the direct danger of violence seems to have been 'pacified' whereas in earlier societies civil war was the norm not the exception. (here no evidence to support what is an unnecessary postulate). Giddens now has the problem of showing why his banalities and platitudes about pre-modern society are so distinct from modernity. He suggests it's a matter of awareness of risk (why this is could not equally apply to pre-modern societies is unclear) and estimation of potential dangers, forgetting now that his whole previous theses have concerned the unpredictability of modern life, he ends with the ambiguous 'fortuna tends to return'!

*“Levi- Strauss’s notion of ‘reversible time’ is central to understanding the temporality of traditional beliefs and activities. Reversible time is the temporality of repetition and is governed by the logic of repetition – the past is a means of organising the future.”

Giddens, somewhat misleadingly, calls anything that has the least degree of sophistication about it ‘abstract system’. Flying on plane (how tiresome this analogy is getting) involves abstract systems as much as monetary exchange. So abstract system is the general world of technology and mediations that Giddens lumps together here. We depend on these systems for ontological security, they are bound up with intimacy and create psychological vulnerability – the reflexivity of modernity implies the construction of the self. What is so mistaken in the pages that follow is that Giddens a-historical ontology of the self has surreptitiously become extreme. The basic intimacy of trust twixt child and mother is now completely accepted, it might be more secure in pre-modern times and modern times might subvert it quicker by non-personal systems, but Giddens has no problem in assuming that the fundamental parameters of sociation can not be breached. So no matter how different traditional societies were, in this respect their fundamental identity is retained. (Now draws on Tonnies’s distinction of *Gemeinschaft* (community) with *Gesellschaft* (society)). Further drawing on both conservative positions and people like Habermas and Horkheimer, Giddens characterises modernity in terms of the break down of the intimate personal contexts of trust, into the predominance of public institutions to which personal relations are a mere adjunct. Discussing friendship the unsubstantiated banalities about pre-modern life (yes that is the whole gamut of all human history folks) continue, as well as noting new forms of community e.g. urban life, alongside abstract systems, a system of what we might call recognition/ acknowledgement goes on in respect to unknown strangers, we accept them and do not bring into question that someone unfamiliar to us is necessarily a threat. The point is that impersonal abstract system structure our everyday social practices which transforms the personal. Self enquiry develops through interaction with the other - through erotic encounter, mutual discovery and love (‘romantic love incorporates a cluster of values scarcely ever realisable in their totality’)

(122). BLAH. But this quest for self-identity is based upon the powerlessness people feel and yet there is no authentic withdrawal from the social (Lasch) as all points of retreat whether religion, well being and health are bound up with the abstract societal systems. Giddens spins self identity as an ‘opening out’, ‘mutuality of self-disclosure’ and ‘positive appropriation of circumstances in which globalised influences impinge upon everyday life.

Charting now different types of risk, the favourite examples of nuclear disaster or nuclear war, impossibility of working out the probability of modern risks (can not be verified through experiment). He introduces Beck’s idea that such large scale and global risks reduce the difference of the other, as all will suffer alike.

“in respect of the balance of security and danger which modernity introduces into our lives, there are no longer ‘others’ – no one can be completely outside”

More on how experts manage knowledge of risks. The examples of nuclear war show how bizarre this generalisation of risk is – very little attention is played to the political processes and conflicts that necessitated the emergence of these weapons and no attention is paid to the actual determinations that might make the use of them arise – the matter is treated as if it were above and beyond our control and as if it were a matter of fate. Giddens conjures up this sense of dread, the apocalypse, total annihilation that is the dark side of the new regimes of trust. This is basically Hobbesian reasoning laced with ever more primordial ontologies of human sensibility. Three ‘lay’ responses are given to these risks; pessimism, faith in providential reason, or the optimism of social movements.

Modernity is described as a juggernaut, relentlessly driving forward partly but never completely steered by humanity. But then it is no singular machine but a mass of differentiated counter-acting parts. We can not seize control over it, its very passage is one of insecurity, risk and displacement and reembedding. Moreover in opposition to Weber’s iron cage of bureaucracy, Durkheim is invoked to note the emergence of new places of ‘smallness and informality’, forging of new ties etc. Against Habermas’s idea that a preexisting life world is colonised, because abstract systems

interact in ‘dialectical interplay’ with everyday life, elements of expert systems are appropriated and vice-versa. Furthermore, most of us are not experts in respect to most systems of modern social life. Then follows a comparison between Giddens’s ‘Radicalised Modernity’ and theories of Post-Modernity’.

The reason why we cannot ride this juggernaut are attributed to operator failure and design faults in typical technocratic treatment, but most important for Giddens are unintended consequences and circularity of knowledge. From explaining the deficiencies of the system in terms of the complications of its design (hence conferring human intentionality and choice to the legitimation of the system) Giddens moves on to say we can never control social life properly – even more paradoxically - on of the main reasons for this is inequality of power and differences in values. But we should still try to steer the juggernaut through positive models of counterfactual and future orientated though in Utopian Realism. Here follows some typical abuse and appropriation of Marx, a sociologism of modelling the ‘good society’ and some general twaddle about life politics, emancipation, self- actualisation and self identity. But the oppressed are not of the same cloth, Marx’s master slave teleology! does not apply – outcomes are open ended – move away from class based/ labour movement in industrialist and captialistic versions of modernity. Giddens says we can separate the struggle for democratic rights from these movements for “surveillance is a site of struggle in its own right.

“The outlook of Utopian Realism recognizes the inevitability of power and does not see its use as inherently noxious. Power, in its broadest sense, is a means of getting things done.

The underdog provides the moral vehicle for ‘getting things done’ but ‘realising the goals involved often depends on the intervention of the privileged’ (162). This section continues endlessly speculating on the necessary post-capitalistic and post scarcity nature of post-modern society and what the plural institutional contours would look like. But really this is just musing on the same themes as before.

Giddens asks himself a question he would have done well to start with. Is modernity western? In its origins then yes, but in its globalising tendencies then no. But as a reflexive reason that questions its own foundations it detaches itself from all other cultures. Postmodernity is only the apparent dissolution and fragmentation - globalising is a countervailing tendency that issues forth this instability. This is in the nature of modernity's future orientation.

REFLEXIVE MODERNIZATION

Reflexive modernization

The idea of reflexive modernisation describes, at its simplest, the notion that we are moving into a third stage of social development within modernity. Beck has subtitled his influential Risk Society 'towards a new modernity'. Lash and Wynne, in their introduction to Risk Society suggest there was 'first pre-modernity, then simple modernity and finally reflexive modernity'. In other words, traditional society was first supplanted by the industrial society which might be called simple modernity. This period saw the emergence of classes, wealth accumulation, rapid scientific advance and the arrival of industrial and capitalist society. We are now, it is suggested, in the grip of the consequences of a shift from that second phase of simple modernity to a third phase, which for Beck, is the period of reflexive modernity. A characteristic of this period is the apparent continuity of industrial society through the change. The underlying nature of this new industrial society is, however, very different from the old. It is now faced not with the problem of harnessing or controlling nature for the benefit of humankind but 'essentially with problems resulting from techno-economic development itself'. It is in this sense that Beck says modernity becomes reflexive, 'a theme and a problem for itself.' This new modernity has to solve the human-constructed problems which arise from the development of industrial society; to tackle how the risks produced as a consequence of modernity can be 'prevented, minimised, dramatised, or channelled' from Reflexive Modernisation and the Social Economy by Mike Aiken One is reminded of two things -

- 1) The joke that gets inserted into a sitcom, where you hear someone say the punchline

– ‘Abd the bear says, “this isn’t about hunting, is it?”’

- 2) In Walter Tevis’ novel about chess, *Gambit*, the young prodigy with a drink problem is playing one of those showing exhibition tournaments, her versus a whole bunch of amateurs in a room that she walks around playing simultaneously. She keeps thinking she can sweep some guy off the board because she is who she is, but...

P.S. Aiken usefully clarifies -

Before proceeding I should first clarify a possible confusion inherent in the term ‘reflexive modernisation’. We should think of ‘reflexive’ more in the sense of ‘reflex’ than ‘reflection’. In other words the notion is about social development arising as a reflex to previous decisions or activities which may give rise to unintended or even surprising consequences.

Beck, for those unfamiliar with his work, is a German sociologist influenced by the Green movement and by thinkers such as Habermas and Giddens. He is a populariser and writes regularly in the German press in addition to his academic work. He is perhaps best known for *Risk Society* (1986), however, in this piece I will draw more from his later work, *The Reinvention of Politics* (1997) and *Reflexive Modernisation* (1994), the last a collaborative work with Scott Lash and Anthony Giddens. Beck, while not the originator of the term ‘reflexive modernisation’, has used it extensively in his writings and been one of the leading exponents of its use. This article is structured in the following way. The first part describes the idea of reflexive modernisation as espoused by Beck and suggests some broad areas where the theory may illuminate activities in the social economy. The second part describes the idea of the social economy and examines some specific examples. The third section looks at some ways they can be viewed through the theoretical lens of reflexive modernisation and offers some critical thoughts.

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Let us call the autonomous, undesired, and unseen, transition from industrial to risk society reflexivity (to differentiate it from and contrast it with reflection).

Then 'reflexive modernisation' means self-confrontation with the effects of risk society that cannot be dealt with and assimilated in the system of industrial society.

The idea of a movement to a third epochal phase has, of course, been widely heralded, not least by the postmodernist movement. Bauman, for example, locates this as a change which took shape ‘in the second half of the twentieth century in the affluent countries of Europe’, and sees the fall of communism as a defining moment for ‘the end of modernity.’

Beck agrees with the thrust of this suggestion and even commences his essay in *Reflexive Modernisation* with the fall of the Berlin Wall. The notion of reflexive modernisation as exemplified by Beck can certainly be seen as expressing a more optimistic alternative to the postmodern theses, with the importance of human agency figuring strongly. This is a second area of importance for those active in social economy activities. It is highlighted by McMylor who comments that throughout Beck’s work there is an increasing tendency for the ‘freeing of agency from structure and a multiplying process of ‘individuation’ which offers hope for a changed future ‘of alternative modernities’. He goes on to describe Beck’s work as representing, in sociological terms, ‘the return of repressed agency after decades of domination by structural determinism in both functionalist and Marxist forms’. The mechanism for this influence is the operation of sub-politics, to be discussed below, and it is in this sense that there is a reinstatement of the importance of the activist in social change.

Beck suggests that as a result of the increasing power of technological and economic forces, governance structures are changing rapidly which brings us to a third area of importance for examining social economy organisations. Towards the end of *Risk Society* Beck talks of an ‘unbinding of politics’ in the new modernity. He describes how the forces of industry, technology and business interpenetrate the mechanisms of parliament, parties and government in such a way as to leave the latter following belatedly behind changes that have already moved into place. In this scenario decisions are not taken by government ‘revolution under the cloak of normality occurs’ and is then justified post-hoc by regulatory frameworks.

The apparent policy makers are bounced along in the wake of technological and industrial progress. It is in this way that politics and decision making shifts to new sites.

Beck is not arguing against the importance of government in the manner of, say, the New Right, but pointing to how this role is changing in an era where the pace of development is rapid. What is being asserted is that 'High speed industrial dynamism is sliding into a new society without the primeval explosion of a revolution, bypassing political debates and decisions of parliaments and governments'.

He goes on to point to the puzzle this creates for our democracies as well as how it undermines traditional ideas like class conflict born in an earlier modernity. The idea that the transition from one social epoch to another could take place unintended and unpolitically, bypassing all the forums for political decisions, the lines of conflict and the partisan controversies, contradicts the democratic self-understanding of this society.

This brings us to a fourth area of importance for the social economy. Beck sees sub-politics as one of the new sites for effecting social transformation which has, he suggests, in many cases, taken over the role of what was previously undertaken by central agencies including the state. Sub-politics, the 'shaping of society from below' covers activities which take place outside the apparent political. In summary the theory of reflexive modernisation outlines a picture of a complex society which changes partly by some autonomous processes that flow from past consequences of industrial, technological and economic change. The results of these forces sometimes by-pass the traditional decision making and policy making apparatus that has arisen in simple modernity. Social change is also steered by a range of new actors who enter the realm of the political as a result of the increasing complexity these forces create. This often happens ahead of any planned governmental activity. The theory suggests that new sites for political activity arise through these processes and this is described as the influence of sub-politics.

POST MODERNITY AND MULTIPLE MODERNITIES

Post modernity and multiple modernities

Modernity and its artistic partner modernism have always been tied to the star of temporal progress. The time of modernity was not only teleological but its home lay in the West. In this sense, “multiple modernities” is an oxymoron, a logical contradiction. Consider, for example, the exhibition entitled *The Short Century*, curated by Okwui Enwezor, that took place in New York, among other venues, in 2001-2002. The show presented a survey of a number of African movements during the second half of the twentieth-century not previously included in standard histories of modernism: spin-offs of European and American art forms, as well as survivals of indigenous traditions dating from pre-colonial times. Fascinating as these artistic initiatives and works might be, the claim that they deserve scholarly attention and aesthetic appreciation is difficult to reconcile with the history of modernism. The triumphal progression towards ever greater abstraction traced by its dominant narrative, simply does not translate into these circumstances. African art typically functions as one of the global shadows that sets off the brilliance attributed to the Euro-American trajectory as it moves from cubism to abstract expressionism and beyond—a necessary backdrop for the performance of those appearing on the “world’s stage.” Only now, after the modernist story has itself petered out and its internal contradictions exposed, has a space for the artistic traditions of other cultures become visible.

The concept of multiple modernities has been developed with a view to highlighting the ways in which modern societies differ from each other.

Other sociological approaches, mostly anchored in some version of modernization theory, emphasize such societies' commonalities. But does the juxtaposition of convergence and divergence in the form of a mutually exclusive, binary opposition really make sense? Might it be that there is convergence in some respect, while diversity persists in other respects; that there are dimensions of social change that exhibit common trends across regions and cultural zones, while other aspects of social life show remarkable resilience against homogenization? The present article argues that the controversy between modernization theory and multiple modernists cannot be settled by empirical means alone because the question as to whether modern societies converge or diverge is not an either-or question. Comparing any two societies will inevitably yield commonalities as well as differences. Facts are meaningless, however, unless their status is determined for a given reference problem: the same observation can carry extremely different weight depending on the frame of reference within which it is considered. The frame of reference for the controversy between modernization theory and multiple modernists is the theory of modernity. If one wants to know what a particular observation means for that theory, one first needs to lay out the conception of modernity that is being employed or proposed. Only then can one assess the significance of empirical phenomena.

Modernity is an important concept in sociology, as it stands for the very societal formation to whose emergence the discipline itself owes its existence. Modern society, as conceptualized in the works of classical sociological thinkers such as Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel and Talcott Parsons, is radically different from earlier modes of societal organization and the outcome of a fundamental transformation of society matched in historical significance only by the Neolithic revolution. Modernization, the change that results in modernity, is an interlinked process of structural differentiation, cultural rationalization and personal individuation in the views of these classics. Once set in motion, social change becomes endemic, favoring institutions that are both adaptable to and stimulate further change.

Multiple modernists reject this conceptualization based on its alleged incapacity to capture the immense social, political and cultural diversity displayed by the modern age. This diversity, they claim, can be accounted for only if the concept of modernity is pluralized. But before one can pluralize any concept, one first needs to know what its variants have in common, because unless one does, there is no way to tell whether a particular case is really a variant of the type in question or rather something else. There can thus be no meaningful talk of modernities without a proper definition of modernity.

Regrettably, though, a sufficiently clear definition of modernity is conspicuously absent from the literature on multiple modernities, as even sympathetic observers have had occasion to note (see e.g. Allardt, 2005). It is, however, clear what the notion of multiple modernities goes against, namely the classical theories of modernity and, especially, the modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s, because Eisenstadt and several of his followers have spared no effort to state their aversion to these theories (see Eisenstadt, 2000a; Wittrock, 2000). Taking modernization theory as a point of departure should therefore provide some hints as to the kinds of assumptions the critics must be making to lend the notion of multiple modernities credibility.

As indicated in the introduction, the main point of contention between modernization theory and multiple modernists is the former's claim that modernization is a homogenizing process, ultimately leading to the convergence of the societies undergoing it: 'a process of social change whereby less developed societies acquire characteristics common to more-developed societies', as Daniel Lerner (1968: 386) put it. But what does modernization theory actually mean by 'convergence'? To answer this question, it is important to keep in mind that modernization theory is conceptually anchored in the work of Talcott Parsons. As is well known, Parsons' theory of modernity is embedded in a more encompassing theory of action systems. Society, in Parsons' conceptualization, is a subsystem of the social system, which in turn is one of four subsystems of the general action system, the other three subsystems being the cultural system, the personality system and the behavioral organism.

Modernization theory concerns itself only with the social, cultural and personality systems. It argues that upon modernization the personality system becomes increasingly achievement oriented, aware of its own individuality and empathetic; that modernization leads to rationalization, value generalization and the diffusion of secular norms in the cultural system; and that functional differentiation is the dominant trend in, as well as foremost structural characteristic of, modern society, the social system that is of special interest to sociological theory (Lerner, 1958, 1968; Parsons, 1964, 1977).

Much like other macro-sociological approaches, modernization theory places particular emphasis on developments in the economic and political subsystems of society, but other important subsystems such as the educational system, the scientific system, the legal system and the system of mass media are also examined. In the economy, the most salient change from the viewpoint of modernization theory is the emergence of self-sustained growth; in politics, it is growing participation by the citizenry (that the population only becomes in the modern age); in education, the spread of mass schooling; in science, the establishment of the research university and other purely research-oriented institutions; in law, the enunciation of universalistic norms and their application by professionally trained, independent judges; in the media, the rapid diffusion of information to mass audiences and, thus, the creation of public opinion.

Functional differentiation, while constituting a key, perhaps the key, difference from the structure of pre-modern society (whose mode of societal organization is dominated by the stratification system), is institutionally underdetermined and hence compatible with a variety of institutional forms.

Modernization theory's understanding of the institutional make-up of modern society is, once again, inspired by Parsons' work, especially by his theory of evolutionary universals. In an influential article outlining that theory, Parsons associates the progression of stages of societal evolution with critical evolutionary breakthroughs that give more-advanced societies an edge over less-advanced ones in terms of their capacity to adapt to environmental conditions.

In the case of modernity, Parsons identifies four such universals that he believes

were crucial both for its breakthrough and ultimate consolidation :

money and market systems in the economy, democracy in the political realm, the rule of law and equality before the law in the legal sphere, and bureaucratic organization of public and private institutions (see Parsons, 1964).

This characterization, while still somewhat vague, obviously bears much resemblance to 'the' Western model of modernity, to which it does indeed owe a lot. Note, however, that it does not reflect a consensual position shared by all modernization theorists. Samuel Huntington, for instance, in his book *Political order in changing societies* (1968), offers a less-demanding conceptualization of at least political modernity by arguing that the most important political distinction in the modern age is not the one between democracies and dictatorships but the one between those governments that really do govern the country under their (formal) jurisdiction and those that do not. A modern political order, on his conceptualization, is a system of rationalized authority wherein office-holders are expected to serve the public, rather than purely their own, interest and have the capacity to execute chosen policies based on control of a well-functioning state apparatus. This leaves room for political alternatives beyond (what is now widely viewed as) the Western model, for instance for authoritarian systems, as many of Huntington's critics have pointed out. Parsons too allowed for more than one route to modernity and for differential institutionalization of its 'program', as can be seen from his treatment of the Soviet Union as a near equal to the United States with respect to the depth and levels of modernization it had achieved by the second half of the 20th century (Parsons, 1977: 216ff.). He was, however, skeptical as to the long-term stability of Soviet-style political systems because of their inbuilt legitimacy deficits (Parsons, 1964: 126). History seems to have proven him right on this point.

But be this as it may, Parsons explicitly stated his belief that there could be '[great] variations within the modern type of society' (Parsons, 1977: 228), and that many more such variations would probably emerge as a result of the global trend 'toward completion' of this type of society, a development which he predicted would

likely continue well into the 21st century (1977: 241).

The notion of convergence must be understood against the backdrop of this expectation. It applies first and foremost to the basic structure of society, the premise being that pre-modern and modern societies differ much more from each other than do the many varieties of (the one type of) modern society that emerge as a result of successful modernization, a process that Parsons viewed as far from complete. Convergence, thus understood, occurs when modernizing countries meet two main conditions. First, they must move toward establishing a set of key institutions that the theory regards as essential to modernity, and second, they must succeed in making these institutions perform in line with their stated purposes, rather than being mere ‘facades’ (Meyer et al., 1997) of modernity.

Even today, many countries fail to meet these conditions and hence would presently not qualify as being fully modern. Yet, while difficult to meet, neither condition requires any modernizing country to become exactly like the forerunners or even a ‘carbon copy’ (Parsons, 1977: 215) of the United States, as some of modernization theory’s fiercest critics would have it (see e.g. Wittrock, 2000: 54). True, Parsons did suggest the United States could serve as ‘a model for other countries in structural innovations central to modern societal development’ (Parsons, 1977: 215), and other modernization theorists have done likewise. In the wake of the Vietnam War and the student revolts of the late 1960s, arguably also of the decolonization of much of the non-Western world after the Second World War, this suggestion came under fire because it was interpreted as a barely camouflaged rationalization of American imperialism. Is that a sensible judgment? While perhaps politically understandable at the time, the judgment’s theoretical plausibility is debatable. To understand why, the term modernization needs some clarification. On the one hand, it simply refers to the dynamic aspects of modernity, the processes and products of change that accompany the transition from pre-modern to modern society and beyond. On the other hand, it signifies conscious efforts on the part of influential societal actors to set in motion, by means of rational planning, developments that result in what is understood as modernity at a particular point in time.

Historically, the two modes of modernization form a sequence. Whereas the earliest breakthroughs to modernity are primarily emergent phenomena, the aggregate effects of uncoordinated actions that, while subverting the old order, were rarely goal directed in the sense of aiming to realize (what only in hindsight and from the scientific perspective of a second-order observation may appear as) a 'program' or 'project' of modernity, later modernizers, through the demonstration effect of forerunners, tend to have relatively clear ideas as to where they are headed and how to get there. The 'pioneers' inevitably serve as models for the followers because not only is it impossible for the latter to ignore (knowledge about) the existence of the former but the perceived superiority of the forerunners provides the very stimulus for modernization. Late modernization, to the extent that it reflects purposive action, is driven by the aim to close the gap with the leaders, and that aim can be realized only through learning from them. Now, to propose the United States as one model for late modernization made perfect sense because at the time the proposal was made the US clearly was a leader in modern development: in the economy, in science, in research and development, in formal education, in social mobility, in popular (everyday mass) culture and arguably in other fields as well.

Today, the picture is more varied because, emulating 'best practices' of institutional design and policy designation in the United States and other socio-economically advanced countries, several erstwhile followers have become models themselves. And what makes them attractive as models is precisely that they have already achieved what others are still striving for: becoming modern and catching up with the West. But one cannot become modern and catch up with the West without establishing a basic structure of society that resembles that of the West, because this structure is the very condition of the West's success. Modernization theory's proposal to view the United States as a model for development amounts to little more than an acknowledgement of this fact. A differentiation-theoretical perspective casts doubt on this view. A case in point is India. Since its independence in 1947, the country has been a political democracy and thus, politically speaking, doubtless modern, despite many shortcomings of its democracy.

At the same time, the caste system, and hence a social structure that is incompatible with full modernity, persists despite its legal abolition several decades

ago. This system divides the population into closed hereditary groups ranked by ritual status.

Intermarriage and interdining across caste boundaries are prohibited, and the relationships between the various groups included in the system are strictly hierarchically organized, with the upper castes controlling positions of prestige and political as well as economic power, and the lower castes relegated to positions reflecting the lesser social worth or value ascribed to them. The centuries-old link between caste and occupation, and, consequently, material wealth or poverty has become less rigid since the 19th century, but socioeconomically privileged groups are still predominantly upper caste and vice versa. Much worse than the situation of members of the lower castes, however, is that of the so-called untouchables, or Dalits, and of numerous tribal peoples, who fall outside the caste system and hence have no place whatsoever within the boundaries defined by that system. According to a recent study, this group, comprising an estimated quarter of the Indian population, suffers extreme forms of exclusion, humiliation, exploitation and deprivation.

Especially in rural India, where 70 percent of Indians live, many Dalits are denied basic rights of citizenship, such as protection against acts of violence or the confiscation of property, voting, access to public services, selling or buying of goods at public markets, entering temples, freedom in the choice of places of residence, sometimes even marriage. Frequently being kept in conditions of debt-bondage, they suffer from the imposition of forced, unpaid or underpaid labor (remunerated below market rates and often at the unrestricted discretion of quasi-feudal landlords), sexual abuse, as well as visible acts of subordination and public insult, such as having to wear filthy clothes, to stand with bowed head, to walk naked in public, etc. (Shah et al., 2006; Sooryamoorthy, 2008). Alongside other minorities (especially the Muslim population), they also face ongoing discrimination in the public education system, whose systematic underfunding and poor quality further contribute to locking low-status groups into their disadvantaged position (see e.g. Dubey, 2009).

While the caste system is unique to India, social cleavages and exclusions of the sort it produces are not; much of Latin America, for instance, exhibits similarly entrenched divisions between quasi-hereditary status groups (Scheper-Hughes, 1992; Larrain, 2000; de Ferranti et al., 2004). Extreme forms of social exclusion pervading the whole structure of society are also found in parts of Southeast Asia (e.g. in the Philippines) and elsewhere in the less-modernized world.

Social structures that sustain – and socio-cultural traditions that sanction – practices and hierarchies such as these are inimical to modernity because they are based, or premised, on categorical inequalities that subvert the principle of functional differentiation by erecting virtually insurmountable barriers between the underprivileged and the privileged. They draw a line between what are viewed – and treated – as essentially different types of human beings among whom horizontal (symmetrical) relations are inconceivable, sometimes even outright heretical (against ‘nature’). They also subvert the proper functioning of many formally modern institutions, which they effectively turn into instruments for advancing elite interests – through the allocation of public offices (that are often filled on the basis of status rather than qualification), the allocation of public funds and services (whose distribution tends to be highly regressive), and by other means.

Before the breakthrough to modernity, a societal order dividing the population into strictly separated and hierarchized strata was the norm in all advanced civilizations; thereafter this order began to crumble and gradually had to give way to a new order wherein each member of society is (to be) regarded (and increasingly also treated) as an equal. To hierarchical systems of stratification, the very notion of equality of status, and hence also that of equal citizenship, is alien and meaningless. Modern social systems, on the other hand, are certainly not egalitarian in all respects, but the inequalities they treat as permissible follow a different logic, are gradual rather than categorical in nature.

Needless to say, this is an ideal-typical distinction because in the real world the two types of inequality almost always overlap. Analytically, the distinction is nevertheless important because it points to a key difference between the ideational foundations of

modern and pre-modern societies. What to pre-modern societies is just an immutable fact of life constitutes a permanent embarrassment to modern societies because it contradicts their self-understanding – the semantics in which they describe themselves and reflect the performance of their institutions. It is precisely for this reason that the existence of deeprooted differences of social class, between the sexes, races, ethnicities, etc., in short: the existence of ascribed differences reflecting gradations of recognized social worth or value, is a problem that requires ongoing remedial effort and/ or justification in modern society.

Cultural traditions often serve to perpetuate hierarchies and practices of pre-modern origin. A field in which this is particularly evident is gender relations. The comparatively low value placed on the lives of girls and women in parts of South and East Asia is responsible for widespread female feticide and infanticide, resulting in a highly ‘skewed’ sex ratio and tens of millions of ‘missing’ women in India and China (Croll, 2000). Unicef (2006) estimates that more than 130 million women and girls alive today have been subjected to forced genital circumcision in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa as well as in parts of Southeast Asia because traditional worldviews, customs and norms deny them the right to sexual pleasure. Illiteracy rates for women in India (Drèze & Sen, 2002), but also in many Arabic countries (see UNDP, 2006), are twice as high as those for men, and many more girls and women than boys and men are undernourished because of cultural norms affording eating priority to males (Sudarshan & Bhattacharya, 2006).

Forced marriages and ‘defense-of-honor’ killings of non-compliant daughters or sisters are the order of the day in much of the Muslim world, especially in its least-developed parts and among the leasteducated segments of the population.

The list goes on and on. For a school of thought as sensitive to ‘difference’ as the multiplemodernities school, it is remarkable how little attention it pays to differences such

as these, which are almost totally absent from its accounts of (diversity in) the modern age. Might the reason be that they are hard to reconcile with a perspective that treats all countries and world regions as equally modern? That, at any rate, is how things appear from a differentiation-theoretical perspective, according to which the most important difference between modernity and its evolutionary precursor is that between stratificatory and functional differentiation of society (Luhmann, 1997; see also Parsons, 1964). As long as stratification continues to be the dominant mode of societal structuring, excluding large parts, if not the majority, of the population from access to its institutions and benefits, modernity, in this view, cannot be said to have genuinely established itself. Instead, it is a lived reality only for socially included minorities (Luhmann, 2000b: 232).

Assuming there are social-structural and cultural differences that, rather than reflecting intra-modern diversity, are better understood as demarcating zones of greater or lesser levels of modernization attained, then one needs criteria by which to judge particular cases. Differentiation theory proposes one such criterion, the degree to which functional differentiation has been realized; and its modernization-theoretical offspring adds others, for instance the levels of socio-economic and socio-cultural development, the spread and performance of modern institutions, individuation of persons, the diffusion of secular and egalitarian norms, and others. And while any proposal is debatable, these two schools at least venture to make some. The multiple-modernities school, by contrast, appears insensitive to truly fundamental differences while making much of relatively minor differences in the expressive cultures of contemporary nation-states; of, as John Meyer (2000: 245) put it bluntly, ‘things that in the modern system do not matter’.

COLONIALISM AND MODERNITY

Structure**9.1 Introduction****9.2 Theoretical Aspect****9.3 Colonial Modernities****9.4 Introduction**

Modernity is best understood as a condition, rather than as the designation for some particular period of time. Aspects of the modern condition can arise at any time and place, but they are most generally associated with historical trends arising out of Cartesian philosophy, industrial capitalism, revolutionary politics, and the cultural changes of the turn of the nineteenth century. The main lesson to be learned from the postmodernism of the late twentieth century is that the tensions of modernity are still with us.

Of course, the term modern has narrower uses in particular fields of human endeavor, including especially art and architecture. The use of the term in the sense discussed here, as a syndrome of conditions associated with the modern mode of human life, is relatively recent. The French revolutionaries, for example, did not think of themselves as modern. When characterizing the more forward-thinking aspects of his time, the philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) did not call them modern or

even enlightened, but described the late eighteenth century as undergoing a process of enlightenment. Classically, the term modern contrasts the present day as opposed to some time in the past, or more specifically, it contrasts ancient times with the modern times subsequent to them, as in Bernard of Chartres's famous twelfth-century description of moderns as dwarves sitting on the shoulders of giants. Modern may also apply as an adjective denoting novelty, as in the phrase "modern conveniences."

From a general point of view, however, modernity should be understood as a condition, mentality, or syndrome presenting characteristic dilemmas to human beings that remain both defining and unresolvable. Elements of the modern condition include rejection of traditional authority, a progressive rather than cyclical notion of time, individual and collective emancipation, a broadly empiricist orientation toward understanding the world, and what John Dryzek has called a Promethean outlook that regards all difficulties as technical problems to be mastered through human endeavor. As a heuristic, contrasts with unmodern conditions may be useful, as in Jürgen Habermas's point that "before the French Revolution, before the workers' movements in Europe, before the spread of formal secondary education, before the feminist movement . . . the life of an individual woman or man had less worth—not regarded from our own point of view, of course, but from the contemporary perspective" (p. 106). The modern horrors of the twentieth century, however, should cause one to be careful to apply these distinctions to elements of human practice, rather than to specific individuals or groups. The impulse to define some people along a premodern/modern axis, itself an outgrowth of characteristically modern impulses toward rational social management, should be resisted, whether the people are described as characteristically modern, as Richard Wagner said of the Jews, or as characteristically premodern, as European colonists considered aboriginal residents of the New World. The tension in this very practice of defining modernity in people and practices, with its disparate results ranging from attempted extermination to processes of emancipation, respectively, reveals the inescapably dialectical nature of the modern condition.

Indeed, an accelerated and socially powerful process of conceptual change constitutes a key element of the modern condition. Reinhart Koselleck has argued

that in modernity, “political and social concepts become the navigational instruments of the changing movement of history. They do not only indicate or record given facts. They themselves become factors in the formation of consciousness and the control of behavior” (p. 129). Koselleck illustrates this process with the quintessentially modern concept of emancipation: once the reflexive verb, to emancipate oneself, gained currency beyond its origins among philosophers and literati and began to be used widely among participants in the revolutionary politics of late-eighteenth-century France, it became linguistically impossible, as it were, to defend the institutions of the Old Regime. The linguistic turn in philosophy and social theory attests to the modern role of language as constituting experience itself. Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) argued that language illuminates specific, comprehensive modes of being in the world; Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) later refined this idea with the idea that human beings move within “horizons” of linguistic prejudgments. Philosophers as different as Habermas, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Hannah Arendt have explored the potential for commonalities in language usage to overcome seemingly fundamental barriers among human beings.

9.2 Theoretical Aspect

Modern theorists do not agree about the role played by historical subjects in effecting the conceptual changes that seem to drive a constantly evolving public sphere. Whereas Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) spoke abstractly of the progress of Geist (mind, consciousness, spirit) and Michel Foucault (1926–1984) revealed the socially constructed nature of the concepts and practices that constrain human beings, Karl Marx (1818–1883) and his followers argued that false consciousness could be overcome, while Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) and his successors sought to overcome the damage done to individual mental health by modern social pressures through psychoanalysis. Some lines of modern argument are characterized by progressive optimism regarding the power of enlightened human reason, once freed from the shackles of tradition, to remake society according to rational principles. Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and his fellow utilitarians, for example, supported a slate of social reform programs, including birth control and

humane treatment of prisoners, based on their application of the principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number to society at large. In another indication of the dialectical tensions inherent in modernity, Bentham's rationalist vision of prison reform, originally intended to redeem the inherent worth and social value of every individual, even those abandoned to the horrors of the premodern prisonhouse, has evolved, as Foucault has demonstrated, into a near-totalitarian vision of social control over the resisting individual. Bentham's modern design for a prison, the "panopticon," has become the blueprint for the present-day "supermax" vision not of rehabilitation, but of central control.

Alexis de Tocqueville's (1805–1859) seminal thinking about this dynamic between modern egalitarian democracy and quasi-despotic central control happened to begin with a study of the early-nineteenth-century American prison system, which in Pennsylvania and New York exemplified Benthamite reformist principles. In *Democracy in America*, Tocqueville warned his fellow Europeans that democratic equality was not a passing fad, that although it broadened opportunities for the masses, it threatened national and individual greatness, and that without a strong network of intermediate institutions, democracy was likely to resolve into centralized administrative despotism. Tocqueville's dystopian vision contrasts with Bentham's progressivist faith in reason's beneficence: modern individuals in American democracy may be free of the old tyrannies of class and king, but they are subject to new forms of despotism rooted in their very freedoms. Like John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), Tocqueville argued that modern social mobility requires individuals to devote most of their energy to economic well-being, to the exclusion of more noble pursuits. Worse, without the traditional intermediaries of the estates checking the central power of the state, democracies will tend toward ever more powerful government. As modern individuals torn by accelerating social pressures become alienated from their premodern social support systems, they are vulnerable to domination by "an immense tutelary power . . . which alone takes charge of assuring their enjoyments and watching over their fate. It is absolute, detailed, regular, far-seeing, and mild. It would resemble paternal power if, like that, it had for its object to prepare men for manhood, but on the

contrary, it seeks only to keep them fixed irrevocably in childhood . . . can it not take away from them entirely the trouble of thinking and the pain of living?” (p. 693).

What Habermas calls the “enlightenment project” thus doubles back on itself. Whereas for Kant, republican government (that is, government responsible to the people) forms an essential part of the emancipation of human beings to autonomy, for Tocqueville this same institution could lead to autonomy’s opposite, to the infantilization of the population under a paternal power far worse than any premodern royalist opposed by the likes of John Locke and Thomas Jefferson. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) had identified this irony of modernity already in the eighteenth century. In his first Discourse he outlines the many sacrifices human beings have had to make to become modern, including even the possibility of authentic relations with each other. However, for Rousseau there is no going back: modern consciousness, once achieved, cannot be forgotten but must enable modern human beings to devise new institutions for achieving a modern kind of authenticity. Similarly, the English poet William Wordsworth (1770–1850) complained in an 1807 sonnet of the loss of authentic relations among newly rational modern human beings :

The world is too much with us; late and soon,
Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers:
Little we see in Nature that is ours;
We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon!
The Sea that bares her bosom to the moon;
The winds that will be howling at all hours,
And are up-gathered now like sleeping flowers;
For this, for everything, we are out of tune;
It moves us not.—Great God! I’d rather be
A Pagan suckled in a creed outworn;

So might I, standing on this pleasant lea,
Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn;
Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea;
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathèd horn.
(Sonnet No. 18).

The loss of the old gods, of traditional ways and of the comforts of an unquestionable worldview worried Wordsworth, the German poet Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843), and many others, but presented an opportunity to those modern thinkers seeking to replace the Old Regime with rational modes of human being. Chief among these were Marx and Engels, who noted with pleasure that in modern life “all fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind” (p. 68). Marx’s optimism was undergirded by his faith in the power of reason; he expects human “sober senses” to point out the direction to progress. Nietzsche has a similar diagnosis of the origins of contemporary institutions in the interests of the few, but no accompanying expectation that the application of modern human reason can end this dynamic :

9.3 Colonial Modernities

There are two important issues in the development of colonial modernities: the interpretation of manifestations of modernity in the process of imperial expansion, on the one hand, and the place assigned to indigenous people in the colonial enterprise, on the other. Regarding the former, authors such as C. L. R. James focus on the modernity of slavery in the Atlantic economies at the beginning of the modern period; similarly, others suggest that the Indian peasant is not an anachronism in a modernized colonial world but a veritable contemporary of colonialism, an indispensable member of modernity. The complicity between colonial history and modernity is precisely the

cause of the circumstances underlying the statement, “The same historical process that has taught us the value of modernity has also made us the victims of modernity” (Chatterjee, pp. 8–9). This strong correlation has its origin in numerous attempts to reinterpret the manifestations of modernity from indigenous impressions of it, by trying to jettison certain of these signs while recognizing the revisionist efforts to which it is heavily subjected in non-Western societies. Such a perspective is notably more apparent in studies on India and China than in those on Africa. One observes in the former an abundance of qualifications that result from opposing the idea of modernity as a strictly European development and affirming it as a multivalent phenomenon. Partha Chatterjee provides the best insight on this point in his definition of an Indian (or rather, Bengali) modernity as “our modernity.”

The many authors who have joined this debate after Chatterjee emphasize the ways in which non-Western societies remake modernity in their own images, revising rationality and capitalism by transforming general formulas and formulations in terms of their own interests, ideals, and enterprises—political, economic, and social. It is essential to recognize that in the case of Africa, the debate is less intense today than it has been. It does not necessarily take the same theoretical and epistemological approaches that color the writings in the social sciences on India and China, to give just two examples. It has always been presented as a double figure, each of which takes various forms, the pair tradition/modernity and the demands, expectations, and aspirations of development through the economic and social compensation by modern, industrial Europe. This figure, which does not always reflect democratic structures, secularism, or equality between the sexes, among other things, is part of a series of attempts to transform African societies by “modernizing bureaucrats” in the final phase of colonial domination. In Africa and among blacks in general, as has already been mentioned, writers and cultural critics—more than historians and social scientists—have drawn connections between Africa and Europe, whether in terms of conflict (Aimé Césaire, Camara Laye, and Cheikh Hamidou Kane) or a fruitful dialogue (Léopold Sédar Senghor and Ousmane Socé Diop). Only one author, Cheikh Anta Diop, a Senegalese philosopher, taking a brutal, ironic approach, reverses this problematic double. He has made a name for himself as a radical dissident and has

struggled to rethink and revise the genealogy of modernity to counter the notion of it as a strictly European development. On the contrary, he asserts, Europe has evolved under the aegis of Africa; it became rational by following the example and teachings of Africa, the mother of civilizations and the originator of modernity, which emerged along the banks of the Nile during the time of the Egyptian pharaohs.

This revision of the history of human rationality erases the boundary between traditional African societies and modern European societies. At the least, the idea of extreme difference between the two is interpreted as an ideological strategy for establishing the mission of civilizing native populations and the enterprises of colonization. By reintroducing Africa as a participant in the development of rationality and modernity, Cheikh Anta Diop reconfirms Africa as producer and consumer of modernity. Not many other African authors share his view, although it has been embraced by partisans of Afrocentrism, especially in the United States. On the contrary, at the heart of the debates, which intensified during the years of nationalism—after World War II to the 1970s—in the era of globalization, the crucial question is how to interpret the complex and paradoxical relationship between culture and modernization. At issue are the conflict-ridden associations between modernity and colonial cultures and violence, and the cultural and psychological renaissance that accompanied the founding of postcolonial nations and states. Two historians, J. F. A. Ajayi and Jacqueline Ki-Zerbo, have responded to this in the same way. Ajayi suggests that the colonial enterprise failed in its desire to erase the African past, having never succeeded in changing the path of African history or the strength and prevalence of African initiative. Ki-Zerbo warns against the assimilation and appropriation of the history and culture of others, which cannot provide any guarantee of success in terms of development and modernization. Among the novelists, Kane emphasizes the ambiguity of the venture. The Grande Royale, who argues for the education of the young people of the kingdom of Diallobés against his brother, the king and religious leader of the community, gives two reasons: to understand why the colonizers, even though they were in the wrong, were able to defeat them; and to enable his people to gain technological expertise. His reading considers that neither morals nor the values of authenticity can save one from domination. The experience at school and university of Samba Diallo, the book's

main character, and his delving into the Koran and texts by the philosophers of the Enlightenment do not open any doors to him other than those of solitude and death, which sanctions failure, and of assimilation and hybridization. Kane is even more explicit in his theoretical texts.

In contrast, Socé Diop, in his novel *Karim* (1935), relates with gusto the metamorphoses of the main character, Karim, who assumes multiple identities, including an accountant trained at a French school, a Senegalese Muslim from Saint-Louis (the oldest French colonial settlement in Africa) educated in the traditions of Islam and the values of the Wolof aristocracy, a dancer and charmer cognizant of urban opportunities and colonial chances. For each identity, Diop gives Karim a corresponding clothing style, dance steps, a manner of being and acting that are superimposed with close attention to French, African, and Islamic teachings and practices on issues of aesthetics and rhythm, dress, love, and sex. Karim represents the celebration of a hybrid form of being, rejecting the draconian choice that would have lethal consequences for the “ambiguous adventure.” The approach taken by Socé Diop is shared by “the translators of colonial modernity” analyzed by Simon Gikandi.

Gikandi describes superbly the dilemma of constructing an indigenous culture that embraces the colonial political economy both internally and externally, and examines the production of colonial modernity through a never-ending negotiation between the desire to maintain the integrity and autonomy of colonized societies and the willingness to face up to the European presence and its political economy (pp. 23–41). Taking as an example the kingdom of Buganda (today the nation of Uganda), he shows how the elite adopts Christianity as a key element in developing a certain modernity, regarded as one way of participating in the colonial culture. Similar characteristics detected and analyzed by Gikandi, beginning with the account of the voyage of Ham Mukasa (Uganda’s Katikiro in England) are found in the ethnographic and religious writings of David Boilat and in the militant intervention of Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, leader of Senegal’s Casamance independence movement, who used the colonial culture to “develop”—in the photographic sense—indigenous moral values and religious beliefs. Through these different figures, people involved in such causes became interested in

reorienting the ways of expressing and of satisfying the desires generated by colonial modernity toward indigenous ends. They tried in various ways to alter the very nature of the “colonial canon” by infusing it with their voices, passions, and anxieties, so that it would present them not as objects of European intervention but as the subjects of their own cultural destiny (Gikandi, in Mukasa’s Uganda’s Katikiro, p. 21).

This way of thinking led to the perception of the dual nature of tradition and the realities it conceals, involving both a constant reinvention of the colonial canon and an ever-shifting horizon due to the ceaseless work of translation, appropriation, and selection. By means of this work, the colonial experience is turned into an indigenous opportunity. The only question that troubles the carriers or translators of modernity is that of defining the colonial culture of modernity (including Christianity) in isolation from the “enlightenment” of the Christian message and colonial modernity, from the repressive, controlling mechanism of political power, and from its very authoritarian economic and cultural manifestations.

To understand the African debate on modernity is, in large measure, to identify the different ways in which the “package” (the concept and the different constructions that it has given rise to) and the numerous realities that it conceals have circulated in Africa, in various historical circumstances. The latter have been shaped by methods of appropriation, forms of opposition, and resistance, but perhaps still more fundamentally by demands and expectations regarding what is understood or proposed by the term. It still has to be made clear, as James Ferguson has suggested, that this modernity has a concrete meaning, reflecting subdivisions, pensions, and family allowances. The African modernity that he analyzes was a preoccupation for certain groups in colonial and postcolonial African societies: political leaders, union leaders, students, specialists as well as workers in economic development. Modernity thus became synonymous with development and material progress.

This reading of the term modernity subscribes to the colonial objective of impeding Africa’s modernity; especially after World War I, restrictions imposed by colonial authorities led to the politics of retribalization, assimilation, and the containment of the “carriers of modernity.” The colonialists tried to hold them back by claiming all

the fruits—material, cultural, spiritual, economic, and political. On this question, the case of the Tsawana people, studied by Jean and John Comaroff, demonstrates the perpetual production of a modernity that is a constant source of tensions between, on the one hand, the adoption of the material elements of colonial culture (clothing, architectural styles, sanitation) and, on the other hand, their consequences under the appearance of new forms of individuation that progressively threaten the customs of the community, especially spiritual and therapeutic traditions. According to the Comaroffs, it is precisely the shock between missionary will and the processes of resistance, selection, and alteration that the Tsawana people go through, successively or simultaneously, that has created modernity. It derives in some way from what the West and the colonial enterprise call modern, the first manifestation of which was the mission to civilize the native peoples, and the last of which was modernization. These have linked the colonial enterprise and the nationalist struggle and its pursuit of development and achieving parity with Western economies. The emblems of the colonial enterprise are roads, commerce, and sanitation; the nationalist emblems are schools, community clinics, and electricity.

9.4 Sum Up

Among the best available analyses of colonial modernity are the groundbreaking studies by two experts on the French colonial empire, Louis-Hubert Lyautey (1854–1934) and Joseph-Simon Gallieni (1849–1916), the former on Morocco and Indochina, the latter on the Sudan and Madagascar. According to Paul Rabinow, the oscillation between the extremes of colonial modernization and continuing poverty within a framework of authenticity is not an exclusive characteristic of the autochthonous elite of African colonial societies. Gallieni, for example, established a definitive correspondence between pacification and modernity. In contrast to Lyautey’s cultural relativism, he was a universalist. He did not by any means imagine that one might regard the lack of sanitation and the nondistinction among domestic space, work space, and livestock pen as anything other than signs of a lack of civilization. For him, “the sign of civilization was a busy road; the sign of modernity was hygiene” (Rabinow, pp. 149–150). Here, the meaning of modernity is, by colonial logic, constructed around

elements such as security, communications lines, agriculture, commerce, and population growth.

It is difficult to determine where this chaotic journey will end. The paths and detours that it has taken reflect the great difficulty involved in making sense of a concept that is so prevalent in everyday conversations and in philosophical, political, moral, aesthetic, and cultural analyses, and increasingly in the economic realm as well. The questions regarding the genealogy of the concept of modernity and its different forms, from its initial appearance to its commonplace deployment and the subsequent debates about it, have provoked numerous examinations of its heuristic value, its effects in terms of status in the narrative and scientific fields, its limits, possibility of application, and the different manipulations that it offers to those who lay claim to it, adapt it, or reject it. As much as the imaginations it recaptures, the historical traces it carries, the uses and abuses it has undergone, the possible or probable futures that one accords it partake of different modes of reference. And it is precisely for that reason that no one challenges it for having lost, during this journey, its capacities for setting in order or disorder realities, as much descriptive as figurative. For others, despite its epistemological and narrative weaknesses, reflecting a quasi-impossibility of relating other histories and conveying other circumstances, modernity is simultaneously a horizon line, a point of anchorage, a mode of being, and a means of constructing a geography of people, of cultures, of aesthetic forms. It is probably this plasticity that makes it what it is, always different, always debated, as expected, plural and unstable, between, on the one hand, European modernity and its desire to remake the world in its image or according to its dictates, and, on the other hand, the never-ending processes of rewriting, reinterpreting, and/or retreating from other societies.

CULTURE-RELIGION AND MODERNITY

Structure**10.1 Introduction****10.2 Changes in Social Structure and Modernization****10.3 Macro-Social Structure and Social Changes****10.4 Sum Up****10.1 Introduction**

Tradition and modernity as heuristic concepts are easy to formulate, but to separate them a substantive level is rather difficult. As Joseph R. Gusfield has said, “We cannot easily separate modernity and tradition from some specific modernity, some version which functions ideologically as a directive. The modern comes to the traditional society as a particular culture with its own traditions. But it seldom comes in the same form or brings about identical cultural consequences in every society that it comes in contact with. Modernization as a process, in fact, has more elasticity of form than tradition. It implies an open world-view which like science undergoes perpetual self-falsification and self-transcendence in its value-structure and postulates.”

Comparative studies on modernization in the new states have shown that contrary to stereotypes beliefs, old traditions are not completely displaced by modernization. What follows is an accretion and transmutation of forms. Similarly, tradition does not necessarily retard the process of modernization. As we have

mentioned above, religious leaders in Indonesia studied by Geertz serve as carriers of modernization. In India, caste associations, which are otherwise typical symbols of tradition, have increasingly been found to serve the ends of political modernization. Lloyd I. Rudolph calls this phenomenon 'modernity of tradition' and concludes with Edward Shils that "modernity has entered into India character and society but it has done so through assimilation and not replacement. Other studies in Indian social processes also provide evidence that traditional institutions like joint family, kin-based entrepreneurial functions continue to co-exist with and support modern values and forms of social action. From the advancement in modern means of transport and communication not only the cultural diffusion of modernization but also that of traditionalism is accelerated.

These processes in the institutional realm of modernization are also in harmony with historical growth of this phenomenon in India. Historically, as we discussed above, the rise of nationalistic movement which later changed into a movement for political, cultural and economic modernization with itself never bereft of the consciousness of the past tradition of India. The new leadership that is now emerging is more conscious of national identity and prides in the traditional culture of India. Consequently, it is fair to assume that as forces of cultural modernization grow there will also simultaneously grow the feeling of national identity and the identification with the nation's past tradition. Cultural modernization will under this process assume a syncretic form and persist along with traditional values. Modernity will never completely supplant tradition in India.

10.2 Changes in Social Structure and Modernization

Modernization implies some typical forms of changes in the social structure of societies. These changes in the systems of social relationships contribute to the growth and institutionalization of new roles and group-structures based on concomitant norms of modernization. This process cumulatively leads to structural modernization of society. There are, however, many forms of changes in the social structure which fall outside this process. Examples may be : changes in family structure through death, birth and marriage, large-scale migration due to war or epidemic, rise and fall of

pre-industrial cities and commercial centres owing to the changes in the political power and the trade routes, etc. Such structural changes in societies have been going on since time immemorial; most of these changes were cyclical or rhythmical in pattern, that is, social structures used to appear or disappear, used to wax or wane in form, but they functionally remained concrete activity and not a whole aspect of social life, which structural modernization implies. Marion J. Level, Jr. writes :

Throughout history craftsmen and even whole village population have been specialized with regard to the output of certain particular types of products, for example, dolls or some special form of cloth, etc. However, the organization in terms of which those activities are carried out... usually a family unit in the case of craftsmen and, by definition, a village unit in the case of the village example...are not usually specialized with regard to a specific aspect of the behaviour of its members such as the economic aspect or the political aspect. The units are viewed by the members who belong to them as general living units. Neither the family nor the village is more predominantly economically oriented than other families or villages.

Specialization of work in traditional societies was, in fact, structurally undifferentiated from traditional forms of authority and particularistic patterns of social relationship. Even the craft guilds were not based on rational-universalistic forms of authority with regard to the allocation of resources and facilities in the group structure. "The merchant and craft guilds of the Occident", Max Weber writes, "cultivated religious interests as did the castes. In connection with these interests, questions of social rank also played a considerable role among guilds. Which rank order the guilds should follow during processions, for instance, was a question occasionally fought over more stubbornly than questions to economic interests. The guild may be an extreme case of work specialization. In other realms of social activities too, traditional societies paramountly comprised groups without significant functional differentiation or specialization.

A classic example of undifferentiated role-structure, as characteristic of traditional society, may be found in the systems of feudalism and patrimonialism of the medieval Europe. The king had the patrimonial authority over his subjects and

the management of his household. This authority was not merely secular but also religious, not merely formal but also patriarchal, and not merely political but also universal. The same was true about feudalism. Occasionally feudalism, like the Church, posed some threat to the patrimonial authority of the kind, but normally both of them were more supplemental than contradictory. The relationships between the king and the feudal lord, between the feudal lord and his tenants and serfs were in substance equally based on a series of hierarchical authority relationships which were more particularistic than universal, more functionally diffuse than specific and more emotionally loaded than neutral. Social classes, representing differential economic interest, did not exist. What existed were the estates wherein not the individual but the group as a whole was charged with rights and obligations according to the social rank of its estate. The individual as such had no rights aside from the estate to which he belonged. "A man (could) modify the personal or corporate rule to which he (was) subject only by an appeal to the established rights of his rank or to the personal and, therefore, arbitrary benevolence of his master. Thus, the social system was closed and had an authoritarian structure."

The social structure of a "relatively modernized" society could grow in Europe only after the breakdown in the feudal-patrimonial system of social organization. Its process was gradual. It started with stray protest movements in the medieval society? But the great transformation came later. It was spurred by the forces released through the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution. The Industrial Revolution led to a gradual change in the social structure of the feudal society by transforming it first into a mercantile society and later into an industrial liberal society. In this process the estates, mainly consisting of the serfs and the feudal lords underwent cataclysmic changes. Peasants and serfs were transformed into industrial workers; feudal lords, especially in Britain, took more and more to commercial and industrial entrepreneurship, traditional guilds in the cities became obsolescent and guild masters were replaced by "projectors" or entrepreneurs. The transition from one stage to the other was not smooth. Its human cost was great. The intervening periods were marked by pauperization of the uprooted peasantry, growth of

slum-like work houses in cities, sudden breakdown in the family structure and exploitation of the workers by an emergent entrepreneurial class which was more predatory than rational in orientation.

The centre of the Industrial Revolution was Britain. To the question, why the Industrial Revolution first started in Britain and somewhere else, Will and Ariel Durant answer :

Because England had won great wars on the Continent while keeping its own soil free from war's devastation; because it had secured command of the seas and had thereby acquired colonies that provided raw materials and needed manufactured goods; because its armies, fleets, and growing population offered an expanding market for industrial products; because the guilds could not meet these widening demands; because the profits of far-flung commerce accumulated capital seeking new avenues of investment; because England allowed its nobles...and their fortunes...to engage in commerce and industry; because the progressive displacement of tillage by pasturage drove peasants from the fields to the towns, where they added to the labour force available for factories; because science in England was directed by men of a particular bent, while on the Continent it was predominantly devoted to abstract research; and because England had a constitutional government sensitive to business interests, and vaguely aware that priority in the Industrial Revolution would make England for over a century the political leader of the Western world.

The pivotal element in each causal factor mentioned above is changed in the structure of relationships between and with groups, economic systems and systems of power. These changes implied the creation of fundamentally new role-structures such as those of industrial labour, factory systems, financial and technological bureaucracies and modern market-mechanism. These changes were not rhythmical but transformative; there was a built in mechanism of acceleration and progression in the process of change taking place now, because the systems of science and technology as forces of innovation had a cumulative character hitherto unknown in the history of mankind. Moreover, scientific and technological inventions revolutionized the processes of

production of goods and services and rendered possible a progressive rate of economic growth. In the past, economic growth did take place, but its rate was so slow as to be imperceptible. “If we had information for points in time perhaps 10,000 years apart, we would probably find that the standard of living of the world’s human inhabitants had increased between each two points. But the rising trend was so slow until recent times that examination, even at thousand-year intervals, might not show progress during every interval. The Industrial Revolution marked the beginning of “a series of advances in technology and a rise in per capita output rapid enough so that marked changes occurred within each generation, and indeed during each decade. Thus, economic growth became an organic part of the process of social changes.”

Similar structural changes were also precipitated by the Revolution of 1789 in France. The emergence of a politically active urban middle-class, break down in the feudal structure and the liberation of a vast section of peasantry from the feudal-military domination, and catastrophic decline in the credibility of Church were some of the major forms of changes which followed the revolution. Slowly new bases of authority-legitimation also emerged which transformed the feudal-patrimonial system of power into a liberal-democratic form. It struck at the very roots of the particularistic elements in the social structure. “The French Revolution brought about a fundamental change in the conception of representation: the basic unit was no longer the household, or property, or the corporation, but the individual citizen; and representation was no longer channelled through separate function bodies but through a unified national assembly of legislators. The law of August 11, 1792 went so far as to give the franchise to all French males over 21 who were not servants, paupers or vagabonds, and the Constitution of 1793 did not even exclude paupers if they had resided more than six months in the *conton*. The Restoration did not bring back representation by estate : instead the regime *censitaire* introduced an abstract monetary criterion which cut decisively across the earlier criteria of ascribed status.”

These processes offer us an example of what is meant by structural changes in society. It implies changes in a whole system of social relationships. For instance, the transformation of the feudal social organization based on particularistic ties

between estates, into industrial social organization based on class and factory systems, professionalization of work and occupation and democratization of the authority and leadership structure is symptomatic of structural changes in society. Such changes were ushered in by the Industrial Revolution in the European society. The process through which structural changes appear in the social system is that of differentiation of roles. Differentiation of roles leads to structural differentiation. “The model of structural differentiation is (also) an abstract theory of change. When one social role or organization becomes archaic under changing historical circumstances, it differentiates by a definite and specific sequence of events into two or more roles or organizations which function more effectively in the new historical circumstances, and finally bring about a structural change in the social system. The new social units which emerge through differentiation are structurally distinct but functionally equivalent to the structure they have replaced. Of course, structural differentiation follows the process of functional specialization. For instance, traditional joint family not only functioned as an agency of procreation and socialization of new members for the society, but also performed duties in other spheres such as occupation, education, leisure and recreation, etc., which have now been taken over by specialized agencies. The nuclear family in industrial societies which had differentiated from joint family is functionally specific and not diffuse like its traditional counterpart. Another example of structural differentiation which followed functional specialization may be that of production which by stages passed from house-holds to guilds and finally to modern factories. Household production in terms of roles was merged with a number of other roles. Work in guilds was more specialized but still not fully differentiated from kinship and religious roles. Division of labour in modern factory is, however, an example of a higher degree of functional specificity and specialization. According to Durkheim it marks a change from the ‘mechanical’ to ‘organic’ type of solidarity or social structure of society.

Structural changes involve similar role differentiations in almost all aspects of social life. Growth in science and technology adds impetus to this process and finally accelerates the momentum of change. Change ceases to be an exceptional phenomenon as in the traditional societies; it becomes a day-to-day fact of life to

live with; it is not merely tolerated, it is glorified. With increasing pace of differentiation new structural forms come into being and older ones disappear. For instance, in medieval England arranged marriages were a common phenomenon : marriage was a relationship between who families or clans; now it has disappeared from the social scene. In marriage, kinship has been replaced by courtship. Formerly marriage also involved diffused sets of relationship, now it is highly specific - a relationship between two individuals who choose to enter into this form of relationship. Modern factories, bureaucratically organized administration, army and modern networks of communication media involve role-structures which were unknown in the past.

The contemporary processes of structural differentiation, coincidentally, also contain elements of structural modernization. This is because contemporary forms of structural differentiation are also organically reinforced by innovations in science and technology. These innovations not only render many modern forms of structures, such as factories, formal organizations of administration and communication etc., possible but also imbue the social relationships within these structures with the value system and cognitive categories of modernization. Marion J. Levy writes : “Characteristically, the structures of all relatively modernized societies reflect an increasing emphasis on rationality, universalism, functional specificity, and emotional neutrality or avoidance (objectivity). It is also characteristic of them that these emphasis are much higher and more general throughout social structure than is the case for any relatively non-modernized society. An important process which contributes to the growth of such structures is that of economic growth, of which industrialization and urbanization are to be certain extent natural concomitants. Political institutions based on legal constitutional legitimation of authority embodied in representative bodies support the social structure of modernization.”

In relatively modernized societies of the West, there was a gradual but spontaneous upsurge of values and motives which laid the foundation of modernization. Cultural forces of modernization were more attuned to the pace of structural differentiation and adaptation. In England the process of breakdown in the traditional joint family system almost coincided with the emergence of modern factories. The changes were continuous and uniform in the realms of culture and social structure

as well as in the central and the peripheral areas of society in general. Modernization was not beset to the same degree with problems of breakdown as in the new nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America. In these societies, modernization both in cultural and structural forms is exogenous to the system and constitutes a phenomenon of historical growth, mostly through colonial confrontations.

Under these circumstances there is often a lag between the cultural and social structural forms of modernizing influences in these societies. The equations of modernization which proved to be reliable with respect to Western society fail to represent the socio-cultural processes of the new nations. Apparently, modern social structures in these societies, in terms of functions, might only partially serve the goals of modernisation, as in parts they might be reinforcing traditional role-structures and forms of social obligations. It is, therefore, necessary that in our study of the structural changes in India, we pay particular attention to the ramifications and inter-linkages of the social structure with regard to both of these directions of adaptation.

We may analyse the forms of these structural inter-linkages under two broad categories : the macro-structures and the micro-structures. Family, community, clan, tribe, caste and sub-caste are examples of the micro-structures of the India social space for primary relationships. Their organization is less formal, the relationships are more affective and particularistic and, as such, their functions are focused mainly to the needs which are narrower yet primary in nature. The network of relationships in these groups is also limited and quality of relational bonds is diffused rather than specific. Relationships are governed by kinship, birth, territorial bonds which delimit the horizon of social interaction and reinforce values which may be in apparent contrast with those of a modernized role-structure. But this is not necessary. Even in a modernized or relatively modernized society there is legitimate scope as well as need for such group structures. Some of the social roles performed by these micro-structures, for instance those performed by family, cannot be substituted and constitute structural universals. Child-rearing, socialization and provisions for institutionalized role of reproduction are basic needs of any society, traditional or modern.

Yet, within the structural framework of these micro-structures there is relative

scope for organization of role in such a manner which reinforces the process of the structural or cultural modernization without basically altering the essential nature of the functions they perform. This is one of the key qualities of structural differentiation of which mention has been made above. What happens under this process of structural differentiation is that the former, generalized nature of role-structures is rendered more and more specialized and specific, and many of the former roles which were not essential to a particular micro-or-macro-structure are relegated to other specialized structures. This happens without significantly altering the qualitative nature of the relationship concerned. For instance, if the micro-structure is family, then its essential affective quality in social relationships involving the basic sets of family roles does not change, but many of the functions which were traditionally performed by the family are radically reduced in a relatively modernized society.

However, the exact way in which the micro-structure in a traditional society adapts to the pressures of modernization might vary. From a structural point of view change may not always be followed by *differentiation* of role-structures but also *role-accretion* under certain situations. This is particularly true of caste in India, which under stresses of change is now taking over many functions which were traditionally outside its domain. In certain situations it works as a political interest group and an economic association, which is essentially foreign to its communal-particularistic structure. We shall discuss this problem below in some detail. Nevertheless, it may be pointed out that role-accretion in such unusual circumstances does not rule out the normal process of role differentiation which social change involves. We shall analyse how similar or other changes are taking place in selected micro-structures of Indian society and to what extent these changes contribute to the process of structural modernization.

Macro-structures refer to those organized roles and relationships which are more extensive, more formal, are organized or acclaimed to be organized on universalistic principles (rational legal norms) and which have to do with the integration or regulation of the larger system of society and involve secondary and higher orders of relationships. Familiar examples of macrostructures are : political and other types of elite, administration and bureaucracy (executive, legal, industrial and military),

industrial workers and entrepreneurs and other urban and industrial groups and social classes. Political elites form part of Indian democratic party structure and its processes; similarly, cultural elites provide a network for the communication of values and ideologies. Systems of administration, factory, industry labour and entrepreneurship provide large-scale structures for social interaction which are necessary for the growth of a modern nation state as a viable economic and administrative configuration. Macro-structures taken together generate social consensus necessary for structural modernization.

We shall analyse the processes of change in the social structure of the Indian society on the basis of ongoing structural changes in selected major macro-and micro-social structures. Among the macro-structures we shall particularly analyse the changes that have taken place through the growth of a new elite or leadership, bureaucratic forms of administration, industrial working class, and urbanward migration, industrial entrepreneurs, industries and factories, and new political structures. Among the micro-structures we shall analyse the changes taking place in the family-caste and village community. While analysing the changes through these macro-and micro-social structures, attention should also be paid to the causal aspects of change. As with the cultural traditions, so also in the case of the social structure of Indian society, changes have been taking place both from the endogeneous (orthogenetic) and exogenous (heterogenetic) channels. Consequently, at each level (micro and macro) of structural analysis, it shall be our endeavour to, draw a line of distinction between the two types of casual factors. Presumably in India structural changes occurring as a result of exogenous sources may far outweigh the changes that have taken place endogeneously, yet, to get a historically coherent picture of change such an attempt may be necessary. Moreover, it may also be necessary from the view-point of systematic theoretical analysis of social change, which we have postulated above.

10.3 Macro-Social Structure and Social Changes

The social and political history of India reveals the existence of a variety of macro-structure through which, from time to time, loose forms of centralized political and economic controls were exercised on a larger part of the country. The rise of the Mauryan empire in the fourth century B.C., the partial centralized control of the

kings belonging to the Gupta dynasty during the A.D. fourth to sixth century, the Mughal empire from the early sixteenth century to take first quarter of the A.D. eighteenth century and, finally, the British empire from the 18th to the middle of the A.D. 20th century are examples of the growth of some kind of political and economic macrostructures in the past. From the Mauryan times to that of the Mughal empire, the organization of the political structure was monarchical-feudal. “There were surely some Republics but to find them one has to go back before Christ.” The economic macro-structure was organized on the mercantile pattern and into guilds, which used to be located in the urban centres. Two important categories of guilds were those of the merchants and the craftsmen. The membership to them was largely closed on ascriptive principles. These and many other forms of macro-structures existed in traditional India. With passage of time, new macro-structures have also come into being. We shall analyse below, as far as possible within a historical context, the stages in which modernizing changes have been taken in the selected macro-social structures in India.

The Elite’ and Social Change

Elite-structure of a society represents not only its basic values but also the extent to which these values find a concrete expression in the power-structure and the decision-making process of the society. It has rightly been suggested that “the ‘leadership’ of a society is a criterion of the values by which that society lives. The manner in which the ‘leadership’ is chosen; the breadth of the social base from which it is recruited; the way in which it exercises the decision-making power; the extent and nature of its accountability...these and other attributes are indicators of the degree of shared power, shared respect, shared well-being and shared safety in a given society at a given time. By learning the nature of the elite, we learn much about the nature of the society.” The changes in elite structure, therefore, might also reveal the essential nature of social changes taking place in that society.

Elites represent the standards of value-excellence in different domains of life through their roles which are either ascribed to them, as in the traditional society, or have been achieved by them by meritorious performance, which is the norm of

a relatively modernized society. There may be as many types of elites as there are the forms of 'valued outcomes' and institutions as mentioned by Harold D. Lasswell. In 1952 he wrote : "The concept of the elite is classificatory and descriptive, designating the holders of high positions in a given society. There are as many elites as there are values. Besides the elite of power (the political elite) there are elites of wealth, respect and knowledge (to name but a few)." Recently, these value-spheres were further postulated by Lasswell into eight categories, e.g. 'power', 'enlightenment', 'wealth', 'well-being' (outcomes involving health, safety and comfort of man), 'skill', 'affection', 'respect', and 'rectitude'. He writes :

Employing the definition of 'elite' as the influential, we distinguish eight elite levels in a social process. Where influence is unequal, the elite class, with respect to each value outcome, may be occupied by few or many. Obviously, the distribution pattern of influence for each value may approximate many different geometrical figures, notably the pyramid or the 'onion tower'. It is clear on reflection that the specific persons who occupy a top position with respect to one value are likely to hold correspondingly favourable positions with respect to other values. In fact, this possibility is the 'agglutination hypothesis'. The social contest as a whole can be characterized according to each value or all values aggregatively.

In fact, the structure of elites in a society also undergoes the process of differentiation with changes in the social system as a 'whole'. – This is especially true when a traditional society passes into the stages of modernization. Innovations in science and technology create value domains and spheres of skill which did not exist before and offer new opportunities of role excellence or elite role in the society. This leads to the growth in the number of elite groups, which to some extent breaks the 'exclusiveness' of the traditional elites : To use the metaphor of Lasswell, new pyramids of elites come into being. Yet, the agglutination process does not cease to operate; as the elite-pyramids multiply a competition goes on between elites representative of one value domain with those who have control over another. This process is regulated and determined by the power structure of

the society. It is in this context that political elites generally constitute the most important segment of the elite structure of any society, since they have direct access to the political power which is over-riding among all other forms of power.

A distinction has also been suggested on the above ground between the 'general' and 'special' elites or between the 'elect elite' and the 'eminent elite'. The general or elect elites are those who possess many qualities or have command over a combination of values; the special or the eminent elite has excellence in only one field of values. In the former case many influences tend to agglutinate in a single elite status and in the latter cases elites have command over only one sphere of influence. Since the crucial factor in differentiation of elites is the growth in values and ramifications of power (we define power as the ability to have command over values in society), change in elite structure has a significant association with the transformation of the traditional society.

A traditional society has more homogeneous structure of values. It offers fewer specialization and its "valued outcomes" are not only limited, but traditionally closed. Elites in such society are not highly differentiated into varieties or levels. Agglutination of levels into one general level of elite status is also simpler to achieve and more characteristic of this type of society. This we could find being the case in most of the traditional societies. The social structure of traditional societies is authoritarian. Elites in such societies constitute a closed group : elite status (command over values) is in most cases ascribed; it is ascribed on the basis of birth-kinship and age; its bases may be patrimonial, or gerontocratic or charismatic; mostly they comprise landed aristocracy; only a section of them spilling over to other occupation such as trade and commerce or priestly callings. The world-view of traditional elites is rooted in the search for the esoteric and abstract ideals and has scorn for manual-technical type of work, which is considered plebeian; this leads to a lack of creativity and innovation in their thinking especially with regard to material and technological aspects of society. Elites in such societies are also psychologically constricted, aggressive and suffer from deep-rooted sense of status anxiety. Their capacity for empathy and psychic mobility is limited.

The social structure of elites in traditional India was based on the principles

of hierarchy, holism and continuity the cardinal values of the Hindu tradition. The king and the priest were the two important elite roles in this tradition. Both roles were derived from the caste system which offered a cultural and moral frame of reference to that elite structure. It was the duty of the king to be an effective military leader, to protect the caste order by enforcing its obligations on people, to strictly adhere to caste-norms himself, to protect the priestly class and offer it congenial environment for meditation and performance of religious duties. The offices of the king and the priest were complementary; the priest was the source of moral norms (*dharma*) which the king was obliged to enforce. Theoretically, therefore, the office of the priest was superior to that of the king. In practice, however, conformity to this ideal was never fully achieved but its ruthless violation was also rare. Kings always respected the moral and religious prerogatives of the priests. The principle of hierarchy was evident in the traditional structure of the elite, since the priest role was legitimately assigned only to the Brahmins and the kingly role only to the Kshatriyas, both comprising the upper two segments of the varna hierarchy. However, this was not always the case. Often, non-Kshatriyas held the kingly offices; “in practice the aphorism ‘whoever bears rule in Kshatriya’ was applied. In some religious texts a cyclical theory of kingship has also been postulated, that with the decay of social and moral standards in each yuga or period of time finally in the *Kali* Age the lower castes (*Shudra*) will come into power and challenge the Brahmins and the Kshatriyas. Thus, a circulation in the structure of elites has also been postulated, which is in accordance with the principle of continuity in the Hindu tradition. Also, we find that in the traditional Hindu theory of elite and social polity no antinomy between the individual and the state is ever conceived of, which in contrast is ‘the favourite theme of Western political thought.’ This is in harmony with the principle of holism in Hindu social tradition.”

As we pass from the level of theoretical postulates about elites to historical transitions, we find that for a long time the elite structure of Indian society remained authoritarian, monarchical-feudal and charismatic. In the Hindu period a quasi-feudal system prevailed. Kings and “emperors” had a number of lesser chiefs or vassals under their sphere of influence. In Mauryan time, the emperor had his own

centrally administered territory surrounded by vassal kingdoms subordinate to him in varying degrees; 'vassals themselves had vassals of their own in petty local cheiftains calling themselves rajas. The relationship of king with his vassals was not contractual as in the West; it was governed by arbitrary relationships of power and conquest. Priests and councillors as supplementary elites were associated with each level of this monarchical-feudal structure. Since often the political control of the king over his vassals used to fluctuate and in many cases was almost nominal, the macro-structure of elites existed only during the time when imperial rule was relatively stable, such as during the Mauryan and the Gupta empires in the north and the rise of the Chow in the south.

With the emergence of the Muslim rule in India, feudal pattern of elite structure was further stabilized. In the first instance, many Muslim warrior established themselves as rulers and vassals of the Muslim kings who came to power by conquest. This was especially true during the Turko-Afghan rule before the rise of Mughal empire. The Turk the Afghan Sultans had a number of courtiers, *Khans, Maliks and Amirs*; justice was the charge of *Qazis and Muftis* and in the provinces kings, viceroys, Naib Sultans ruled with the help of *Amirs* who were rulers over smaller estates. Ulema now occupied the same position in the hierarchy of elites which was assigned to the Hindu priests in the past. A more compact feudal structure of elites emerged with the establishment and consolidation of the Mughal empire. Mughal emperors introduced the system of jagirdari and mansabdari which involved land grant to a vassal with contractual obligations to supply a predetermined number of troops and personal military services to the king at the time of need. The jagirdars and mansabders thus emerged as new feudal nobility. The nature of these elites was partly patrimonial and partly feudal. Besides, there were various categories of administrative elites who looked after the functions of the royal court and its departments). But their selection or appointment was not based on rational criteria; its system of 'imperative co-ordinations' as Weber would call it, was governed by tradition and more than that by chief's own free will.

The character of elites, whether political or intellectual, was predominantly feudal and charismatic. Both, Hindu priest and king, derived their authority from

qualities inherited by birth which had behind it traditional as well as charismatic sanction. Elite status was partially rooted in the caste system which is itself an example of hereditary charisma. The position of political elite was hierarchically arranged with at the top followed by his vassals, councillors, courtiers, priests, artists and poets. From the top to the bottom the structure was governed by particularistic loyalties and patronages. The Muslim rule only replaced the persons or offices involved in elite status and not the system as such. It was succession of one class of elites by another in the same system rather than a change in the structure or functions of elite; elite structure continued to be feudal, patrimonial and charismatic. As Muslim kings stepped into the imperial role of power many Hindu kings became their vassals; others who did not accept vassalage remained in perpetual conflict. But within his limited domain each vassal king maintained the traditional paraphernalia of officers and elites under his patronage.

Not all sections of these elites had a macro-structure or a pan-Indian influence. Such influence was characteristic only of the few top political elites who were the representatives of the imperial Power or of the cultural and religious elites who controlled monastic organizations with networks in various parts of the country. Even then the macro-structural linkages were not always effective. Local vassals or vice-regal representatives had the tendency of revolting very frequently and no religious or cultural movement was without rival schools. The elite structure of this time was mainly segmental with a very thin crest of a macro-structure.

The slow downfall of the Mughal empire coincided with the decadence of the traditional elites. The enrichment of the British power further accelerated this process and created the material condition for the emergence of an entirely new structure of elites. The monarchical-feudal type of elites were to be replaced by the national-liberal type. The British colonial rule in India helped in this process in many ways. It neutralized the military potential feudal chiefs in India, it established a rule of law in the country; it introduced a modern system of education, rational form of administration, a modern army, communication channels and technological and scientific know-how. True, many of these things the British did in their own enlightened self-interest, but its latent function was the emergence of a new macrostructure of elites in India.

Manifestly, the British continued to patronize the traditional feudal elites; they even created (by permanent settlement) a new class of big landlords in Bengal and Bihar. In Bengal it led to great hardship for the old landed gentry who could not pay the high taxes imposed on their lands and it passed on to the *nooeaux riches* sections of the rich business classes. The British had a vested interest in keeping the traditional elites—the land owners and the princes-in-power since their motto was; ‘counterpoise of natives against natives.’ This created a historical schism between the traditional feudal and the emergent nationalist elite in India.

The social structure of the nationalist elite which grew in spite of the British policy (which should be distinguished from the orientation of individual scholar, missionary or journalist English man) in India was fundamentally different. The new elite, a product of cities rather than villages, belonged to the professions (journalists, lawyers, social workers, etc.) more than landed aristocracy, which was in most cases hostile to national movement; the elite constituted a new middle class which grew in India, as a result of English education and the expansion of administration, judiciary and teaching professions. Raja Rammohan Roy was a journalist and scholar, Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar and Keshab Chandra Sen were educationists and teachers, Dayanand Saraswati and Vivekananda were social and religious reformers, Ranade and B.K. Gokhale were ‘Social workers and teachers, Madan Mohan Malviya was an advocate, educationist and scholar, B. Tilak was a journalist and teacher, Moti Lal Nehru, Jawhar Lal Nehru, Rajendra Prasad, Lajpat Rai, Ambedkar and Sardar Patel were trained in the legal profession, Gandhi was himself a barrister-at-law. Similar professional backgrounds could be found in the cases of other illustrious national leaders such as Aurobindo Ghosh, Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, J.P. Narayan, Abdul-kalam Azad, Subhas Chandra Bose and others.

The rise of the political elite coincided in India with the growth of a Westernized middle-class. It emerged as a result of the expansion of higher education among the upper castes. The upper castes which dominated the elite position were the Brahmins (Nagar and Anavil Brahmins in Gujrat, Chiptavan Brahmins in Maharashtra, Kashmiri Brahmins in the north, Bengali Brahmins in eastern India and various subcastes of

Brahmins in South India), Kayasthas, Parsis, Banias and other Muslim upper castes. In professional terms lawyers were predominant in the early social structure of the political elite. "The total of 13,839 delegates who attended the various annual sessions (of the Congress) between 1892 and 1909, as many as 5,442, or nearly 40 per cent, were the members of the legal profession. The other important groups were those of the landed gentry with 2,692 delegates, and of the commercial classes with 2,091. The rest of the total was made up of the journalists, doctors and teachers. As the political movement grew in strength the landed gentry was increasingly isolated and the political elite role passed to the educated middle classes and professional groups.

In the early twentieth century Indian elite constituted a composite groups. But for the bureaucratic and the technical professional elites, other levels of elite were not fully differentiated. No sizable section of business elite had emerged as the process of industrialization was just beginning. The levels of the intellectual and political elite were merged into one sub-structure. Most of the top political elites had attained high intellectual standards, had their education in well-known Western universities and were actively engaged in creative political and social discourse through the media of newspapers and journals, group meetings and mass public appearances. Intellectually, they were more active than many college and university professors, their thinking was directed towards the contemporary political and moral issues confronting their society and the world at large and it was pragmatic and from the type of abstract theoretical ratiocination common among the contemporary academics. They combined the roles of demagogue and scholars. In times to come this pattern was going to be radically altered.

The growth of this type of elite was a structural break from the feudal monarchical character of the traditional elites. The new elites were there on the basis of their professional achievements and modern education. The role was not ascribed of them nor was it delegated to them by feudal-patrimonial patronages; in fact, a sizable section of the new elite was opposed to feudalism and wanted social and economic reform. Its internal composition was now different and its former exclusiveness was also gone. But, since still the majority of elite belonged to the upper castes, particularly the Brahmin caste, the elite structure could not be said to have been 'democratized'

in the real sense. Also, the emergence of the new elites in India did not follow the same types of structural changes in the Indian society as were characteristic of the European social transformation after the Industrial Revolution. The breadth of the social base from which elites were recruited remained narrower and their selections was confined to the upper castes. The predominance of the Brahmins in elite role also had major sociological consequences; it introduced, an element of moderation in the social and cultural adaptation to the Western values; it kept the traditional allurements for charismatic elites alive; the latter was also conditioned by the structural process. In this connection it is said:

The process of breaking from traditional past creates attitudes that are strongly inclined towards accepting charismatic leaders. Native ruling houses and aristocracies are rapidly losing, or have lost already, an authority sanctioned by supernatural beliefs. Withering of deep emotional roots of respect for traditional authority is taking place which leave the habits of obedience free-floating, in search of new attachments. In the meantime, the slow spreading of education of a rational character and the scarcity of the media of mass communication retard the development of new consensus based primarily on intellectual persuasion. In such periods of transition, charismatic leaders are likely to fill the vacuum:

The conditions described above are extraordinarily suggestive of the Indian situation, and probably also explain the reasons why Gandhi and Nehru had charismatic control over the Indian people. But even otherwise, the new elite had a continuity with the traditional elites. According to Prof Srinivas, this continuity existed in two forms: "First, some members or section of the traditional elite transformed themselves into the new, elite, and second, there is a continuity between the old and new occupations. A simple instance of continuity is provided when the sons of Brahmin enter the professions, or when a chieftain's son achieves a high position in the Indian army, or a Bania's son becomes a leading exporter and importer of goods."

This structural continuity explains the ideological peculiarities of the new elite, most of whom were westernized yet committed to the Indian tradition. There were a few cases where the elite were wholly enchanted by the West; in most cases their greater exposure to the Western culture and its system of values used to reinforce their feelings of nationalism and nationalist cultural identity. The elites of all the three major political ideologies, e.g. communal-conservative, moderate-liberal and radical-populistic, had one factor in common, that is, emphasis on maintaining the traditional cultural identity of India. The differences of opinion on this point were only of degrees. The most influential political elites, belonging to the Congress, which eventually won freedom for the country, were openly wedded to this policy. 'Gandhi, as we have discussed above, provides all extreme case of this ideological tradition. Nehru, in spite of his passion for internationalism and cultural pluralism was also a proud nationalist.

The new elite stood for the modernization of economy, social reforms, policy of egalitarianism, social justice, universal civil rights, removal of caste handicaps and for welfare and equal rights of women and, backward classes. These policy exhortations together constituted a value system which was logically far distant from the traditional Indian value of hierarchy, holism and continuity. It came closer to the modernized Western world. Yet, these elites were fascinated by the Indian tradition, and wanted to preserve it in its essential forms. This created a psychological schism in their outlook which has been variously described, but its common feature is a feeling of ambivalence between tradition and modernity emerging from the differential demands involved in the quest for cultural synthesis on the one hand and cultural identity on the other.

Structurally, the new elite were from the middle classes, belonged to various professional groups, and had primarily an urban base. Their social influence used to flow downward from the top of the social structure to which they belonged. Their political orientation was idealistic and free from regional group interests. For this reason, they constituted an integrative macro-structure of the Indian society. Since they were also highly westernized, they were somewhat culturally distanced from the people.

The form of elite structure changed further after independence. The political and cultural goals, which before Independence were diffuse and idealistic had now to be translated into specific goals; the function of elites was also now altered; former exhortations had to be converted into action, and the national movement now had to be transformed into an effective system of party movements under a parliamentary democratic framework. This altered the elite-people relationships, which were now materially dominated by interest-groups within and outside the political parties. Since a strong opposition party could not grow in India, the operation of these group interests largely remained confined within the Congress Party.

The important trends of change in the elite structure which have appeared during the post-independence period are (i) increasing influence of rural based political elites and slight decrease in the influence of the elites drawn from various profession; (ii) greater differentiation in the elite structure with significant increase in the number of persons belonging to the middle classes; (iii) greater articulation of regional and interest-group oriented goals in political cultural ideologies (iv) slight breakdown in the exclusiveness of upper castes to the elite position and its consequent democratization.

One indication of the trend of increase in the rural-based political elites may be had from the study of the occupational background of the members of the Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha). In the provisional Parliament of 1947 there were only 6% members with agricultural occupational background; they comprised 19% of the total strength of Parliament of 1952, 22% in that of 1957 and finally their number rose to 26% in the Parliament of 1962. In contrast to this, the percentage population of members belonging to professions successively declined. In the provisional Parliament of 1947 their strength was 83% of the total; this in 1952 declined to 74%, in 1957 to 73% and remained the same in 1962. The two professional groups which constitute a substantial proportion of the strength of the Parliament are the lawyers and the social workers. Both of these groups together constituted 46% of the total membership. The business groups have also increased their strength by 2% in course of successive elections. But the maximum increase (20%) has only been in the number of the rural-agricultural

elites. Similar ruralization of the political offices has been taking place also in the state legislatures.

Second important process following Independence was that of increase in the number of person in the middle-class group which strengthened the elite structure at various levels and eventually led to rapid differentiation in its internal structure. Consequently, the ranks of the intellectual and political elites separated into two functional elite groups. Among the intellectual elites were large numbers of persons now engaged in various technical; legal and educational professions, in journalism and art. The number of urban middle class professional employees (teachers, journalists, lawyers and doctors and other engaged in health services) increased by 74% during 1950 and 1961, The total number in 1950 was estimated to be 7,70,000 which rose to 1,220,000 by 1961. All of them obviously do not have elite position, yet a substantial increase in the middle-class group may be noted. About the number of intellectual elite in India, Edward Shils writes:

It is extremely difficult in the present state of Indian statistics and the shadowiness of the boundaries of the term 'intellectual' to assay an estimate of the number of Indian intellectuals now in existence. Within an upper and lower margin, ten thousand in each direction, one might say that there are about 60,000 professional intellectuals in India today including in that figure college and university teachers, research workers in government and on the staff of scholarly and scientific research institutes, applied scientists in industry, writers and journalists, literary men, critics, scenario writers, painters and sculptors. Productive intellectuals on bench and at the bar, in medical practice, civil services; in business and in active professional politics, might add a thousand more. The consuming intellectuals whose vocations are not in themselves intellectual, but whose training and disposition, whether connected with their occupations or not, lead them to interest themselves in intellectual matters, must run into neighbourhood of 100,000. In sum, we estimate that there are at least 160,000 persons in India today who might be

termed 'intellectuals' according to strict standard.

The figures quoted by Shils (published in 1961) are based on a definition of intellectuals which does not include all the categories of the urban middle class professional employees mentioned above, whose number in 1961 alone amounted to more than 1,00,000. In the absence of definite records there is no reliable way to check the facts but the figures of Shils might be an under-estimate of the actual position. The trend is, nonetheless, self-evident. The number of productive and consuming elites has increased significantly, and Shils concluded that "India alone, of all the new states, appears to possess an intellectual class which is 'modern' in the sense of embodying the wide range of technical and analytical skills and the dispositions and tastes characteristic of the intellectuals of the Western countries. It is "an estate of the realm," its existence, for better or for worse, is acknowledged within its society, and it performs the great variety of roles, such as are appropriate to the intellectuals in Western countries." This clearly substantiates our point that differentiation within the elite structure has taken place during the post independence time.

Another important change has taken place in the orientation of elite's interests and loyalties, specially that of the political elites. The political elites now increasingly succumb to as well as articulate the values and aspirations of the regional interest groups; the diffuse ideological orientation of the pre-Independence days is found to be increasingly absent till the consciousness of the emerging new political elites. This, however, reflects the normal realities of political life in India which Myron Weiner terms as the politics of scarcity. As the democratic process takes roots in the Indian soil, mobilization of regional interest-groups is a normal process to take place, and the political elite has to take account of these forces. But since this process takes place with the simultaneous differentiation and increase in the numerical strength of other types of elites, one should not read too much of political regionalism in it or conclude that this would finally break up the Indian federation. On the contrary, it is through articulation of the regional group-interests with its counter-checks

in the growth of politically independent, articulate and enlightened professional, bureaucratic and intellectual elites that lies the possibility of a higher level of political and social integration of India.

Finally, since Independence, the social and economic bases for the recruitment of elites in India have also been widened. The former monopoly of the upper castes and the middle classes to this role-structure has to some extent been broken. In most of the southern States, such as Tamil Nadu, Andhra, Mysore and to some extent in Kerala, the upper caste monopoly on, political elite status has been foiled. In these States, however, there is a tendency among Brahmins who were former political elites to now move away to other elite roles which are politically neutral and depend upon higher standards of professional and intellectual achievements in science, engineering, medicine, etc. Thus, there is a vertical mobility in elite status, the character of which is being governed by changes in the political power of the Brahmin and non-Brahmin groups and by the time lag from which the non-Brahmins suffers in these States in the matter of education and general westernization.

10.4 Sum Up

To summarize the changes taking place in the elite-structure of the Indian society we postulate three stages of transition: (I) the monarchical-feudal elites of the traditional types, whose social structure as well as the worldview has hierarchical, to whom elite role was ascribed on religious, patrimonial and other particularistic grounds or on the basis of wealth; who were less creative and more wedded to the ideology of the status quo, and finally, the source of the legitimation of their authority was in the traditional status, honour and charisma; (2) the new nationalist-liberal elite, who emerged as a result of the British rule in India, led to the growth of Western education, contact with Western ideology of liberal-humanism, democracy, egalitarianism, nationalism and industrialism. It created a kind of elite structure which though in some respect being rooted in the past social structure based in high caste state middle and upper middle class status and traditional

positions of honour, were in some respects differentiated from the social structure of the traditional elites; most of the new elite did not belong to feudal-morarchical class or landed aristocracy but to an emerging professional group; most of them were highly westernized and faced hostile response from the elites of the older disposition. The social drama of such conflicts is clearly portrayed in the *The New Brahmins* by D.D. Karve. The elites of this type had a diffuse rather than specific ideology; they projected cultural values of nationalism, liberalism, science and economic advancement as general goals, but without specific policy orientations. Their reaction to such values, being of Western origin was ambivalent and ranged from xenophobia to xenophilia. But pure cases of the either extreme are very hard to come by. Most of the elites of this group were, as Prof. Srinivas says, “two-faced, one face turned toward their own society, while the other was turned toward the West. They were spokesmen for the West as far as their people were concerned, and spokesmen for their people, as far as the rulers were concerned.

With the growth of India as an independent democratic nation another elite structure emerged: the new elite of political-populistic orientation. These elites differ from the new elites of the pre-Independence time in the fact “that they have more pragmatic and specific policy orientation in political goals; their political ideology is not diffuse but specific; they do not appeal to masses on the ground of generalized nationalistic themes but on specific issues which form part of the social structure of the contemporary interest groups in their community or region; they are also now increasingly recruited from rural, agricultural and lower middle caste or class backgrounds; they are less westernized than the national-liberal elites of the British times; the rise of this level of political elite also coincides with increasing differentiation within the elite structure. The intellectual elites have now a separate and relatively autonomous existence; the new political-populistic elites are seldom intellectuals and they rarely claim such pretensions.

These stages of change in the elite structure of the Indian society conform to a general process of change taking place in South Asia, Africa and Latin America

where political elites are increasingly becoming more conscious of national identity and resist direct cultural and institutional identification with the West. The new populist elites in India are also more pragmatic and identity conscious than idealistic and international in orientation. The rise of Jana Sangh in the north and D.M.K. in the south is clearly indicative of growth in the populist types of elites. Communists and other political elites of the Leftist or Marxist leaning too have their identification more with the specific and immediate issues concerning specific groups interests rather than commitment to a diffuse political ideology (which they have in theory but ironically always tend to flout), which was characteristic of the national liberal elites.

In ideal typical form, bureaucratic organization is an extension of a modernized social structure. It is based on legal authority, which according to Weber, is located in rationally defined legal norms; these norms are not embodied in persons' but in 'offices' which are abstract rational categories; obedience in bureaucracy is, therefore, not to persons but to the 'the laws' which are defined by 'rules' and 'specified sphere of competence'; offices are hierarchically arranged in terms of competence and responsibility; administrative procedures are formulated and recorded in 'writing', so that the whole organization is 'rationalized and de-mystified specially in the realm of power relationships. In a pure type of bureaucratic structure, as Weber writes, individual officials are appointed and function according to the following criteria:

(1) They are personally free and subject to authority only with respect to their personal official obligation. (2) They are organized in clearly

defined hierarchy or offices. (3) Each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence in the legal sense. (4) The office is filled by a free contractual relationship. Thus, in principle, there is free selection. (5) Candidates are selected on the basis of technical qualifications. In the most rational case, this is tested by examination or guaranteed by diplomas certifying technical training, or both. They are *appointed*, not *elected* (6) They are remunerated by fixed salaries in money, for the most part with a right to pensions. Only under certain

circumstances does the employing authority, especially in private organizations, have right to terminate the appointment, but the official is always free to resign. The salary scale is primarily graded according to rank in the hierarchy; but in addition to this criterion, the responsibility of the position and the requirements of the incumbent's social status may be taken into account. (7) The office is treated as the sole, or at least the primary, occupation of the incumbent. (8) It constitutes a career. There is a system of 'promotion' according to seniority or achievement, or both. Promotion is dependent on the judgement of superiors. (9) The official works entirely separated from ownership of the means of administration and without appropriation of his position. (10) He is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office.

In real life, however, there are variations from the characteristic of bureaucracy mentioned above. Weber says that traditional India did not have a developed socio-cultural foundation for the growth of rational legal authority and bureaucratic social structures. Broadly speaking, he is right. We get details of complex system of administration of the State, city, and military organization, etc., in Kautilya's Arthashastra; king's counsellors are reported to be organized into hierarchies of competence and power, there men' a number of counsellor (*mantrin*) below a chief counsellor (*maha-mantrin*), for administration of various state activities; there was the treasure (*Artlzasastra sannidha T*), the tax collector (*samahal" tra*), the chief judge and legal adviser (*pradvioaka*), the army general (*senapati*), and the chief record keeper (*mahaksapatalika*).

All were members of the king's council. Cities were administered by an officer called *nagaraka* or *purapala* who was responsible for tax collection and maintenance of law and order; he controlled the police, secret agents and the troops which were sometimes under the command of a captain (*dandanayaka*), or under his own command. For each forty households in the city there was a *gopa* or a petty officer, who kept record of their income and expenditure, and took note to deaths and births in the families under his charge.

There also were administrators for the control of crime, disposal of criminals, and for the administration of finances.

Apparently, this administrative structure makes us believe that some form of legal authority with a bureaucratic type of structure existed in ancient India. But this legal system was not contractual or egalitarian; social and criminal codes had a bias in favour of certain castes and individuals in certain offices; charismatic and traditional status were given priority in the administration of justice; equality of all persons before law was not an accepted rule. There was no established constitution or legal procedure; king used to rule through royal decrees (*sasana*), which were arbitrary and were changed from time to time. Some officials were paid salary, but most of them depended on commissions; none of them had a fixed tenure or a rationally defined sphere of competence; the abstract notion of 'office' did not exist, all officials were servants of the king and owed loyalty to him in person. This type of administrative structure comes closer to the 'patrimonial bureaucratic model.'

With some variation, the system continued during the Turko-Afghan and the Mughal rule in India. Now, both the Hindu and the Muslim law formed the basis of administration of justice; some changes were affected in the personnel and the pattern of administration, but, non-equalitarianism in law and patrimonialism in official appointments and allocation of duties, etc. continued to persist.

The modern bureaucratic structure in India is a contribution of the British rule. Its rational character has evolved slowly, and in its present form, this organization has imbibed many typical elements, which distinguish it from bureaucracy in any other nation; as we shall discuss below these typicalities

have resulted from its organic development in the unique historical setting of India. This was also to be expected. The political and administrative growth in the new nations might have systematic similarities with those in some nations of the West, but as Ralph Braibanti has pointed out, "the qualitative fibre of

the context both affects and creates conditions of dissimilarity vitiating relevance of other experience,” consequently the same systems assume different functional orientations in different societal contexts.

This is also true for the bureaucratic system and its elite structure (Indian Civil Services) in India. In some respects the British gave it a shape; they were responsible for introducing into this system its basic rational framework which consists of: “open entry based on academic competition; permanency of tenure irrespective of party political changes; a division into grades or classes according to whether the function is responsible or merely routine; a regular, graded scale of pay; and a system of promotion based on a combination of seniority and selection by merit.” But these characteristics have evolved under a historical contingency of forces, which the Company and the British government encountered in India. They could not have been imported from Britain in toto. Hugh Tinker writes; “None of these features could be detected, even in embryo, in the ‘Civil Service’ in the United Kingdom of the eighteenth century. Whitehall functionaries moved from party political appointments into ‘administrative’ office and back into politics. Appointment still by patronage. Salary was attached to a specific appointment. Frequently, an ill-paid deputy discharged the duties of the post. No clear distinction was drawn between purely clerical posts, which might be ill-paid or richly paid, and higher positions of responsibility. Not until after 1870 did the ‘home’ Civil Service begin to assume its parent pattern. This pattern was largely derived from the evolution of a superior civil service in India.”

A more rational organization of Civil Service evolved in India because of the concern of the politicians in Britain to control the possibilities of accumulation of wealth by the Company’s servants so that “the cornucopia of Indian patronage should not become the means of dominating the politics of England.” Consequently, Pitt’s India Act of 1784 was introduced which provided for

definite scale of pay and emoluments and formulated the principles of promotion by seniority; it also fixed the age for entry into the service of

'writers' and cadets at fifteen to eighteen years. In 1793, under Company's charter the position of higher civil office was reserved for the "covenanted" civil service, which was later renamed as Indian Civil Service and regularized by the Indian Civil Service Act of 1861. During the Company's time the bureaucratic elite were the members of the 'covenanted' civil service; Indian Civil Service came to occupy this position with the beginning of the Crown's rule, now renamed in the Independent India as the Indian Administrative Service. Thus, one might find a great deal of community in the structure and function of the bureaucratic elite-cadre in India.

GLOBALISATION AND MODERNITY

Structure**11.1 Objectives****11.2 Introduction****11.3 Globalization****11.4 Themes****11.2 Introduction**

We are now on the road to the formation of a global society. The legacy of this society goes back to the enlightenment era. It was during this era that we developed a modern social thought which believed that the universal community of humankind is in all respects the end of object of the highest moral endeavour. Underlying this vision is an assumption that at root the needs and interests of all human beings are universally similar. Such a vision has shaped the emancipatory aspirations of both liberalism and Marxism, which have been committed to the eradication of those structures - the state and capitalism respectively deemed to suppress the realization of a cosmopolitan world order based upon liberty, justice and equality for all of humanity.

Society is now changing so fast that globalization seems to be the only alternative for the world. Revolution in information technology and an ever-increasing role of mass

media have strengthened the ideology put forward by enlightenment and modernity. Moreover, 'surface' events, such as the end of cold war, the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union, the transition from industrialism to post-industrialism, the global diffusion of democratic institutions and practices, together with the intensification of patterns of worldwide economic, financial, technological and ecological interdependence, have all signalled to many observers the final clearing away of the old world order, with all its menacing features, and the inauguration of a new world order which contains the promise of an evolving world, society, a single global community of fate. Certainly, there can be little doubt that the world is being re-made around us, that radical changes are under way which may be transforming the fundamental parameters of modern human, social and political existence.

There is no single globalization. There are several globalizations. Its *avatar* is plural, its processes are historical and its outcomes are varying. And, therefore, instead of calling it globalization, we should call it globalizations. Globalization, the world over, does not have a cakewalk. Challenges' given to it are by no means ordinary. There is always a fear that the nation-state would lose its identity and importance. And, who knows, the state itself would die. There is yet another fear that the gap between the rich and the poor would increase. It is also argued that globalization is nothing short of a cultural bombardment on the developing countries by the western modernity - capitalism, industrialism and the nation-state system. And, the supporters of globalization - its intellectual lobby, keep on threatening as Fukuyama would say - there is end of history; there is no alternative to capitalism, since socialism has collapsed. And again, to quote a line of Bob Dylan: "You'd better start swimming, or you'll sink like a stone." Where is the alternative? Let us explore globalization from the perspective of sociology.

11.3 Globalization: Meaning and definitions

Any discussion on globalization - its meaning and content - should necessarily begin with Roland Robertson, who could be said to be father of globalization. It was in the year 1990 that Mike Featherstone edited a book, *Global Culture* (Sage Publications, London) which appeared in the market. In this book, Robertson had contributed an article, 'Mapping the Global Condition: Globalization as the Central Concept'. It is here that

Robertson for the first time explained the concept of globalization. He says in his introduction: "My primary aim in this discussion is with the analytical and empirical aspects of globalization." Surely, global culture is not the culture of a particular nation-state, say, D.S or Europe, the culture of a nation-state cannot be global culture because it is homogeneous and integrated. Global culture is, therefore, necessarily trans-societal culture which takes a variety of forms which have preceded the inter-state relations into which nation-states can be regarded as being embedded, and processes which sustain the exchange and flow of goods, people, information, knowledge and images which give rise to communication processes which gain sane autonomy on a global level.

Robertson refers to political upheavals, which took place at the world level in the beginning of 1990. The shaking events, which took place in China, the U.S.S.R. and Europe, disturbed the traditional world order. Robertson writes :

We have entered a phase of what appears to us in 1990s as great global uncertainty - so much so that the very idea of uncertainty promises to become globally institutionalized. Or to put it in a very different way, there is an eerie relationship between the ideas of postmodernism and postmodernity and the day-by-day geopolitical 'earthquakes' which we (the virtually global we) have recently experienced.

For Robertson, the beginning of the idea of globalization goes back to the global uncertainty of the relations between world nation-states. In his effort to define globalization, Robertson links it with modernity and postmodernity. He also mentions about the politics of the global human conditions. Robertson writes:

I deal with globalization as a relatively recent phenomenon. In fact, I argue that it is intimately related to modernity and modernization, as well as to postmodernity and postmodernization. All that I am maintaining is that the concept of globalization per se should be applied to a particular series of developments concerning the concrete structuration of the world as a whole.

In other words, globalization is a comprehensive process, which includes both

modernization and postmodernization. It would be wrong to say that the origin of globalization is from intra-societal relations. Nor is the origin from inter-state relations. Its making, according to Robertson, has been much more complex and culturally richer than that. It is inclusive of both modernity and postmodernity. Robertson (1992) defines it as under :

I maintain that what has come to be called globalization is, in spite of differing conceptions of that theme, best understood as indicating the problem of the form in terms of which the world becomes united, but by no means integrated in naive functionalist mode. Globalization as a topic is, in other words, a conceptual entry to the problem of world order in the most general sense - but, nevertheless, an entry which has no cognitive purchase without considerable discussion of historical and comparative matters.

It is exciting to know that the *International Sociology* decided in the year 2000 to bring out a special issue of the journal on 'globalization' for the practice of social science and also for the understanding of world issues. The issue grew out of a multidisciplinary committee on global processes that was set up by the Swedish Council for the Planning and Coordination of Research. Consequently, a thematic research programme on globalization had also been made. The *International Sociology* has shown its concern for the world society as late as 2000. Its guest editor for the June 2000 issue, Goran Therborn, has defined globalization as under :

In comparison with the preoccupations of the social sciences 100 years earlier, the current overriding interest in globalization means two things. First of all, a substitution of the global for the universal, a substitution of space for time. In a sense, globalization may be interpreted as modernity's flight into space. This issue of *International Sociology* is concerned with the implications of globalizations as plural, historical, social processes both for the practice of social science and for the understanding of world issues.

What Therborn means by globalization is :

1. It is global; it replaces universal. **154**

2. It is space, and replaces time.
3. It is modernity plus a flight into space.
4. It is plural, that is, globalizations.
5. It consists of several social processes.
6. It helps understand world issues.

Therborn has further elaborated the subject matter of globalization and includes in it five major topical discourses, namely, (1) competition economy; (2) socio-critical; (3) state impotence in the face of world economy; (4) cultural; and (5) globe as a whole, i.e., a planetary eco-system. We shall discuss all these discourses on globalization at a later state.

Anthony Giddens has written extensively on modernization. He assumes importance in the discussion of globalization for the simple reason that for him globalization is the direct consequence of modernization. Robertson did not think this way. He did not link modernization with globalization. Giddens argues that each of the three main dynamics of modernization implies universalizing tendencies which render social relations even more inclusive. They make possible global network of relationships (e.g., the system of international relations or the modern social system of capitalism), but they are also, for Giddens, more fundamental in extending the temporal and spatial distance of social relationships. Time-space distanciation, disembodiment and reflexivity mean that complex relationships develop between local activities and interaction across distances. Giddens defines globalization in his book, *The Consequences of Modernity* (1990) as under :

Globalization can thus be defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations, which links distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shared by events occurring many miles away and vice versa. This is a dialectical process because such local happenings may move in an obverse direction from the very distanced relations that shape them. Local transformation is as much a part of globalization as the lateral extension of social

connections across time and space.

What is particular about Giddens' definition of globalization is that he links it with modernization. For him, modernization means a capitalist system, which is concerned with the commodity production, where there are social relations between the owners of private capital and non-owners who sell their labour for wages. The second feature of modernity is industrialism, third is the nation-state, and finally, nation-state's power to keep surveillance. All these features of modernity are involved in the process of globalization. He adds to these features the process of time-space distanciation as a prime ingredient of globalization.

Malcolm Waters has done quite a helpful work on globalization in his book, *Globalization* (1995). The book has come out after a serious 'grinding' by the author. In this work, he has defined globalization as under :

We can therefore define globalization as a social process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding.

Actually, Waters, quite like Giddens, associates globalization with the wider social processes such as post-industrialization, postmodernization and the disorganization of capitalism.

We have argued earlier that globalization has several aspects. Waters has dealt with three major theoretical assumptions or arenas of globalization. These arenas give meaning and content to globalization:

1. *The economy arena:* It includes social arrangements for the production, exchange, distribution and consumption of goods and tangible services.
2. *The polity arena:* It includes social arrangements for the concentration and application of power, especially in so far as it involves the organized exchange of coercion and surveillance (military, police, etc.) as well as such institutionalized transformations of these practices as authority and diplomacy that can establish control over populations and territories.

3. *The cultural arena*: It includes social arrangements for the production, exchange and expression of symbols that represent facts, affects, meanings, beliefs, preferences, tastes and values.

Waters has tried to develop a theory of globalization. The main thrust of his theory is that globalization has relationship between social organization and territoriality. The theorem of globalization in terms of theoretical paradigm as developed by Waters (1995) is as under :

In summary, the theorem that guides the argument of this book is that: material exchanges localize; political exchanges internationalize; symbolic exchanges globalize. It follows that the globalization of human society is contingent on the extent to which cultural arrangements are effective relatives to economic and political arrangements. We can expect the economy and the polity to be globalized to the extent that they are culturalized.

Thus, a broad survey of the definitions of globalization brings forth two major aspects. One is the economic context and the other is non-economic context. The non-economic context broadly includes socio-cultural, historical and political dimensions of globalization. Economic context of globalization seems to be stronger and louder. The European Commission defined globalization as below :

Globalization is the process by which markets and productions, in different countries are becoming increasingly interdependent due to dynamics of trade in goods and services and flows of capital and technology.

However, the economic interpretation of the European Commission is contested by several authors, important among them is Thompson (1999). He argues that the nature of the internationalized world economy would be a non-timed nationally embedded capital.

Here, the principal private actors are the multinational corporations having a clear national base and working under the control of the home country, authorities. In contrast, the globalized world economy represents a new structure of disembodied economic relationships independent of national economics.

The definition of globalization which is contested 'by Thompson makes five important improvements: (1) private sectors in globalization are international and are independent of national economy; (2) new markets and productions are independent; (3) global economy is controlled by neo-liberal regulations; (4) under globalization new world economic system has emerged, and (5) the world economic system is transformed into capitalist system. Actually, the world capitalist system has undergone several changes. The Marxist theory of capitalism, as an explanatory tool to analyze capitalism, has become irrelevant after the disintegration of Soviet Russia. In this context, the economic explanation of globalization has provided a new dynamic of capitalism known as 'flexible accumulation'. This capitalism has considerably altered the structure of global financial system, and with the computerization and communication, the significance of instantaneous international coordination of financial flows increased and intensified the reduction of spatial barriers (Harvey, 1989).

I. Wallerstein is a Marxist economist. He has applied Marxian theory to the understanding of globalization. According to him, the existing integrated world capitalist economy dates back to the 16th century. Wallerstein (1983) observed :

The transition from feudalism to capitalism involves first of all (first logically and first temporary) the creation of a world economy. This is to say, social division of labour was brought into being through the transformation of long-distance trade from a trade in 'luxuries' to a trade in 'essentials' or 'bulk goods' which tied together processes that were widely dispersed into long commodity chains. Such commodity chains were already there in the 16th century, and pre-dated anything that could meaningfully be called 'national economics'.

Wallerstein says that the national economics got a shift during 20th century. It has ultimately resulted in the shift of capitalist world economy from its primary location in Europe to the entire globe.

Wallerstein's main argument in defining globalization revolves round capitalist system. What he argues is that the capitalism, which was restricted to Europe, went beyond it and

covered the whole world. Malcolm Waters questions Wallerstein's economic model of globalization and argues that globalization does not end up in the proliferation of capitalism only. It also integrates political and cultural variables.

There is yet another perspective of globalization which does not put emphasis mainly on economic system of capitalism. This approach is best represented by Leslie Sklair in his book, *Sociology of the Global System* (1991). According to him, environmental processes can be analyzed not by inter-state relations but by transnational practices. Sklair has defined transnational practices as those "that cross state boundaries but do not necessarily originate at the level of the state. The transnational corporation, the transnational capitalist class and the culture-ideology of consumerism that together constitute transnational practices, are the dominant institutions found in the economic, political and cultural domains respectively as the driving forces of globalization".

What Sklair means by transnational practices is the amalgam of (1) transnational corporations, (2) transnational capitalist class, and (3) consumerism. In globalization, the global capitalist class is likely to operate from a nation-state, which has hegemony over other states. The U.S. seems to be such a hegemonic state which would guide and dominate the transnational practices in all the spheres of economic, political and cultural globalization.

Wallerstein talked about world economy, which has constituted global capitalism. Castells' global economy is different from world economy. Manuel Castells is the writer of the multi-volume book, *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture: The Rise of the Network Society* (1996). The book discusses elaborately the dynamics of information age. At its core, the information age is the age of new technologies of information, processing and communication. "Information technology is to this revolution what new sources of energy were to the successive industrial revolution. The technological innovations have been essentially market-driven. The economic process that accompanied the information technology revolution is both informational and global because, under new historical conditions, productivity is generated through and competition is played out in a global network of interaction."

Castells has developed the theory of globalization around his concept of global

economy. His definition of global economy runs as under :

It is an economy with the capacity to work as a unit in real time on a plenary scale.

Castells further explains global economy by saying that “it is capitalist in nature short of, however, a capitalist class structure”. Castells and other postmodernists who discuss globalization argue that in postmodern society classes have ceased to exist. According to them, postmodern capitalism is without class structure. Castells (1996) writes :

There is not, sociologically and economically, such a thing as a global capitalist class. But there is an integrated global capital netWork whose movements and variable logic ultimately determine economics and influence societies.

Castells further argues that the present capitalist societies are inherently based on information technology, which provides material basis for this society.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) normally publishes *Human Development Report* on annual basis. It argues that globalization is not new. There was some kind of globalization in early 16th and the late 19th centuries. But, the present structure of globalization is totally different from its earlier versions. The present globalization era consists of the following variables :

- (1) *New markets*: Foreign exchange and capital markets linked globally, operating 24 hours a day, with dealings at a distance in real time.
- (2) *New tools*: Internet links, cellular phones and media networks.
- (3) *New actors*: The World Trade Organization (WTO) with authority over national governments, the multinational corporations with more economic power than many states, the global networks of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other groups that transcend nation boundaries.
- (4) *New rules*: Multilateral agreements on trade, services and intellectual property,

backed by strong enforcement mechanism and more binding for national governments, reducing the scope for national policy.

There is also a brighter side to globalization. The *Human Development Report* says: “Global markets, global technology, global ideas and global solidarity can enrich the lives of people everywhere, greatly expanding their choices. The growing interdependence of people’s lives calls for shared values and a shared commitment to the human development of all people.” But the brighter side of globalization is not without its gloom. The same *Human Development Report* says: “Globalization expands the opportunities for unprecedented human advance for some but shrinks those opportunities for others and erodes human security. It is integrating economy, culture and governance but fragmenting societies. Driven by commercial market forces, globalization in this era seeks to promote economic efficiency, generate growth and yields profits. But it misses out on the goals of equity, poverty eradication and enhanced human security.”

The list of negative impacts of globalization is large indeed: “Gaps in income between poorest and richest people; and countries have continued to widen. Furthermore, the new rules of globalization privatization, liberalization and intellectual property rights - are shaping the path of technology, creating new risks of marginalization and vulnerability.” Some of the other negative impacts of globalization include global crime in terms of illegal trafficking in weapons, cross-border terrorism, spread of HIV / AIDS, environmental degradation and fundamentalist movements as a part of assertion of local culture. Body-Gendrot (2000) supports *Human Development Report’s* observations by empirical data and says that in Europe and America inequalities and associated problems of violence in cities have worsened under economic globalization.

A.K. Bagchi (1999) reports from India on the basis of field data that “globalization as a policy expression of neo-liberal regime has, failed to improve macro-economic management and capacity in the region”. It has also been observed that globalization driven by liberal economic policy in India has actually increased rural indebtedness, landlessness, food insecurity, child labour, casualisation of work, wage gaps between skilled and unskilled labour, and the incidence of social pathologies such as violence and intimidation

even as global culture has brought in its wake *some* changes in the lifestyles of the non-poor.

Yet another economist, Michael Chossudovsky (1991) also reports about the negative impacts of globalization :

The overall impact of globalization has been a global crisis of which India and many other Asian and Eastern European countries have been made victims.

The British authors Stuart Hall, David Held and Gregor McLennan consider globalization as a complex process which extends the scope of modernization. According to them :

Modernization is a process which reaches back to the earliest stages of modernity and continues to shape and reshape politics, economics and culture at an accelerated pace and scale. The extension of globalizing processes operating through a variety of institutional dimensions (technological, organizational, administrative, cultural and legal), and their increased intensifications, within these spheres, creates new forms and limits within modernity as a distinctive form of life.

Anthony McGrew (1992) views globalization as a process, which operates at a global scale. He writes :

Globalization refers to those processes, operating at a global scale, which cut across national boundaries, integrating on connecting communities and organizations in space-time combinations, making the world in reality and in experience more interconnected. Globalization implies a movement away from the classifiable sociological idea of a 'society' as a well-bounded system, and its replacement by a perspective which concentrates on "how social life is ordered across time and space".

What McGrew means by globalization is :

- (1) National identities are being eroded as a result of the growth of cultural homogenization and the global postmodernism.
- (2) National and other 'local' or particularistic identities are being strengthened by the resistance to globalization.
- (3) National identities are declining but new identities of hybridity are taking their place.

We have thus tried to define globalization at length in the above pages and in doing that we have, as far as possible, included all those scholars who have provided specific perspectives on globalization. Globalization is a vast process taking place at a global scale. But recently, there are scholars who have developed some theories on globalization. The definitions of globalization also raise certain issues. Some of the major themes which emerge from the definitions and meaning of globalization are put below :

- (1) Building of a universal community of human kind. The objective goes with the assumption that the needs and interests of mankind all over the world are similar. The vision of globalization as a world community would give liberty, justice and equality for all humanity.
- (2) Globalization establishes linkages and interconnections that cut across the nation-states.
- (3) Globalization involves a profound reordering of time and space in social life. Giddens refers to it as time-space distanciation or compression. Today, we have to learn how to cope with an overwhelming sense of compression of our spatial and temporal worlds. Harvey argues that there is need to speed up or intensify time-space compression. It is in this context that Harvey talks about 'global village'.
- (4) Capitalism occupies a central place in globalization.

- (5) Globalization is associated with technological progress.
- (6) Globalization is a product of political factors, in particular the existence of a permissive global order.
- (7) The theory of globalization involves the analytical separation of the factors which have facilitated the shift towards a single world, e.g., the spread of capitalism, western imperialism and the development of a global media system.
- (8) Globalization is interrelationship between the political, economic and cultural dimensions of social life.
- (9) Globalization is dialectical having ' both positive and negative consequences. It contains certain dualities or binary oppositions: (1) universalisation versus particularization; (2) homogenization versus differentiation; (3) integration versus fragmentation; (4) centralization versus decentralization; and (5) juxtaposition versus syncretization.
- (10) Globalization is the expansion of the world system.
- (11) Globalization is a necessary accompaniment of modernity.
- (12) Globalization is the creation of a single world market.
- (13) Globalization is the consequence of modernity.
- (14) Globalization is a modern myth.
- (15) Globalization is a second modernity.

For some sociologists, globalization gives a danger signal. For instance, Ian Roxborough (2002) traces the appropriation of globalization concept by American military strategists. Roxborough argues that the end of cold war has raised the question of world hegemony. And, in this race for power, the U.S. has occupied a dominant position in the post-cold war world. After the disintegration of communism in Europe, globalization has

come as a ready alternative. It has become a tool in the hands of U.S. Roxborough writes:

Of all possible answers, globalization as a diagnosis of the new world order rapidly emerged as the winner, certainly in the rhetoric of the Washington BeltWay. It seemed to explain the triumph of free market capitalism over state regulation, it offered a technological underpinning (the internet) for the changes, and, most notoriously articulated as the end of history (Fukuyama, 1992), it celebrated the victory of the USA in the cold war. The concept of globalization provided a bridge between past (the cold war). and future by arguing that victory in the cold war had gone to the forces of free market democracies.

And if the 'U.S. tames globalization, what would be the fate of developing countries ?

While tracing the history of globalization, we must refer to the work of Anthony Giddens, namely, *The Consequences of Modernity* (1990): In this book, Giddens argues that postmodernity is not actually a break with modernity. The 'radicalized' or 'high' version of modernity is postmodernity. And globalization, therefore, carries all the elements of modernity and postmodernity. In fact, when we discuss globalization, we discuss both modernity and postmodernity. However, Giddens makes a difference in modernity and globalization. Modernity and postmodernity are often considered to be culturalistic while -globalization is taken as an economic phenomenon. The difference between the three concepts, viz., modernity, postmodernity and globalization, is, therefore, only of emphasis. Basically, all the three deal with institutional forms of modern society.

Malcolm Waters has traced the history of globalization in his book, *Globalization* (1995). He says that the word 'global' has been in usage for about 400 years from now. But, it was not used in its technical connotation. The words 'globalization, 'globalize' and 'globalizing' did not exist until about 1960. *The Economist* (4/4/59) reported, "Itlay's globalized quota for imports of cars has been increased"; and in 1961 Webster became the first major dictionary to offer definitions of globalism and globalization. The *Spectator* (5/10/62) recognized that "globalization is, indeed, a staggering concept". It also mentioned about globalism, globalization, globalize and globalized.

Robertson (2000) reports that the word ‘globalization’ was not recognized as academically significant until the early or possibly the mid-1980s, but thereafter its use has become well established. Although he says that its pattern of diffusion is virtually impossible to trace, it is beyond reasonable doubt that he is himself centrally responsible for its currency in sociology. The many items he himself has published on the topic include what is possibly the first sociological article (1,985) to include the word in its title although he had used the concept of ‘globality’ somewhat earlier. Waters (1995) says that after Robertson, the word ‘global’ has reached five figures in its use. Waters further informs: “As at February 1994 the catalogue of the *Library of Congress* contains only 34 items with the term or *one of its* derivatives in the title.” None of these was published before 1987.

UNFINISHED PROJECT OF MODERNITY

Structure**12.1 Introduction****12.2 Unfinished Project****12.3 Sum Up****12.1 Introduction**

Jurgen Habermas belongs to the second generation of the intellectuals of Frankfurt School. He was Adorno's assistant at the Frankfurt School. In 1961, he was appointed 'Professor of Philosophy' and Sociology at the University of Heidelberg. He returned to the Frankfurt School in 1964. He was one of the staunch supporters of Marxism. However, he recognizes that many of Marx's ideas have become obsolete. He moves towards Weber as a source of alternative ideas. Yet, he also suggests that some of the basic principles which inspired Marx's writing need to be sustained. Habermas writes: "There is no alternative to capitalism, nor should there be: capitalism has proved capable of generating enormous wealth. Nonetheless, some of the fundamental problems that Marx identified in capitalist economy are still there—such as its tendency to produce economic depression or crises. We need to establish our control over economic processes which have come to control us more than we control them."

12.2 Unfinished Project

Habermas determined his research strategy in accordance with his conception of society. He analyzed the historical nature of society and put it into four types: primitive, traditional, capitalist and postcapitalist. According to him, primitive societies were kin-societies. In these societies, age and sex constituted the-organizational principle. Here, change occurred as a result of external factors that undermined familial and tribal identities. The usual sources of social change were demographic, growth in connection with ecological features and above all, inter-ethnic dependency as a result of economic exchange, war and conquest.

The traditional societies were those where there was political domination. Habermas defines this category of societies as that wherein the dominance of kinship system is replaced by the power and control of the state. He further describes traditional societies :

In traditional societies, differentiation and functional specialization began to appear. Social change or crises occurred as a result of the contradiction between validity claims of systems of norms and justifications that cannot explicitly permit exploitation and a class structure in which privileged appropriation of socially produced wealth is the rule. The result was 'heightened repression' in order to maintain system integration.

Discussing capitalist societies, Habermas distinguished between liberal capitalist society and advanced capitalist society. The organizational principle of liberal capitalism is the relationship of wage labour and capital which is anchored in the system of bourgeois civil law. In this type of society, economic exchange becomes the dominant steering medium and the state power is limited to the (a) protection of bourgeois in accord with civil law (police and administration of justice); (b) shielding of the market mechanism from self-destructive side effects; (c) satisfaction of the prerequisites of production in the economy as a whole (public school education, transportation and communication); and (d) adaptation of the system of civil law to needs that arise from the process of accumulation (tax, banking, business law).

Coming to the postcapitalist societies, Habermas argues that in these societies the

liberal capitalism is transformed into state-regulated capitalism. In these societies, there is rise of MNCs. The state in these societies intervenes in the economy because of the steering problems caused by economic fluctuations. As a result, the distinction between the economic and political systems tends to disappear when for example, the state offers subsidies to industry, sets up job creation schemes and offers tax relief to attract industry.

We now explain some of the central theories of Habermas which have a bearing on neo-conflict theories.

Habermas' critique of Marxism

Habermas, as we have mentioned earlier, is a second generation critical theorist. He has written extensively on communication and this has helped him to develop his critical theory. He is concerned with reformulating Marxian theory in the light of postmodern society. Therefore, developing his own critical theories, he has provided a critique of Marxism. His major arguments against Marxism are given below:

Marx's concept of labour and production is unable to understand cultural and political life.

Habermas was committed to Marxism. He belonged to the Frankfurt School. But he was critical of some of the dogmatic theories of Marxism. Marx explained capitalism through production relations. Habermas contested it. Earlier, state and economics were independent of each other. The state followed the policy of laissez-faire. But now, in the modern society, there has emerged state capitalism. State is an active partner and, therefore, it has a greater role in deciding the future of society. In such a situation, it is not the economic structure only which is determinant of social structure. Political factors also play a decisive role.

In advance societies the ways of oppression have changed

One very striking feature of capitalism is the alienation, oppression and exploitation of labour. This was true when there was monopoly capitalism. Habermas rejects the oppression-exploitation theory of Marx. Now, the proletariat does not have consciousness for mobilization. They are satisfactorily remunerated. Their perks are more than several.

Habermas questions: In the new situation, why should proletariat commit a revolution? The problem with them is that they feel that they are a deprived lot of people. Their poverty is now not absolute; it is relative. Thus; exploitation and oppression have been replaced by psychological and ethnic deprivation. Habermas is convinced that the labour of modern capitalist society is now not in need to go for revolution.

Marxism has failed in Soviet Russia

The downfall of Soviet Russia has proved to some extent the theoretical weakness of Marxism. Marx misconceived the problems of the proletariat. He thought that the Russian society was essentially an agricultural society. And here was the rub. There was industrialization. Quite like Western Europe, Eastern Europe also took giant step towards industrialization. Then there came Fordism and post Fordism. In such a situation, the notion of Marx that the extension of capitalism would end up with revolution was wrong. The reality today is that with the increase in capitalism, the labour has also become prosperous. Now, the state, instead of becoming coercive, has become welfare.

Marx has totally neglected superstructure

Not only Habermas, the postmodernists, including Marxist postmodernists such as Jameson, have criticized Marx for his undermining superstructure. Marx has discussed the evolution of production relations, but what about the evolution of religion, ideology, culture and values? In fact, evolution is a comprehensive process, which also includes superstructure, besides economic structure. Habermas, at this state of his discussion, puts forward the concept of communication reason. He argues that communication plays an important role in the development of infrastructure and superstructure. Symbols, interaction) ethnicity and language are the mediums of interaction. These cannot be ruled out.

Marx's class struggle and ideology have become irrelevant.

Habermas argues that capitalism has changed so drastically that the two key categories of Marxian theory, namely, class struggle and ideology, can no longer be

employed as they stand. Advanced, state regulated capitalism suspends class conflict by buying off the workers with improved access to goods and services. The probability that the stark differences between the owners of capital and the non-owners will become more obvious, promoting a revolutionary consciousness among the dispossessed, is circumvented by the glitter of consumer society.

Commenting on the status of class conflict in the modern capitalist society as analyzed by Habermas, Adams and Sydie (2001) write :

Class distinction persist (even today,) but according to Habermas, they are not central to social conflict. Conflict in modern society involved underprivileged groups who are not class as such and certainly do not represent the majority in the society. Like the earlier conflict theorists, Habermas has abandoned the proletariat as a potentially emancipatory force, and he has problems finding another group to replace them. He also tends to overlook the situation in non-western countries and the possibility that emancipatory transformation may arise as a result of the obvious inequities of global capitalism. He has suggested that the only truly revolutionary group in western societies is the women's movement.

Habermas' neo-conflict theories

The work of Habermas and the earlier critical theorists is predicted on the idea that theory was central to the practical transformation of society. The Frankfurt School worked on this belief. They were hopeful to change the society. But Habermas, and earliest: critical theorists, the revolutionary agent of such transformation was difficult to identify. Critical theory stresses the importance of fundamental transformation which has little basis in social struggle, but tends to lose sight of important social and political struggle both within the west and beyond it-struggle which have changed and are continuing to change the face of politics. We now describes some of the major critical theories of Habermas.

Communication and domination theory

As a critical theorist, Habermas was very much concerned with Marxism. And,

what does Marxism mean to him? Emancipation of mankind. There might be disagreement with Marx but all Marxists, whether structuralists, poststructuralist, or posmodernist share this concern for emancipation of mankind. Habermas argued that we should not expect any revolution from the proletariat class. They are now a pampered class of people within the trap of the capitalist class. The pampering of proletariat has also defeated class war. In such a situation, Habermas puts his critical theory of communication and domination.

Habermas expands Marx's conception of humanity by adding language, i.e., communication to work. Labour is a distinct feature of species being. The introduction of language as a significant part of human development led Habermas to concentrate on how it could lay the foundation for emancipatory practice. Language or communication has two aspects : (1) undistorted communication, and (2) distorted communication.

(1) ***Undistorted communication:*** It refers to the conditions under which social goals and values can be discussed on a rational egalitarian basis so that consensus can be reached on the ends and values to be pursued. Undistorted, rational communication only occurs when the peculiarly constraint-free force of the better argument prevailed.

The situation of undistorted communication is, in fact, perfect communication. Each society has its own means-end schema and the general consensus emerges out of this schema. Such a communication does not create any problem in the society.

(2) ***Distorted communication:*** The aspect of communication refers to the realm of psychoanalysis. In Freudian psychoanalysis the patient is encouraged, through a process of self-reflection, to become aware of previously repressed needs. Recovery (freedom) results from the patient's recognition of this self-imposed repression. As with the psychoanalyst, the role of the critical theorist is to assist the-repressed to recognize and understand their collective, social situation and, as a result, formulate emancipatory practices. Habermas regards this endeavour as particularly important today because of the extent to which science and technology distort communication in the interest of technological rationalization and the political reinforcement of repression. Distorted

communication is equivalent of Marx's false consciousness.

Domination and communication

In order to solve the problem of domination, Habermas suggests the construction of an ideal speech community. He explains his thesis with reference to Max Weber. Weber has given an ideal type of action. One such type is purposive rational action. Habermas introduces purposive rational action in the economy to the knowledge spheres of science, art, and political/legal/moral theory. His main point was the purposive rationality penetrates everyday practices, especially everyday communications, and contributes to the loss of meaning in everyday life. The modern capitalist society is today governed by purposive rationality, everything has a price. As matter of fact, in this society, everything can be justified in rational means-end schema. This results in the sideline of normative life. In fact, everything is made obsolete. In this situation, the emotional desires and subjective institutions are relegated to the irrational sphere.

A way can be made out of this. We need to construct an ideal speech community. Some of the features of the ideal speech community given by Habermas are as below :

- (1) all individuals capable of speech can participate in the debate;
- (2) all individuals have equal rights to give their reasons for their stated position;
and
- (3) no individual can be denied the right to participate in the debate.

The objective of constructing the ideal speech community is to guarantee that the force of better (rational) argument will prevail. Second, it is also to link theory and practice. Third, it is also linked with Marx. Marx said that ideology could be understood as distorted communication by giving false communication. The ideal speech situation is, therefore, politically important in providing the foundation for the full realization of human needs and interests. The very nature of communication in the ideal speech community is one of mutual trusts and comprehension rather than the achievement of rational instrumental ends.

Positivism and communication

In the modern capitalist society, we are all vulnerable to distorted communication. The TV screen displays day in and day out : “Our studies show that those who use this brand of toothpaste, never get tooth decay; no matter how many times they visit ice-candy parlour” Or, our, “brand of suiting and shirting makes a man complete.”

The critical theorists, one and all, are against positivism. In the modern capitalist society, there is domination of science and technology. And, science and technology in most of the cases create distorted communication.

Habermas maintained that science and technology were not neutral or objective procedures without any evaluative weight. Surely, in the early 19th century, science was a progressive force, but by the 20th century, science in its positive form had become a form of ideological domination. Positive science becomes a means for the manipulation of both the natural and social world in the interest of technical rather than social progress. Furthermore, Habermas claimed that science was “no longer understood as one form of knowledge; rather knowledge was not identified as science.”

The advanced capitalism or what Jameson calls ‘late capitalism’ may be charged with shrewdness and falsehood. It gives a general understanding that all our problems-political or moral-have a technical solution. In our total life, Habermas says, there is domination of scientism. The individual becomes powerless in the face of technological experts, whose presumed efficiency in solving social and economic crises is presented as being in the best interests of the individual. What is the result of such a domination of science and technology in our life, Jameson comments:

The depoliticization of the mass of the population by science gets objective power over individuals’ self-understanding. The dominance of technological rationality and positivist science over all spheres of life was not an inevitable process, although ideologically it might be presented as such. Admittedly, like several other critical theorists, Habermas reject positivism. But his rejection is on the ground that science used distorted communication to enslave the individual. This should mean that Habermas abandon

science altogether. He saw science as an instrument, which frees individuals from the constraints of external nature. What Habermas argues is that the place of science in the society must be balanced by a politics that was enlightened and emancipatory. A basic distinction needed to be made between rational-purposive action (Weber's ideal type), on the one hand, and communicative action of values and beliefs, on the other.

12.3 Sum Up

To conclude, we can say that Habermas had been a witness to several events that engulfed the world. He had suffered as a Jew from the Nazi regime. He had witnessed the Second World War. And, he was in the intellectual company of some of the stalwarts of Frankfurt School. He was a strong supporter of Marxism. But, he was also a critique of dogmatic Marxism. He applied critical theorists' perspective to re-examine Marxism.

Habermas argued that modern capitalism cannot be analyzed adequately with the dogmatic Marxism. He therefore, suggested that class struggle and ideology-the two key categories of Marxian theory-need to be updated. State-regulated capitalism has made class war defunct. The proletariat has lost their interest in revolution and its outcome - socialism. Habermas has constructed his own theory of communication and domination. He argues that due consideration should also be given to the values, beliefs and symbols of society. He stresses on psychoanalysis methods also. His central themes of theory are to improve upon dogmatic Marxism and lead the modern capitalist society to the doorsteps of human emancipation. That is what Marx wanted to attain and that is what we all want to attain.

Habermas sees critical theory as true to its Marxist origin. Its objective is to analyze the abstraction of social life that conceal the real relations of exploitation and domination. To accomplish this, the analysis must concentrate on the "grammar of forms of life". Therefore, Habermas sees critical theory as true to the origins of sociology :

Sociology originated as a discipline responsible for the problems that politics and economics pushed to one side. Its theme was the changes in social integration brought

about within the structure of old European societies by the rise of the modern system of nation-states and by the differentiation of market regulated economy. Sociology became the science of crisis par excellence; it concerned itself about all with anomie aspects of all the dissolution of traditional social systems and the development of modern ones.

ALTERNATIVE MODERNITY

Structure**13.1 Introduction****11.2 Alternate Modernity****11.3 Sum Up****13.1 Introduction**

Sociology as a discipline is intimately entwined with modernity, both as lived and theorized.

Sociologists have galvanized distinctive mechanisms of social rationalization and technical regulation (not least statistics and surveys) and authored ideas of the modern social space as a realm that we denizens inhabit and control. Sociologists have also helped define modernity's significant Others, including the categories of tradition and post-modernity. They have applied their intellectual energy to formulating what might be called the "sociological modern": situating actors and institutions in terms of these categories, understanding the paths by which they develop or change, and communicating these understandings to states, citizens, all manner of organizations and social movements – as well as vast armies of students. On this basis, sociologists have helped build and manage today's sprawling, globally extended social edifice, while simultaneously trying to diagnose and dismantle its disciplinary aspects and iron cages. The discipline is itself a product of modernity, not simply in its institutions but, as we will argue, in its theoretical core.

The formation of modernity now figures as a place of disorder as well as dynamism – troubled, fissured, perhaps even in civilizational crisis. This is all the more ironic now that capitalism – surely a core constituent of modernity – is thought by some to have arrived at a point of triumphant stasis, the highest stage and culmination of history.

In this unsettled time, the discipline of sociology finds itself in an interesting position. It is prey to heightened theoretical dispersion and home to a confused array of possible stances toward the place of the “modern” in ongoing global transitions, reconfigurations and cataclysms. Many sociologists still embrace the familiar contrast between tradition and modernity and assume that a directional development from the former to the latter is underway.

They may celebrate or mourn the modernist rationalization and disenchantment of the social world against which romantic or neo-traditional energies are aimed and from which “we moderns” cannot turn back. Others, particularly of a more cultural studies bent, insist on the plasticity of all such distinctions or celebrate the viability of alternative modernities.

And so on. Yet what is often missing in the stew of sociological discussion, research and political prescription is a sense of history as more than a vague preamble to the current moment.

Historical sociology is one place for reflection about theory in the broader discipline, its connections to other academic and intellectual formations and to the quandaries inherent in the “sociological modern” as it plays out in the social world. In part that is because historical sociologists have offered analyses and narratives of how people and societies became modern or not – what was it that changed in the series of Great Transformations, and how these manifold processes are continuing to reshape the contemporary world.

At times historical sociologists have done even more. “Doing justice to the reality of history is not a matter of noting the way in which the past provides a background to the present,” as Philip Abrams (1982: 8) eloquently put it: “it is a matter of treating what people do in the present as a struggle to create a future out of the past, of seeing the past not just as the womb of the present but the only raw material out of which the present can

be constructed.” In this Introduction, we offer an archaeology and analysis of the three waves of historical sociology specifically in order to inform these reflections about theory, doing sociology and the future scholarship that might emerge from present debates.

Sociology’s Historical Imagination For much of its own history, sociological theory has evinced a deep concern for historical thinking. Attention to history has been tightly coupled to theoretical exploration as sociologists addressed the central questions of the discipline: how did societies come to be recognizably “modern”? how did selves come to be understood as individuated, coherently centered and rationally-acting human subjects? From Thomas Hobbes through Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Georg Simmel, W. E. B. DuBois, Thorstein Veblen and Norbert Elias, various lines of theory developed as an effort to understand the processes by which social structures and social actors were created and transformed over the course of the transition from “traditional” or feudal societies to some distinctively “modern” social life.

How modernity was understood varied, of course: it might involve the rise of capitalism and class-structured actors, as in Marx; the formation of the disciplined bourgeois subject and his confinement in the iron cage of rationalized collective life, as in Weber; the twinned inventions of Enlightenment individualism and a new order of racial subordination, as in DuBois, or still other broad evolutionary visions.

The proposed mechanisms of change were framed differently as well, whether in terms of political revolutions; the growth of the division of labor; colonialism and empire; pressures to manage the manifold anxieties of the self; opportunities for group cultural distinction, and so on. Yet within this diverse intellectual landscape, social theorists converged on a fundamentally historical project. Sociological theory, however, has been marked by striking shifts in just how it has attended to history. As sociology was institutionalized in this century, particularly as it took shape in the United States, this historically-informed theoretical vision gave way to more ahistorical models of social and cultural change.

Structural-functionalism and other allied approaches invoked highly general and abstracted characteristics, processes or sequences while claiming to explain change over

time. These approaches paid little or no attention to the temporally-bound logics of particular social and cultural configurations. Moreover, they lacked an emphasis on critical turning points, and tended to assume that many constituent and possibly disjoint processes could be coherently collapsed or fused under one general and rather vague heading – “modernization.” Ironically, these approaches either deployed the concepts of “modern,” “modernity” and “modernization” in unreflective ways, with minimal explicit substantive content, or aligned the “modern” with a roster of associated static concepts.

13.2 Alternate Modernity

Yet by the 1970s and 1980s, these ahistorical approaches served as the foil for a resurgence of historical inquiry. Of course this arid, desert background is partly fictive. A certain reading of one master theorist, Talcott Parsons, came to stand for, to signify, a broader and more complicated intermediary epoch. Intellectual lineages are constructed out of many materials, including people’s desire to claim forebears who will lend them academic credibility; the dynamics of disciplinary competition and collaboration, and authors’ conscious and unconscious desires and identifications (Bloom 1997; Camic 1992; Gieryn 1995; Latour and Woolgar 1979). We all interpret our predecessors, polishing some and vilifying others. Nevertheless we think the general point still stands. The mid-20th century was the apex of presentism in U.S. sociology as well as the moment of highest confidence in modernity. Luckily, not all sociologists in the United States – and sociologists working in the U.S. were the most enthusiastically encamped in this presentist desert – were captured by modernization theory or its more sophisticated cousin structural-functionalism, even in their palmiest days. One immediately thinks of Barrington Moore Jr., Reinhard Bendix, Seymour Martin Lipset or the early work of Charles Tilly among others.

They were in dialogue both with like-minded scholars outside the United States, and with colleagues from more presentist persuasions. Thus there were always a few engaged by fundamentally historical questions, particularly with respect to politics and political transformations. Their work nourished the next generation of historical sociologists — a “second wave” of the 1970s and 1980s – and helped inspire programmatic calls for

a return to historical inquiry. It was a “theory group” and a system of signs bound together by continuing engagement with questions inspired by Marxism. It was also a social movement. (The sense of a movement was nourished both by interdisciplinary activity and by the spread of historical methods to a large number of core sociological topics, and perhaps also by the influence of historians of, for example, the Annales school, who had earlier borrowed social scientific concepts and orientations.) This is not to say everyone was then a Marxist, but that even those who were not debated on largely Marxist terrain. Indeed, most of the best-known works of the comparative-historical renaissance of the 1970s and early 1980s – even those that did not explicitly embrace a Marxist theoretical stance – take off from puzzles within the Marxian tradition to which Marxism itself could not provide satisfactory answers. To resolve these puzzles, analysts had to draw on intuitions and concepts from other theoretical traditions. Any such characterization necessarily simplifies along two lines. First, many of those who contributed to the consolidation of the initial resurgence of historical sociology have continued to grapple with the new intellectual currents that challenge contemporary work. They have moved on after having created (and surfed) the second wave. For example, Charles Tilly is now engaged in the lively interdisciplinary work on “social mechanisms,” Theda Skocpol moved from revolutions to the emergence of the U.S. welfare state, in the process making a major contribution to the understanding of gendered politics and institutions, and Craig Calhoun has emerged as one of the leading voices of the cultural turn. The analytic contribution of a scholar in a field at one time does not exhaust her or his intellectual persona. Second, although the second wave was a broad, eclectic movement, sheltering a variety of actors who contributed to the resurgence of theoretically-informed history in sociology and allied disciplines, it was quickly typecast in terms of some of its members, and only some of their ideas. The canonical second wave was a system of signs as well as a movement of actors, and macroscopic, comparative scholars of revolution, state building, class formation became the synecdochal representative of the whole. Why should this have been so? First, the macro-political sociologists put forward programmatic statements and self-consciously forwarded historical approaches against the prevailing orthodoxy (see Abbott 2001, chapter 4). They also had a well-defined theoretical agenda which put them in dialogue with thriving marxist-inspired debates across history, anthropology and (to some extent) political

science. And let us not forget the *Zeitgeist*, and the worldwide audience for radical politics and Marxist theory. Those who worked on key intellectual questions that intersected with that theoretical formation were most likely to be seen as central. In what follows, we walk an analytic tightrope. We discuss the second wave in terms of its canonical version, which came to represent comparative historical sociology in the academic eye. But we will also insist that during the very period of its ascendancy in the 1970s and early 1980s, a number of historical sociologists were publishing important research that fell outside the hegemonic analytic framework. One might instance Andrew Abbott, Charles Camic, David Zaret, Viviana Zelizer among others.

One of the nicer ironies of the present moment – reflected in many of the chapters that follow – resides in the ongoing rediscovery of some of the substantive contributions of these and other iconoclastic historical sociologists, some of whose work was marginalized during the moment of canonical second wave dominance, and some of which represented the leading wedge that helped explode it. As an emerging paradigm, then, second wave historical sociology was defined by a shared set of commitments: a substantive interest in political economy centered on questions of class formation, industrialization, and revolution along with a (usually implicit) utilitarian model of the actor. While motivating a forceful line of inquiry into the transformations associated with modernity, these core assumptions reproduced many of the exclusions and repressions of modernist social theory. Certain subjects – in the double sense of both topics and actors – tended to be marginalized or excluded: colonial peoples, women, and groups that we would now call people of color and queers. The analytic dimensions of gender, sexuality, race, and nation were downplayed in parallel fashion. Moreover, culture, emotion, religion, the informal aspects of organization and more were repressed by the powerful political-economic analytic framework undergirding the resurgence of historical sociology. And, in proper dialectic form, they returned. In the process, recent scholarship has greatly enriched historical sociology while shredding many of the core assumptions of second wave scholarship. Take, for example, the combination of structural determination and the utilitarian model of action that informs canonical second-wave analyses of the influence of economic position on political action.

This double reductionism has been questioned as attention to culture and identity has unearthed the complex and contingent ways in which selves and discursive positions are formed. So what count as key substantive elements of “structure” or psyche is analytically open, and getting more open all the time.

The once-robust combination of structural determination and comparative methods is also deeply contested. Thinking historically, it is increasingly acknowledged, undermines comparative strategies that isolate distinct events in an empty “experimental time.”

Some see salvation for explanatory claims in terms of “mechanisms” that may be identified across diverse temporal and social settings. Others pin their hopes on a more thoroughgoing reconstruction of sociology’s own categories of analysis, now themselves under the historicizing microscope. The latter approach owes something to poststructuralism and post-modernist critiques of Enlightenment universalism and the grand narratives of modern historical development, including those deployed by sociologists. Some sociologists have drawn on this postmodern repertoire to destabilize organizing imageries of progress and modernity in productive ways. But because these organizing imageries are constitutive of our discipline, post-modernist and poststructuralist modes of thought are anathema to many sociologists, including the many historical sociologists who get twitchy when they see the very ideas of progressive social and cultural change being put into question. Thus a congeries of lively debates and oppositions — sometimes friendly, sometimes antagonistic — have replaced the relatively cohesive theory group that initially reestablished historical sociology in professional associations, streams of syllabi and publications.

There is a great deal of legitimate uncertainty about what sort of claims can be made and sustained at this juncture. The open-endedness and fragmentation of the present academic moment evokes intellectual anxiety, over-determined by the epochal events of 1989 and the subsequent revitalization of liberalism, the vagaries of globalization, fundamental challenges to the order of nationstates, and the collapse of Marxism as a mode of imagining a future beyond capitalist modernity. If, as Abrams argued, a fully historicized sociology explores the construction of futures out of pasts, recent events shift

figure and ground in our understanding of trajectories of social change. The present problematizes the past in new and challenging ways. Yet we also see grounds for hope: a new intellectual openness associated with this unsettled moment, a willingness to forsake old antagonisms and to experiment with new ways of thinking sociologically and historically, while drawing on the theoretical and analytical resources bequeathed by the sociological pioneers, our predecessors and their critics. We see this moment as an opportunity to examine some crucial questions: Is there a distinctive theoretical project (or projects plural) for historical sociology in informing approaches to social and cultural transformation? What are we to make of the irony that the programmatic calls for a more historical sociology have inspired much better sociological history and rather less consensus on theory? To what extent can newer varieties of historical sociology contribute to a reconsideration, perhaps a reconstruction, of theories of social and cultural change, and of modernity or modernities? These are hard questions, but tackling them will propel sociological and cross-disciplinary conversations about social theory. No one person can successfully address them, and no one approach will do. We gathered a diverse group of sociologists, first at a conference and then as contributors to this volume, to assess the accomplishments of the resurgence of historical inquiry and to peer into the future, delineating the challenges to come. We editors made certain choices, among several possible strategies, in assembling the group. We chose to limit ourselves to sociologists currently working in the U.S. (although some in the group originally hail from other countries). This decision wasn't just a matter of money! Historical sociology, as international as it was and is, has clearly had its own history in the American academy; the concept of "historical sociology" itself was adopted most enthusiastically in the United States, for reasons including the "brain drain" of historical sociologists to the U.S. from abroad.

We deliberately included people who reflect a wide range of theoretical orientations and a broad spectrum of understandings of what constitutes historical sociology. Some would sign onto what Craig Calhoun calls a minimalist list of inherent historical sociological objects: "rare but important sociological phenomena (e.g., revolutions); critical cases – particular events or cases which bear on theory, or have intrinsic interest (e.g., Japanese capitalism); phenomena that occur over extended period of time (e.g., industrialization,

state formation, creation of “modern” family forms); phenomena for which changing historical context is a major set of explanatory variables (e.g., changing international trade opportunities, political pressures, technologies shape the conditions for economic development)” (Calhoun 1996: 313-14). Other members of our group still understand historical sociology as it was defined by Theda Skocpol in *Vision and Method*: works that “ask questions about social structures or processes understood to be concretely situated in time and space ... address processes over time, and take temporal sequences seriously in accounting for outcomes ... attend to the interplay of meaningful actions and structural contexts, in order to make sense of the unfolding of unintended as well as intended outcomes in individual lives and social transformations ... [and] highlight the particular and varying features of specific kinds of social structures and patterns of change [author’s emphasis]” (Skocpol 1984: 1). And still others would insist that even this is too limiting a frame, and that the rightful province of historical sociology is the “problematic of structuring” — and therefore all of history and sociology. Here is Phillip Abrams again: “Sociology must be concerned with eventuation, because that is how structuring happens. History must be theoretical, because that is how structuring is apprehended.” (1982: p. x) We aren’t fully satisfied with any of these definitions. But since what historical sociology is is now sharply contested, we sought to reflect rather than constrain the diversity of understandings.

We editors also elected to bring together sociologists, rather than a cross-disciplinary group. This may at first seem surprising. Historical sociologists are enthusiastically interdisciplinary. In examining any particular historical event or transformation, our own work – and that of all the contributors – has been deeply engaged in conversations with historians, political scientists, literary theorists, economists and anthropologists. And we recognize that the “historic turn,” or the move to historicize social inquiry, is decidedly a cross-disciplinary project.

The contributors to this volume are joining with a broad range of scholars responding to the classics of social theory, and to the problems of modernity, post-modernity or alternative modernities, however understood. Political theorists interrogate the classical canon for its textual silences or rhetorics; ethnographers in the “new ethnography” incorporate the situated nature of anthropology and sociology in the construction of the

distinction, still alive and kicking, between the “modern” self and the “traditional” other, to cope with problems of power and modernity.

Sociologists have much in common with these categories or groups of scholars, but they also make distinctive contributions. Those of us who pursue a historicized sociology can tackle the processes conventionally grouped under the heading of “transitions to capitalist modernity” on empirical as well as theoretical ground. Of course, historical sociology is about not only the past, but also the ways in which the past shapes the present and future, inviting our remaking of modernist social analysis and the concept of modernity itself, which has significant disciplinary specificities. So perhaps we even have an intellectual responsibility, born of our middleman position, both to our own discipline and to others. Disciplines – like any structure – provide both distinctive constraints and capacities embedded in theoretical and methodological orientations, transmitted through graduate education, hiring, the tenure process, and the gate-keeping of fellowship, research proposal and manuscript review. We can illustrate this point with reference to the treatment of “race” in U.S. historical sociology versus historical political science.

Why is it that historical work foregrounding race and ethnicity has been less typically found among the most-cited works of historical sociology, while it has been central to studies of American political development, a core constituency in historical political science? In the historical study of American politics, the problems of race, slavery and political freedom have loomed large, motivated both by the foundational position of liberalism in political theory and the national crisis of the Civil War. Given these theoretical and empirical foci, work on race could not be so easily marginalized. Yet in historical sociology, “race” has been one of the areas of scholarship that had to be “brought back in” in the current period (although work on racial formations and identities was flourishing in other areas of sociology). Key programmatic statements of historical sociology explicitly mention “race” as a keyword in the survey of current literature; for example, Skocpol’s *Vision and Method* includes in its survey, among others, Orlando Patterson’s work on slavery.

Yet the analysis of race was sidelined by the second wave’s orientation to Marxian questions about the transition to capitalism, revolution, class conflict and the state in modern

Europe. The larger point is that disciplinary specificity still matters. Trans-disciplinary intellectual projects – the historic, linguistic, or cultural turns, gender studies, Marxism, rational choice theory – attempt to reform or revolutionize knowledge and academic practices across these boundaries, yet their success will be reflected in their penetration of disciplinary canons and graduate training practices, and this requires engagement with the substantive, methodological and theoretical particularities of each discipline. Sociology is also a symptomatic site where people from a variety of disciplines can get a bird’s eye view of processes of paradigm formation, contention and implosion. Historical sociology in particular lies at the crossroads of current intersecting trends in knowledges that touch all the social science disciplines – the rise of cultural analysis, neo-positivism, the revival of the mechanism metaphor, to name but a few. Other disciplines have experienced some of these developments, of course, but not simultaneously; political science has witnessed the juggernaut of rational-choice theory, while culturalist trends are almost entirely absent outside the subfields of political theory and constructionist international relations. Anthropology and history, on the other hand, have been most influenced by culturalist and poststructuralist trends, and have proved inhospitable to rational choice approaches. But all of these orientations are well-represented in sociology – and their representatives are fighting over claims to define the overall disciplinary field. Readers from many points in this range of contending perspectives, and from the other disciplines, should be interested in how these debates are progressing in the discipline where the alternative perspectives are most directly contending. Finally, our group has given substantive pride of place to politics, broadly understood to include not simply forms of authoritative sovereign power but much of what, since Michel Foucault burst on the American academic scene, has come to be thought of as disciplinary power dispersed throughout the social landscape. The political focus has enabled participants to respond to a central legacy of historical sociology, while at the same time broadening its concerns in light of the developments we signaled above. In their essays for *Remaking Modernity*, the authors have engaged a range of analytic strategies and/or theoretical models in light of more recent sociological research on a process or dimension of historical change. In some cases, there is an obvious continuity between classical theory and contemporary research. Given that secularization

— including the changing institutional relations between church and state and the making of a “bourgeois” and secular self — was identified by Max Weber and others as an important aspect of modernity, for example, how do these claims and assumptions inform recent research? How is current work revealing the limits of these claims and theories? For other themes, the redefinition of key processes is critical. State formation, the transition to capitalism and professionalization were originally theorized as European phenomena, so what happens when we widen our frame to take in post-socialist, colonial or post-colonial states as well? Finally, for some topics, the absence of attention in classical theory is an important feature: how should we reconceptualize theories of social and cultural change in light of research on race, gender, sexuality, nation and other concepts that were marginalized — or simply unknown — in earlier theoretical debates? We think about these revisions and reformulations under the general heading of “remaking modernity.” The Oxford English Dictionary defines modern as “of or pertaining to the present and recent times, as distinguished from the remote past.” To be modern is to be in the now and (if the metaphor still has life in it) at the cutting edge of history. The concept remains eternally fresh because it is a moving index. It points to everything — and nothing. In the face of such slipperiness, the authors in this book have gravitated toward alternative responses. Some of our contributors try to endow “modernity” with fixed referential content that can be defended as a platform for generalization and explanation, usually with “capitalism” or “industrialism” at the conceptual and causal core.

“As Max Weber observed,” say Michael Lowy and Robert Sayre, “the principal characteristics of modernity — the calculating spirit (*Rechnenhaftigkeit*), the disenchantment of the world (*Entzauberung der Welt*), instrumental rationality (*Zweckrationalität*), and bureaucratic domination — are inseparable from the advent of the ‘spirit of capitalism.’

Others who want a stable and univocal definition gesture toward Marx, whether modernity is taken to signal “the cultural articulations that accompany processes of capital accumulation” (Pred and Watts 1992: xiii) or a “mode of vital experience — experience of space and time, of the self and others, of life’s possibilities and perils — that is shared by men and women all over the world today.... To be modern is to be part of a universe in which, as Marx said, ‘all that is solid melts into air.’”

These various approaches may or may not be compatible: the arguments over problems and affiliated research are ongoing, and readers must judge. Alternatively, one could abandon the whole family of concepts – modern, modernity, etc. – as social science concepts.

This we think would be a mistake, if it's even possible. We editors would advocate approaching “modernity” as a conceptually unstable historical concept. Our definitions should capture both people's changing ideas of what is or isn't modern (or traditional, or backward, or postmodern) and the valences of emotion and moral judgment that these mappings assume in varieties of discourse and institutions. Historical sociologists would be wise to at least think about why, in today's world, the idea of the modern (and its associated practices) is invested with such desires and hatreds, and has such political force – and to do that, we need to better understand it. The theme of “remaking modernity” is far too grand to approach as an integrated totality; we do not want to reinstate a grand narrative of the present day, a new Key to All Mythologies that the very terms modernity and post-modernity may seem to invite. And in fact the contributors to this volume differ on many important questions — together, they represent a range of responses rather than a single consolidated position. But we do imagine that our still-separate revisions will clarify our collective understanding of what is at stake in debates about modernity and post-modernity, perhaps even lead to a better grasp of what is entailed in fashionable claims that alternative or distinct modernities are possible, if they do not already exist. We see these questions and concerns as crucial not only for historical sociology but for the fabric of our discipline – and for the human sciences more generally.

The Second Wave and the Reappropriation of the Classics In justifying their turn to history, the second wave latched onto the classics in a very particular way. The disciplinary canon with which they operated, filtered through Talcott Parsons, had enshrined Weber, Durkheim and latterly Marx as the major scholars of reference.

Second wave scholars wanted to bring to the fore class inequality, power and the conflicts these engendered, and Marx became the most important figure for them, as they cast themselves as the leading protagonists against the postulates of modernization theory,

particularly the claim that all paths of development led from the “traditional” to the “modern.”

From Marx they took their emphases on the importance of the “material” (understood as separate from and determinative of the “ideal”) modes of production, class conflict as the basis of politics and the motor of history. The history that the second wavers drew out was one of conflict, particularly of class conflict, expropriation and bloody oppression. It was also one that was built around the tendential development of social structures and epochal transitions.

It is important to note that their Marx was leavened with an emphasis on elements of Weber’s writings, as we will see below, and laced with a strong refusal of Durkheim, who was understood as the patron saint of the twin evils of cultural values and structural functionalism.

The second wave – memorably described as an “uppity generation” by Theda Skocpol – consigned modernization theory and structural-functionalism to the dustbin of intellectual history.

The radical political movements of the 1960s and 1970s had inspired many students to go on to graduate study, where they linked their political concerns to intellectual questions, and found guidance from that historically-inclined minority of senior scholars even as they rebelled against their more presentist colleagues. In sociology, Andrew Abbott notes that rebellious impulses helped to direct many younger sociologists to historical approaches, which allowed criticism of two then-dominant tendencies :

Parsonian functionalism and atheoretical and ahistorical empirical work. Theoretically, historical sociology was for them a way to attack the Parsonian framework on its weakest front—its approach to social change—and a way to bring Marx into sociology. Methodologically, historical sociology damned the status attainment model for its micro focus, its antihistorical and antistructural character, its reifications, its scientism.

Ensuing sociological debates arrayed second wave scholars against more orthodox Marxists of various complexions. Second wavers, who tended to prefer an eclectic

theoretical approach, were nevertheless powerfully pulled into the current of the Marxist problematic.

Modes of production were the basic units of comparison, and transitions from one mode to another marked the significant historical transformations – that which was to be explained. Wallerstein’s world-systems theory, castigated as shockingly “circulationist” by many Marxists at the time, can in retrospect be seen as a close cousin and marxisant variant.

Scholars of the second wave found this broad tradition of work useful, but thought that it discouraged comparative work to explain variation across regions, countries, cities and other sites within the same mode of production or position within the world system. Even more problematically, it tended to consign history to the realm of the singular and idiographic, grist for the nomothetic mill of Marxist theory.

Still, while second wave historical sociologists in the American academy appreciated Marx’s *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* for the prominent role it awarded politics in nineteenth-century France, and excavated it as a meaty source of aphorisms on history as tragedy and farce, they had yet to appreciate its full potential as a source of anti-structuralist and cultural analysis.

The questions posed by the Second Wave derived from a Marxist theoretical agenda; their answers pushed beyond. The question of why revolutions didn’t happen how and where Marxists expected them animated exciting work by authors including Theda Skocpol, who drew on the Weberian tradition in her discussion of the “great revolutions” of France, Russia and China, and Mark Gould, who recruited Parsonian theory in his work on the English Revolution.

Immanuel Wallerstein worried about why socialism could not succeed in one country, and if his “one world system” answer was novel, it was certainly addressed to an ongoing preoccupation of the Marxian tradition.

A different sort of challenge to Marxist thinking on states which also deployed the idea of a (cultural) system of states emerged from the collaborative work of John Meyer,

Michael Hannan, George Thomas, Francisco Ramirez and John Boli. Ronald Aminzade, Victoria Bonnell, Craig Calhoun, Jeffery Paige, Sonya Rose, William Sewell, Jr., Mark Traugott, Charles Tilly, and many others worked on the Marxian problem posed by the collective action of what were thought to be intermediary, transitional or surprising groups like artisans, counter-revolutionary peasants, women workers, intellectuals and so on. Perry Anderson studied absolutism — a state form emerging from within an economic context where it “shouldn’t have” appeared.

This conundrum made sense within the space of Marxian theory, to which Anderson wedded fundamentally Weberian insights about state forms. Anthony Giddens, Michael Mann, Gianfranco Poggi, Theda Skocpol, Charles Tilly (to name just a few) interrogated the sources of state formation and dissolution, highlighting the dynamics of war-making and violence that were emphasized by Weber and Hintze but given short shrift in Marxian theory.

Randall Collins staged a “confrontation” between Weberian and Marxian theories of capitalism.

Michael Burawoy highlighted the “color of class” in a historical analysis of the Zambian copper mines; Michael Hechter studied the “Celtic fringe” and the puzzle of nation for issues of class formation; Judith Stacey’s pioneering analysis tackled the role of gender in the Chinese revolution, and John Stephens and Walter Korpi sought to understand the socialist potential of social democracy and the welfare state in capitalist countries.

This is, of course, just a partial list of contributors to what was an incredibly exciting moment of intellectual ferment. When we explore these individual works, we find that they differ on many important matters. They also have distinctive takes that relate to national and regional genealogies of intellectual debate. But in retrospect there is also an incredible level of international conversation and convergence. These trends extended across all the social sciences and history in the 1970s and early 1980s: one thinks of Louise Tilly and Joan Scott’s ground-breaking research on women workers and David Abraham’s class analysis of the breakdown of the Weimar Republic; Ira Katznelson’s investigations of the ethnic and racial complications of working-class formation, or the interdisciplinary “Brenner Debate” on the transition from feudalism to capitalism

Indeed, this was also a period in which social scientists were avidly reading historians' work and forging interdisciplinary allegiances and ties, especially with the resurgent social history typified by the work of E. P. Thompson, Sheila Rowbotham and the History Workshop Journal; with the work of Fernand Braudel and the Annales school, and marxisant historians who were pondering the intersection between family and economic forms.

13.3 Sum Up

Consequently, the historical turn in sociology was linked to the erosion of the boundaries between social theory, scientific method and historical research, exemplified by the changing contents of key journals such as *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, and by the growth of the Social Science History Association, incorporated in 1974. Reflecting the broader trends characterizing social science and history, the SSHA was at first a meeting place for historians ("cliometricians") wanting to learn methods from social scientists, then in the 1980s and 1990s became the place for social scientists who wanted to do history, with a second wave twist, and for both social scientists and historians who wanted to explore the cultural and linguistic turns, the uses of narrative and network analyses, as well as substantive work that crossed the fields.

The Marxian heritage of the second wave functioned as an overall regime of knowledge. The second-wave comparative-historical sociologists varied in the extent to which they conceived their project as revising Marxism or as combining diverse theoretical insights to create fresh understandings of important processes and events, but they consistently read and argued with each other. Even as they challenged this tradition, they leaned on its coherence, especially in terms of what Geoff Eley calls "social determination" or the claims that collective action, subjectivities, politics and culture rested on "material interests," themselves embedded in material life, however conceived.

And while it raised hackles from the very beginning and continues to be controversial today, the work of these sociologists and others working in allied disciplines is in our view of lasting significance. Their attention to politics opened up a tremendously

fruitful vein of analysis, which gained force in the 1980s and early 1990s and continues today.

In fact, it is that impossibly cumbersome phrase, “the relative autonomy of the political,” that best characterizes both the promise and the limits of second wave work. It is also true that the appropriation of classical theory by second wave scholars emphasized the political-economic and material, understood as opposed to the cultural and ideal, while the ironies and irrationalities of modernity hinted at by classical theorists disappeared from view. The enduring structuralist Marxist leanings of the second wave, emphasizing the necessary and sufficient conditions for transitions between modes of production, effaced the Marx who theorized the continuing cataclysm of capitalist development, including its contradictory impact on the individuals whom it continually reconstituted. “Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fastfrozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify.”

Where was this modernist Marx in the second wave? Similarly, the second wave sociologists reached out to Weber’s writings on the specificity of the organizational and politico-economic, drawing on his analyses of ideal types of organization, of relations between rulers and staffs, of power politics. Yet this resurgence of politics in a debate dominated by material determinism came at the cost of excising the Weber of *The Protestant Ethic*, of complexes of meaning, the historical ironist who saw the personal losses and terrors instilled by processes of rationalization.

The second wave historical sociologists were by no means apologists for capitalism, and they clearly understood that the development of post-revolutionary states, democracy, social welfare, and so on, were not linear and progressive – but they also viewed these matters and processes as neatly contained, and often reducible to a single analytical principle. Certainly their own theoretical categories, and their position as analysts, remained serenely above the fray.

RELATIVISING INDIAN MODERNITY

14.1 Introduction**14.2 Relativising Modernity****14.3 Sum Up****14.4 Introduction**

OVER THE AGES, unity of India has been symbolized by a cultural continuity, embodied into a unified principle of consciousness, which has contributed to the identity of its 'inner-structure'. This inner structure primarily lies in the religious principles and their interpretations. The unity or identity has not been static. On the contrary, the structure of this tradition, which throughout succeeded in projecting an image of unity in value-structures, ritual styles and systems of beliefs, also contributed to the growth of a unified world-view of Indian civilization, in spite of the fact that it contained innumerable substrata of cultural beliefs and practices. Both its substantive structure and its underlying processes have been diversified and pluralized, each flowing like small rivulets and streams in its own local and regional matrix, and undergoing its own localized convulsions. But each finally, like all rivulets and streams, merged into the great ocean of the Indian cultural tradition. This interlinkage of the processes in the Little traditions of the Indian culture with its Great tradition, contributing to the processes of transformation and synthesis in the latter, is a historical reality.

Complex as this process has been, we could analyse its changing pattern and

form in terms of our own theoretical approach. In the first instance, we have to view it in an evolutionary comparative-historical perspective in order to determine the quality-pattern of the direction of cultural change. In our scheme this refers to a change in the structure of tradition from its primordial-traditional moorings towards modernization. In the concept of modernization no evolutionary universalism is implied. Modernization, in its specific content and form, is treated as a historical rather than a universal evolutionary reality. This implies that modernization in the cultural traditions of India might not be identical to or just a replica of modernization in other parts of the world. At the same time this historicity of development should not imply a refutation of the evolutionary viewpoint, which primarily lies in the existence of recurrent causal relationships in independent cultural traditions.” The specific form that modernization might take in different cultural traditions may have distinctive features. Nevertheless, in its essential ethos, its basic system of values and cognitive structures, modernization everywhere in the world might share in some common and ‘recurrent’ substantive and causal characteristics. In order to demonstrate this historical yet evolutionary nature of cultural transformation through modernization, as stated above, analysis may be undertaken of each ramification of the major cultural tradition in India. In this respect a distinction, as maintained earlier, between the Little and Great traditions of the Indian culture may provide the starting point. The processes of change in each cultural tradition may be analyzed in the context of the orthogenetic and heterogenetic causal sources. Cultural renaissance of the primordial Hindu system of cultural and religious beliefs may be treated as a major process of change in the Great tradition from the orthogenetic sources. Sanskritization, as an empirical process of cultural change, may symbolise an orthogenetic response to change in the Little tradition of the Hindu culture. From extra-systematic or heterogenetic point of origin, the changes taking place in the Little traditions may be called ‘Islamization’ and ‘primary Westernization’ and those in the Great traditions may be termed as ‘modernization’.

Question may arise as to whether or not these various processes of cultural change contribute to some general pattern and direction of change in the Indian cultural tradition. Evidently, some of the processes have a mutually contradictory

orientation and their simultaneous existence in the cultural system might lead to stresses and strains, which have been recognized by social scientists. On a deeper evaluation, however, it may appear that in spite of apparent dissonance between one process of change and the other, there exists an underlying principle of unity. The source of this unity perhaps lies in the underlying uniformity of the externally variant aspirations and adaptations for modernization. What at the national level might appear as nationalistic introversion or 'identity crisis' may at group level take the form of 'Sanskritization or 'Westernization'. The basic structural principles underlying both the processes, however, continue to be identical, viz., motivation for normative adaptations to status ascendancy. The differences in the form of adaptations might result from differential contexts of structural constraints. It is one of our objectives in this study to bring out this aspect of the integrative principle in the various processes of cultural change in India. 'We shall not only attempt to map out the nature and extent of cultural changes by merely describing the various processes of cultural mobility and change. Our primary objective would rather be analytical : to underline the patterned aspect of cultural changes in terms of an emerging general 'macro-process' of change. In this context a basic question to be posed and analysed would be the nature and direction of cultural modernization in India.

In this chapter we shall focus only upon those changes in the cultural tradition which have emerged from time to time through the orthogenetic sources of change. Subsequent chapters shall be devoted to the discussion of cultural changes through acculturative adaptations to heterogenetic traditions.

14.2 Relativising Indian Modernity

It is not easy to distinguish between the primary (orthogenetic) and secondary (heterogenetic) stages of growth in the Indian civilization on the basis of historical data. From a strictly historical point of view, what one might call the orthogenetic or primary structure of the Indian tradition may itself be a product of synthesis of a number of indigenous or even alien cultural patterns. Ethnographers and historians are undecided on the extent to which a relationship existed between the pre-

historic Indus Valley culture and the traditional Vedic culture in India. Similarly, controversy is rife about the nature of the relationship between the Aryan culture of the Vedic period and the culture and customs of the tribal people in Indias. In view of these difficulties a historical formulation of the orthogenetic or primary nature of the Indian civilization might be difficult. Its sociological formulation, on the basis of typical normative principles, might be relatively less fraught with difficulties. In this sense, however, valid distinctions between orthogenetic and heterogenetic sources of change in the cultural tradition could be maintained. The cultural tradition of Hinduism, its religio-ethical values and aesthetic patterns, the life styles and conduct-norms which crystallized around about 1000 B.C. in Vedic literatures and were subsequently formalized in the Epics (being roughly dated from 1000 B.C. to 500 B.C.) could provide a working ground for an orthogenetic conceptualization of the tradition. The forms of Vedic Hindusim. especially its manifestation during the period of the Epics, laid the foundation of a system of beliefs, ritual patterns and cultural practices which may be treated not only as distinct from other world religions and cultural traditions but also as being autochthonous or primordial in nature.

This distinctiveness primordality of the cultural tradition may still be difficult to define in terms of the Vedic or the Epic culture of any specific period. Theoretically, the Vedas represent the Revelation of Hinduism and all its cultural patterns. But in practice, from time to time new innovations and additions were always made in the structure of this tradition. Whereas this process supports the hypothesis of continuous orthogenetic growth in the tradition, it also necessitates that the main characteristics of the tradition may be conceptualized ideal-typically rather than historically. It is on this basis that a distinction between the orthogenetic and heterogenetic processes of change in Indian culture could be attempted.

In concrete terms, Hinduism constitutes the basis of an orthogenetic cultural tradition in India. In contradistinction, all other religio-cultural patterns existing in India parallel to it provide instances of heterogenetic growth in its cultural traditions. Hinduism, as repeatedly emphasized by many scholars, may not be viewed as a religious system alone but more than that, it represents a way of life. It constitutes

a distinctive world-view and a cultural complex, in the background of which orthogenetic transformations in culture may be analysed. This analysis may be undertaken on the levels of the Little as well as the Great traditions and should draw its material both from historical sources and empirical studies conducted by sociologists and social anthropologists.

Constant orthogenetic changes have been going on in the Great Tradition of Hinduism from the Vedic time down to the twentieth-century period of cultural reformation. We define these processes of change as orthogenetic because the categories of cultural innovation that were sought to be introduced through such reformations were drawn from the structure of the primordial tradition itself. New categories or value-themes were under this process not drawn from cultural systems foreign to the original Great tradition. Even in extreme cases when some of the earlier normative principles were to be completely given up or refuted (such as in Buddhism and Jainism) the logical nature of departure in such cases was to be found rooted in the autochthonous tradition. Cultural tradition in such cases underwent changes through intrasystematic differentiation and diversification of forms. Such processes of cultural changes' in the Great tradition of Hinduism have been defined as cultural renaissance.

In order to evaluate as to how these forms of cultural renaissance have been taking place under stages of progressive differentiation and departure from the 'primary' roots of the Hindu civilization, some of the basic attributes of the Hindu tradition may be delineated in an ideal-typical form. In other' words we may formulate its basic 'cognitive structural' characteristics in a systematic approach. Each subsequent differentiation in the cultural tradition compared from this ideal-typical form may then be treated as a case of intra-systematic growth and change.

The normative principles of Hinduism have been as meticulously systematic and closed as its empirical-structure has been varied and amorphous. Often this latter attribute (eclecticism or amorphousness) of Hinduism is emphasized without any regard for the former, which gives an imperfect and incomplete picture of Hindu culture and religion. Behind the extreme degree of permissiveness and

liberalism in beliefs and variety in ritual practices as admitted by Hindu canonical system, there exists a strictly logical view of phenomena in terms of which the principles of *order* and *change*, *being* and *becoming*, *creation* and *destruction*, *hedonistic-utilitarianism* and *spiritual transcendence* can be meaningfully explained. Implicit in this system of logic and metaphysics is a theory of society and culture which admits little confusion and has been formulated with extraordinary clarity. The twin basic concepts of this system are *order* and *change*. Order, both normative and social, is conceptualized through the principle” of hierarchy and change, which is assumed to be the immanent nature of all phenomena, and is thought of to be cyclical, occurring in temporal rhythms. The principle of hierarchy combined with cyclical theory of growth and change introduces an element of dynamism in this theory of culture and society.

The principle of hierarchy, in traditional Hindu culture, is not viewed in a static form. Hierarchy is itself subsumed in the process of cyclical transitions which adds on to it a dynamic quality. For instance, by birth a person may be endowed with high or low moral potentialities which lead to the ascription of caste status, but these moral potentialities are not static but accumulative and additive, being influenced by man’s personal deeds in this life or a series of lives to which he may be born. Similarly, even in this life, where a person is born with very high moral potentialities for example if he is born in a Brahmin family, the status of Brahmin does not come to him automatically; he has to cultivate those potentialities and realize them through socialization and self-discipline in other words, he has to undergo a rebirth and then achieve the status of a ‘twice born’. Everyone, otherwise, is at birth a Shudra (lowest in social and normative rank) by Hindu tradition.

Some of the ideal-typical characteristics of the orthogenetic Hindu Great tradition, in the light of which later differentiations and changes could be analysed, are capable of being formulated in spite of the complexities and contradictions as apparent in this tradition. Two major criteria for such an attempt could be the concepts of *order* and *of change*. Most of the cultural themes of the Great tradition may be integrated around these twin concepts. Order in the cultural tradition may be viewed in the manner of what Redfield and Singer call ‘cultural structure’ and

‘cultural performances’ in the social organization of tradition. The chief abstractions on the cultural structure of this tradition from the view-point of order could be the principle of *hierarchy*, *holism* and *continuity* (between the sacred and the secular and between the material and the spiritual) in the tradition. In the frame of reference of change, the cultural structure tends to be oriented to a cyclical-devolutionary conception of cosmology and cultural time.

However, hierarchy, holism and continuity may be described as the characteristics of any traditional cultural system. We must demonstrate as to in what specific contexts these cultural norms subsisted in the orthogenetic Hindu tradition. Our second endeavour would be to bring out the various major stages through which historically these cultural themes have been orthogenetically subjected to revision, addition, depreciation and transformation.

The principle of hierarchy could easily be called the ethos of the Hindu traditional cultural pattern. It permeates through most of the cultural categories. In an analytical sense, principle of hierarchy may be seen as governing the cultural structure at many points. A few of such areas where this principle may be found in a manifest form are: role institutionalization and its legitimation in terms of *varna* and *jati*, the realms of goal-orientation or the theory of *‘purushartha*, the classification of the levels of charisma or *guna* as group and individual attributes, and finally, the changing cultural cycles. In some form, a principle of hierarchy may also be discerned in the Hindu view of the evolution of mental phenomena as formulated first in the Upanishads and then elaborated in the philosophical system of the Sankhya.

Hierarchy through role-institutionalization and its legitimation provides to us the cultural counterpart of the social structure of the caste system which still persists in India, and confirms our formulation about continuity as being a major attribute of the traditional culture. Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaisya, Shudra and the Untouchables as social groups based on differential commitment to normative standards have existed from the time of the Vedas. Through orthogenetic modifications and formalizations-during the time of the Epics and the Dharmashastras

caste system underwent such changes which rendered its values internally more rigid and subject to greater non-equalitarian sanctions. It was perhaps during this period that caste emerged as a cultural system based on institutionalized inequalities. The principle of Vedic hierarchy based on functional specializations of groups was during this period petrified in the shape of rigid taboos on coimmensality, connubium, and other forms of social interactions. The earlier notion of distance between one caste and another, which was mostly based on functional criteria was accorded a ritual complexion; inter-caste distantiation thus became a ground for elaborate distinctions and rationalizations about pollution-purity relationship. Thus, hierarchy which was a functional principle became a religious phenomenon. Although some kind of latent religious sanction to inter-caste distance was accorded right from its mythical Vedic origin, there is reason to believe that a fuller sacerdotal transformation of this principle took place later during the time of the Epics and Dharmashastras. This leads us to another cultural dimension of hierarchy in the orthogenetic tradition the hierarchy of *guna* or charismatic qualities of individuals. The theory of *guna* in Hindu cultural tradition provides a systematic formulation of the principle of charismatic legitimation not only of the caste hierarchy but also of the order of power or kingship in this tradition. The charismatic qualities (*guna*) are conceived on the principle of levels, the highest and the most virtuous being the quality of *sattva*, of brightness and virtue, associated with the sages and the Brahmins. Next in hierarchy comes *rajas*, the charismatic quality of passionate commitment to action; to power, the attribute of the *Kshatriyas* and the kings; the last and the lowest in hierarchy is *tamas*, a charismatic endowment to dullness, to profane inclinations and to servitude. *Sattva* also implies quietude and spiritual bliss; *rajas*, strong activity orientation and worldly commitment; and finally, *tamas* represents innate endowment of dependency and ignorance. Characteristically, *sattva* is the charismatic endowment of the Brahmins (priests), *rajas* of *Kshatriyas* (rulers) and *tamas* of the *Shudras* (the low castes). The *Vairyas* have a position between the *Kshatriyas* and the *Shudras*. Thus, the hierarchy principle of role-institutionalization is reinforced by the theory of charismatic hierarchy.

The third major hierarchy in the Hindu cultural tradition is that of values regarding goal-orientation patterns. On this scale life-goals have been arranged with increasing merit into the pursuit of *kama*, or sex and other material goals of sensory enjoyments, *artha*, or the economic-utilitarian goals, the *dharma*, or the goals of (moral obligations in social, religious and cultural realms) and finally *moksha*, or the pursuit of salvation from the chain of birth and rebirth. The first three orientations have a socio-cultural frame of reference but the orientation for *moksha*, which some scholars say was introduced later in the body of goal-orientations, has a meta-social significance. Hinduism does not deny the pursuit of any of these goals because of being at a lower level of merit. *Kama* or sex goal is as laudable as that of *dharma* or moral obligations. But each level of goal-orientation is to be pursued at the appropriate stages of social life-cycle, in the context of which each becomes a *dharma*, or a moral duty. Value system of *dharma* therefore, has a specific as well as a diffuse connotation in the Hindu social theory. At the specific level *dharma* is a progressive stage in goal-orientation pattern preceded by *artha* (economic values) and *kama* (biological gratification). At a diffuse level, however, in appropriate or culturally sanctioned social contexts each of the four goal-orientations described above constitutes *dharma*. Moral obligations *dharma* is, therefore, a diffuse value-orientation pattern of the Hindu tradition, which renders its world-view sacred.

We have talked of culturally sanctioned contexts in which each level of goal-orientation becomes *dharma* or moral obligation from a generalized point of view. These contexts are defined through division of Hindu life into another hierarchy of four-fold stages, called *ashramas*. These are, *brahmacharya*, stage of learning and strict celibacy, *grahastha*, stage of householder's life, *vanaprastha*, stage of relative withdrawal to exclusive pursuit of moral and spiritual goals without leaving the family, and finally *sanyasa*, the stage of complete withdrawal from affective-particularistic social obligations, and devotion to pursuit of spiritual values and its propagation in society. If we compare the hierarchy of goal-orientations with the hierarchy of life-stages the specific and diffuse meanings of *dharma* (moral obligations) would be clear. For example, pursuit of *kama* (sex) is a legitimate goal

for a householder but a deviation or sin for a person who has not crossed the stage of *brahmacharya* or education. Similarly, attempt for *moksha* or salvation is a laudable objective but only at the stage of *vanaprastha* or *stulyasa*, the stage of relative or absolute withdrawal from social life. It should, therefore, be clear that commitment to ascetic other-worldliness in Hinduism is not as absolute and all-pervasive as generally conceived. Moreover, most of these values of life-stages and its goals being parts of the Great tradition, conformity to them was only expected from the upper (twice-born) castes. The rest of the population had greater permissiveness in this regard. Most of these values as ‘ideological-motivational’ phenomena did not find their articulation in the “institutional-organizational” framework of the society, and many of them were ‘ethico religious’ rather than structural in nature. A great deal of flexibility was allowed in the expectation of conformity to the prescribed values of goal-orientation, role-institutionalizations and appropriate obligations to duty in various life-stages or *ashramas*. These obligations were relative to space (*desha*), time (*kala*), ability-to make *shrama* (effort) and innate *guna* (endowments of the individuals concerned).

The above hierarchies of role-institutionalization (*varna*) charismatic endowments (*guna*), goal-orientations (*purushartha*), life-stages and its value-obligations (*ashrama*) relate mainly to the Hindu concept of cultural order and its structure. Each hierarchy is in one way or another dependent or related to the formulation of the other hierarchy of cultural values. This inter-hierarchical connection and dependence of value-categories renders the system of the Hindu Great tradition logically coherent as well as closed. Apart from the hierarchical notion of the values, the formulation of the nature of the mental phenomena may also be treated to have been developed in Hinduism in a hierarchical manner. In Upanishadas and later in the Sankhya system of the Hindu philosophy mental patterns have also been conceptualized to be at various levels of evolutionary growth such as those of *budhi*, or intelligent mental awareness, *ahamkara*, ego involvement of consciousness, and finally *mana*, mental ratiocination which emerges after that growth of many intervening factors in the form of an integrative mental force for the various material and cultural phenomena created by the *ahamkara* or the “ego principle”. The final

stage of this evolution of the mental patterns culminates into the Being of the *purusha*, the greatest Creative Force.

As evident, all these hierarchical constructions of the cultural structures fit together into a logical pattern and develop into a holistic view of culture and society. The idea of holism is itself rooted in the notion of hierarchy. The hierarchies discussed above relate to the synchronic-structural attributes of the cultural Great tradition of Hinduism. A diachronic view of this system does nevertheless exist although it may not be historical in the Western sense. Its first difference lies in the fact that like all other cultural constructions this too is postulated on the principle of hierarchy. It is hierarchical, cyclical and devolutionary; the last, if evaluated from a modern view-point. The basic unit of time, *kala*, a day of Brahma (4,320 million earthly years) is sub-divided into fourteen *manvantaras*, each lasting 306,720 thousand years and each progenerated by a new *manu*. Each *manvantara* contains seventy-one *mahayugas* or aeons (of which a thousand form the *kalpa*) and each is sub-divided into four *yugas*, called *krata* (age of spiritual beings), *treta* (spiritualism still predominates), *dwapara* (age of mixed spiritualism) and *kaliyuga* (the age of debased spiritualism). The duration of each of these *yuga* progressively declines along with the declining spiritualism. At the end of the *kaliyuga* a divine incarnation, *kalika*, is prophesied to emerge and mark the beginning of another *mahayuga* after destroying the deviant tradition.

In this four-fold time span (*yuga*), the human beings, as we know them in our own contemporary time, come to exist only during the last phase, the period of spiritual degeneration during the *kaliyuga*. During other higher level cultural periods, population is supposed to have consisted of superhumans or of men qualitatively different from our own mankind. This reveals existence of hierarchies within hierarchy. On this scale, there is a hierarchy of humans, super-humans and gods. But as we have discussed above, in connection with the theory of role-institutionalization and the charismatic qualities super-humans too, there, is a hierarchical division based on these principles. Such a hierarchy would have been very tormenting for the existence of stable social and cultural systems but for another counterbalancing cultural category which has occupied

an equally important place in the Hindu Great tradition. This is the notion of *continuity* and its chief institutional manifestation has been the theory of *karma* or predestination through one's actions. Its allied category is the theory of transmigration of souls.

The theory of *karma* is based on the assumption that the soul being immortal, its rebirth, its social placement after birth and its accompanying happiness and sufferings are due to the accumulations of deeds (*karma*) in the previous lives and the nature of commitment to the prescribed norms of action in the present life. These also hold the key to one's future after death. Final liberation from this cycle of birth and action (*karma*) could only be attained through salvation, *moksha*, which liberates man from birth either by means of right conduct (*dharma*), or through devotion (*bhakti*), or accumulation of knowledge (*jnana*) or finally through the mastery of one's self (*yoga*). The concepts of action (*karma*) and rebirth (*transmigration*), thus provide a rationale for the hierarchical view in Hinduism in regard to various cultural dimensions, such as goal-orientation and role institutionalization. In time dimension: these provide orientation in human life not only to one's present but also to one's past and future. Thus as a concept, action (*karma*) establishes *continuity* in the hierarchical worldview of the traditional Hindu culture. Action (*karma*) theory also reinforces the value system of hierarchy.

Holism, another characteristic of the Hindu cultural tradition, emanates from its principle of hierarchy. It amounts to a denial of the principle of the individual in this system in the Western sense of the term. The concept of the individual as a mediating independent variable in culture does not exist in the ideal-typical structure of the traditional Hindu culture. Dumont has rightly stated :

The modern individual implies two things in one: a normative principle, and the agent, or as I should say, the subject of institutions such as private property and the State. What equivalent is found in India for these two functions of the individual? As normative principle, we may say at the outset that it is replaced by the holistic idea of order or *dharma*, a proposition that will have to be verified and made

more precise. As to the second aspect, it is my contention that while a particular human being is here as elsewhere the empirical elementary agent of institutions, the individual, is absent from all social institutions save one, that of *renunciation and becoming of a sanyasin*. Hierarchy is thus a universal language through which everything is located in the whole and “receives its life from it”, everything, including the very opposite of the governing principle. The caste system has its principle in the interdependence of higher and lower. The whole is hierarchized because it is oriented to its proper end, “and its elements must be fixed and unaltered, in principle, for the whole to be. Hierarchy is fundamental, and separation an entailment of it, as we had occasion to notice regarding endogamy (C. VII-91) Caste endogamy as oriented to the whole, is the opposite of racist endogamy, for ‘race’ is in this respect the individual substance made permanent.

The principle of holism, which is thus subsumed in the notion of hierarchy is maintained through a series of value-propositions which though apparently contradictory are yet reconciled together in the higher order of cultural symbolism. This higher symbolism is based on the belief in eternal continuity and unity of Lower and Higher, *atman* (soul) and *paramatman* (Godhead) change and changelessness, creation and destruction and *Karma* (predestination) and *mokasha* (salvation). As Pocock suggests, it is “a sociology that operates in terms of contradictions and disengages the structure which is founded on them.” This is logically accomplished as the whole system is based on the value system of hierarchy.

Now, in the light of these ideal-typical attributes of the traditional Hindu culture it may be possible for us to analyse and compare some of the changes which have been going on intra-systematically within its structure of basic categories. We might only focus upon some major renaissance alternatives introduced from time to time in the cultural structure of Hinduism. Orthogenetic changes constantly took place in this tradition right from the Vedic times through two types of processes. First, through accretion and reformulation within the Vedic tradition and, secondly, through differentiation and establishment of new traditions. The various reform movements

within the Hindu cultural and philosophical systems may be quoted as examples of the first type and the emergence of Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism as examples of the second type, that of independent differentiation. The former process marks change through continuity, a value syndrome of the ideal typical Hindu culture. The latter process symbolizes change through fission in the tradition. Nevertheless, it may be possible to find out some elements of continuity even in these breakaway traditions.

The cultural tradition during the Vedic time had not evolved a closed hierarchical system either of the goal-orientations, or of role-institutionalizations or of the charismatic attributes. With the probable exception of the *Shudra*, there used to be a good deal of overlap in social and cultural roles of the *Brahmin*, the *Kshatri* and the *Vaisya*. These three categories were more in the nature of functional specializations than as crystallized forms of social segmentations or hierarchies. Referring to the caste in this context, Spear writes :

The nature of the caste system is a social wonder and its origin a standing sociological mystery. It is thought that it attained the hard outlines it presented in the early nineteenth century at the time of the Muslim" invasion from the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries. But of its origin we know little. We know that it did not exist in Rigvedic times. We know that by 500 B.C. it was in recognizable working order. We believe that it has been in existence for perhaps three thousand years.

Following from the hierarchy of role-institutionalization, one might also detect that the formulation of goal orientations (*kama*, *artha* and *dharma*) was not-as rigid during this time as it later became. In the first instance, the ossification of an ascetic ethic of life in Hinduism is of the post-Vedic origin, much later than the rise of Buddhism and Jainism. Emphasis on humanistic and life-affirming values was pre-eminent during the Vedic period; there were no restrictions on inter-dining and on the consumption of meat, drinks and on enjoyment of life through singing and dancing. Orientation to the principle of right conduct or *dharma* was adapted to the fulfilment of the goals located in the spheres of material desires or *kama* and

the means of its achievement, that is *artha*. This order of values in goal orientations was almost reversed during later times. The humanistic primacy in the goal-orientation pattern of the Vedic culture was itself an extension of the liberalism which existed at this stage regarding the role-institutionalization patterns.

From the Vedic period onwards, the formalization in the ideal-typical attribute of the orthogenetic tradition continued. Roughly this period may be dated from 900 B.C., the time of the Mahabharata warfare, till A.D. 800 following the end of the Gupta period. It was during this period that changes from within the Hindu cultural tradition took place both through processes of accretion and reformation (within the Hindu tradition) and through differentiation and fission in the forms of separate Great traditions like those of Buddhism and Jainism.

Within the Hindu tradition, this had been a period of the growth of the *Smritis* and *Dharmashastras*, which embodied the social legislation; it was also the period of the writing of the Epics (*Mahabharata* and *Ramayana*) of the *Puranas* (mythological traditions), of the *Arthashastra* (book of economic and political administration), of the *Kamasutra* (erotics) and finally of the efflorescence of classic poetry, drama, art, architecture, philosophy, science of medicine and astronomy. The very fact that separate treatises were prepared for the elaboration of the norms connected with the erotic (*kama*), economic-administrative (*artha*) and social-ritual (*dharma*) aspects of life, amply testifies to the fact that the Great tradition of this time was not, as popularly believed, entirely engrossed with the matters of the other world. It sought to establish a harmonious relationship among various levels of goal-orientations, role-institutionalizations and social obligations. In spite of this fact, the notion of hierarchy was all pervasive, even stronger than ever. The material realm was in principle subordinated to the spiritual realm.

A major orthogenetic change which occurred during this period was a concretization of the normative structure of hierarchy. Manu's code book (*Dharmashastra*) clearly established the extent to which the rigid barriers now existed among the various *varnas* and castes. Unlike in the Vedic period the

‘twice-born’ castes not no longer had a socially homogeneous character and were socially not open in matters of commensality and connubium; they had ceased to be mere functional groups, and had turned into *jalis*, endogamous castes-the prototype of which we encounter today. No principle of equity or equality was accepted before law for all the Castes and there were differential norms for reward and punishment for the same deeds on the basis of people belonging to higher or lower castes. The position of Brahmin commanded higher and most privileges and rewards. A new group or caste, that of untouchables, had come into existence, introducing rigid norms of pollution and purity. The social norms were deeply subsumed into the hierarchical notions of charismatic attributes (*gunas*), theory of action (*karma*) and predestination. Only a few of these values were modified in other *Dharmashastras* or the codebooks. Apart from these, the epics and the books of tradition (*Puranas*) now reinforced a more ascetic and self-negating world-view, probably owing to the impact of Buddhism and Jainism. More emphasis was now laid on teetotalism and vegetarianism. Vivid pictures of heaven and hell were drawn in various puranas to portray rewards and punishments for right and wrong conducts, respectively. These developments had a negative consequence through value-polarization in favour of what Weber calls ‘other-worldly asceticism’ in the Hindu tradition.

The *Dharmashastras* not only contributed to a strengthening of the hierarchical values related to goal-orientations and roles of various *vamas* and *jatis* but also integrated these values in the hierarchical system of cultural cycle and on that basis postulated a relativism in the normative aspect of *dharma*. Similarly, the hierarchies of charismatic endowments were also confirmed. To a no lesser degree do we find the support to these ideal typical characteristics in the *Arthashastra* of Kautilya. The relationship of *Arthashastra* to the *Dharmashastra* is not identical to that of the secular to the sacred. As we have mentioned, *artha* is itself a part of the hierarchical system of the four-fold goal orientations. In fact, *Arthashastra* reaffirms the principle of hierarchy through the introduction of its essential principles in the theory of kingship and power structure in society. It is an effort to directly formulate a system of polity based on holistic and hierarchical conception of political order. The seven limbs of a kingdom, viz., the

master (*swami*), the companion (*amatya*), the country (*janapada*), the stronghold or the fortified town (*durga*), the treasury (*rosa*), the army and the organs of power (*danda*) and the ally (*mitrani*) are postulated in a hierarchy of relationships and on all organological model. The central figure in this hierarchy is the king. He is the wielder of the *legitimate* force (*danda*); the legitimacy is, however, derived from *dharma*. The concept of power is formulated in a secular context, but not complete disjunction between the secular role of a king and its sacerdotal implications to the maintenance of religious order is implied. The relationship between the *priest* and the *king* in this tradition is supplemental, although fully differentiated in terms of role performance. Thus, the secular role of kingship does not violate the principle of hierarchy. Dumont writes :

In ancient Egyptian or Sumerian kingship, or in the kingship of the Chinese empire for instance, the supreme religious functions were vested in the Sovereign; he was the Priest *par excellence* and those who were called the priests were only ritual specialists subordinate to him. Compare this with the Indian situation, there seems to be a simple alternative: either the king exerts the religious functions which are generally his, and then he is the head of the hierarchy for this very reason, and exerts at the same time political power, or, this is the Indian case, the king depends on the priests for the religious functions, he cannot himself operate the sacrifice on behalf of the kingdom, he cannot be his own sacrifices, instead he” ‘puts in front’ of him a priest, the *purohita*, and then he loses the hierarchical pre-eminence in favour of the priests, retaining for himself power only.

Through this dissociation, the function of the king in India has been *secularized*. It is from this point that a differentiation has occurred, the separation within the religious universe of a sphere or realm which is opposed to the religious, and roughly corresponds to what we call political. *As* opposed to the realm of values and norms it is the realm of force. *As* opposed to the *dharma* or the universal order of the Brahman, it is the realm of interest or advantage, *artha*.

Among the various forms of role-institutionalizations, the kingly role (*arthadharmā*) has been most eclectic and assimilative in structure. Some scholars even doubt the existence of *Kshatriya* as a distinctive *varna* or *jati* in historical times. Pannikar writes that, “it is a fact that in historical times there was no such caste as the *Kshatriya*. “Similarly also in the Brahmin tradition or the structure of its role-institutionalization constant internal changes were always taking place, each having a differential orientation within its legitimate spiritual vocation as well as in-between the spiritual and material pursuit in life. This also was the time for the integration of other forms of values in the” spheres of literature, education, art, craft and various other apparently secular vocations into the sacred-hierarchical nonnative structure of the tradition. Consequently, hierarchical nature of the goals of education was formally spelled out and systematic expositions of the six philosophical traditions of Hinduism followed.

The goal of education both in its esoteric (*para*) and utilitarian (*a-para*) manifestations was communication of knowledge from proper conduct of *dharma* or moral and social obligations. Originally, education meant the knowledge of the Vedas but subsequently it also came to include the learning of various artistic, scientific and linguistic capabilities. The principle of hierarchy was, however, still maintained and even the apparently secular crafts and techniques (*kala*) were not free from these norms. As in the role of kingship, the role-institutionalization of the craftsmanship too came to be treated as a blend of the sacred and secular norms, with the primacy of the sacred, in a hierarchical sense. Stella Kramlich writes :

The upward trend within a craft, however, has also a deeper cause than social ambition. This was implicitly recognized in the law books. Manu says that the hand of a craftsman engaged in his work is always ritually pure. The Gautama *Dharmasastra* postulates that a Brahmin may not accept food from an artisan. The law books thus distinguish the craftsman in his social position on the one hand, and in his state of grace on the other-when he is engaged in his work, when he creates and, thereby gives effect to his being an embodiment of Vishvakarma (the God as sum total of creative consciousness.)

These orthogenetic changes in the Great tradition continued to take place from the classical age of the Hindu period of history (A.D. 300-700) through post-classical (A. D. 700-1500), and medieval periods (A. D. 1500-1800) to the contemporary times. By the end of the Gupta period, most of the systematic works in the expounding of the Great tradition, be it in the field of religion, literature, sculpture, art, science, philosophy or ethics, etc., had reached the highest point of development. What followed later was a process of gradual 'particularization' of these institutions and values in the structure of Life Hindu cultural tradition. As these changes were taking place in the wake of the breakaway traditions of Buddhism and Jainism, etc., in subsequent periods signs of segmentation and disintegrative pluralism also began to appear. Shankracharya by his exegesis of the Great tradition (Vedanta school of philosophy) contributed a great deal to unifying the cultural tradition of Hinduism. In this regard his most important contribution was the establishment of four sacred centres of pilgrimage in the four corners of the nation (Badrinath in Himalayas, Puri in Orissa, Dwarka on Western coast, Shringeri in the South) which since then have served as the network of communication of the Great tradition.

In the post-Gupta period, the centre of cultural effervescence had shifted from north to south. Shankaracharya was from Kerala in the south. Another philosopher-Saint Ramanuja, in the eleventh century, also came from the south. His emphasis, unlike that of Shankaracharya was not primarily on the metaphysical but on devotional and ritual aspect of Hinduism. In the thirteenth century, Madhava, another saint-philosopher from the south, further postulated the devotional cult of Hinduism. A very important function of these orthogenetic movements in the tradition was that through reformulation and re-interpretation the basic tenets of the cultural and ritual structure of Hinduism were brought nearer to the life of the people. These contributed not only to the Great tradition, but also established a bridge of communication between the Little and the Great traditions of Hinduism. Another significant development which had taken place during this period was the emergence of a liberal reform movement in the ritual status of the Shudra or the lower castes.

Both Ramanuja and Madhava favoured the temple entry for the lower castes, and the removal of their many disabilities.

This was a period of cultural renaissance in the south. The Great tradition of Hinduism flourished in the south under the protection of the temples, which were not only works of art but also served as educational institutions and centres of intellectual discussions, cultural festivals and other artistic expressions. So Many classics, epics and literary works of the Great tradition were during this period rendered in Tamil, Kannada, Marathi and other regional languages. It was during this period that a differentiated form of the Hindu tradition evolved the cults of Virashaivism (Lingayat movement). Virashaivism was partly a protest-cult and partly a reform movement within the tradition. The same was true of various other devotional cults which grew in south India during this time.

From this period up to the end of the medieval times, orthogenetic changes in the cultural Great tradition of Hinduism have mainly been marked by a growth of devotional-liberal traditions which had earlier started in the south. Guru Nanak in Punjab, Meerabai in Rajasthan, Raman,^{S2} Kabir and Tulsidas in Uttar Pradesh, Chaitanya in Bengal, Dadu in Gujarat, Tukaram and Ramdas in Maharashtra emerged as the leading saints of the new devotional tradition in Hinduism. The contribution of these movements was two-fold: first, they liberalized the orthodox conception of religious beliefs and carried it to the people in their own languages; they rendered the so far esoteric and ritual-ridden religious beliefs into simpler idioms of the masses; some of them, notably Kabir and Nanak, also introduced purely humanistic; and mystical values in religious beliefs criticising both the Hindu and Muslim orthodoxy. Most of them were for the abolition of the social disabilities based on caste, sex and religious beliefs.^{S3} Their second contribution was to bridge the gap between the Little and the Great traditions of Hindu culture. In fact, the devotional cults and the social structure of its movement served as a major communication channel for the continuity of the Hindu Great tradition during a time when due to the Muslim rule state patronage to this tradition had not only broken down but it was exposed to constant external and internal

challenges and threats.

The 'main channels of communication were the roving bands of disciples, the *mathas* (religious seminaries) and congregational meetings held for songs and prayers. Through these media the value system of this movement was carried in the country far and wide.

While a larger segment of the devotional school was an effort to popularize and reiterate the selected values of the Hindu Great tradition (which we find in the preachings of Chaitanya, Tulsidas and Tukaram, etc.) an important section of it led by saints like Ramananda, Kabir, Nanak, etc. were directly motivated by the need for the introduction of more equalitarian and non-hierarchical value system in the world-view of Hinduism. Similarly, in their exposition of the tradition, conscious effort was towards liberalization of the Hindu tradition and its synthesis with Islam. In this respect their movements were not entirely orthogenetic in nature.

As we pass from the medieval history of India to the contemporary history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it becomes difficult to isolate the processes of cultural change and many attempts towards cultural reformation and reformulation which could be called as entirely orthogenetic in origin. Most of such movements tend to be socio-political in nature and directly or indirectly emerge as reactions to the forces outside the traditional culture. Consequently, the reform movements in Hinduism which emerged in the wake of the British rule in India could be grouped into two major types. First, reforms which called for changes in the cultural practices and values of Hinduism on the pattern of the primordial tradition of the Vedas, and second, which postulated synthesis of new norms and cultural themes with the traditional themes and value system of the Hindu culture.

The pioneers of the second trend in cultural reformation have also been the apostles of modernization in India. It is difficult to catalogue the names of the

social and cultural reformers of the two schools, as in some respects and with few exceptions, almost all the reformers of this, period show moderation in their views on the need for synthesis. A distinction may, nevertheless, be made between those who postulate synthesis in terms of the normative structure of the Great Hindu tradition itself and those who adumbrate this point of view in terms of synthesis between the orthogenetic (Hindu) and the heterogenetic (Islamic and Western) sources of the normative structure.

Roughly speaking, among the reformers of the first category we might include the names of Dayananda Saraswati, Vivekananda and on final account that of Mahatma Gandhi. Other reformers of the nineteenth and twentieth century India right from Ram Mohun Roy to Nehru may be grouped in the second category and consequently their contributions to the process of cultural change form more a part of the process of cultural modernization in India rather than of orthogenetic changes in its structure.

It is curious to note that in their appeals for reform in the Hindu cultural tradition neither Dayananda nor Vivekananda nor Gandhi rejected the basic ideal-typical cultural themes of Hinduism. All of them accepted the legitimacy of the principle of hierarchy. Dayananda did so by following the Vedic model of functional division of varna and its pattern of role-institutionalization. Vivekananda and Gandhi adhered to it, drawing their model from the Gita and giving it a new legitimation in terms of the philosophy of karma-yoga, or of detached social action. All of them considered the ritualistic disabilities of caste and social disabilities of women as being based on misunderstanding of the Hindu tradition and exhorted for their rejection. But they did not challenge the hierarchical world-view of Hinduism as found in its beliefs in charismatic attributes of men, hierarchy of goal-orientations or even the hierarchical cyclical conception of cultural change. Gandhi even borrowed the idea of Rama Rajya, a modified version of the Hindu conception of Golden age to project his ideals of a moral society. Although, unlike Dayananda, Vivekananda and Gandhi did not plead for deliberate hostility or rejection of the non-Hindu cultural values and religious beliefs, yet their interpretation of Hinduism and their formulation of the cultural policies for the

Hindu society itself were such that it came as a sharp contradiction to the Western or modern way of life and its basic value Premises.

In this connection, the contribution of Gandhi is far more systematic and complete from a sociological point of view than that of the other two, and needs careful analysis and thought. In fact, the model presented by Gandhi is not a product of aggressive reaction to alien religious or cultural patterns. It is also not an angry protest against the pathology of some Hindu cultural and ritual practices which is paramount in the writings of Dayananda. It does not emerge from a deep sense of resentment at the comparative lack of development or dynamics in the Hindu society vis-à-vis the West, which unconsciously or consciously motivated Vivekananda. Gandhiji's contribution to the orthogenetic change in the Hindu cultural tradition has, therefore, been of the most fundamental kind.

14.3 Sum Up

Gandhiji had realized the significance of the encounter of the Hindu tradition with the West, whether it came in the form of the Marxist challenge or through the Western ideology of hedonistic-individualistic Liberalism. He counterposed his philosophy which was drawn from the essentials of traditional Hinduism, as an alternative system. He reiterated the Hindu concept of social and cultural order based on dharma, or moral obligations which implied a conscious rejection of the Western theory of social order based on power. Gandhian principle of non-violence, which is derived from the hierarchy of five yamas (means of self-control) in the Hindu tradition, later extolled in the Jaina philosophy, is an effort towards restoration of a moral society as traditionally conceived. Similarly, his emphasis on agrarian and handicraft economy, his rejection of modern technology, his non-legitimation of private gain and profit, his theory of trusteeship in property (an alternative to communism), his emphasis on decentralized system of administration through a hierarchy of representative bodies in opposition to the atomistic form of modern democracy go together to reveal as to how deeply his whole system of ideas was rooted in the primordial tradition. His conciliatory

view on other religions too might be simply an extension of the basic philosophy of tolerance, ever present in the Hindu theology. Gandhism, thus, should be treated as an expression of orthogenetic cultural renaissance *par excellence*. It is a fact that in independent India Gandhism has become a mere sect instead of being a cultural force with a dimension of mass mobilization, which it once had generated. The failure of Gandhism in India opens a vast window on the problem of cultural change and modernization in this country which should be analysed.

NEW INTELLIGENTSIA

Structure**15.1 Introduction****15.2 Muhammad Iqbal****15.3 Abdul Kalam Azad****15.4 M. K. Gandhi****15.1 Introduction (B. R. Ambedkar)**

Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (1891-1956), later known as Babasaheb (respected master) Ambedkar, was born into the, . untouchable Mahar caste in Maharashtra. In a sharp departure from the general illiteracy of his caste, Ambedkar was able to obtain an outstanding, Western-style education: first at a college in Bombay, next at Columbia university in New York (where he received a doctoral degree), and finally in London (where he secured a doctor of science in addition to passing. the bar). On his return to India he plunged himself into political and organizational activities aimed at uplifting the Untouchables and (what then were called) the ‘Depressed Classes’ .Following a confrontation over the issue of separate electorates, he reached a compromise with Gandhi in 1932 which gave special representation to Untouchables (now known as ‘Scheduled Castes’). Progressively turning away both from Hinduism and the dominant Congress Party, Ambedkar tried to organize an independent Labour Party, but with limited success. Following independence, he served as chairman of the committee drafting the

constitution and, in a gesture of reconciliation, Nehru appointed him minister of law. However, in 1951, he signed from the cabinet protesting the government's continuing neglect of the Scheduled Castes. He devoted himself more intensively than ever to educational activities and visited a number of Buddhist countries. On October 1956, a few weeks before his death, he converted to Buddhism in a massive ceremony in Nagpur.

For primary and secondary sources see B.R. Ambedkar, *Thoughts on Pakistan*, Bombay, Thacker, 1941; *What Gandhi and Congress Have Done to the Untouchables*, Bombay, Thacker, is : I would not weep over the disappearance of machinery or consider it a calamity.

His opposition to machinery is well evidenced by his idolization of [the] *charkha* (the spinning wheel), and hand-weaving. His opposition to machinery and his love for *charkha* are not a matter of accident. They are a matter of his philosophy of life. This philosophy Mr. Gandhi took special occasion to propound in his presidential address at the Kathiawad political conference held on 8 January 1925. This is what Mr. Gandhi said :

Nations are tired of the worship of lifeless machines multiplied *ad infinitum*. We are destroying the matchless living machines, viz., our own -bodies by "leaving them to rust and trying to substitute lifeless machinery for them. It is a law of God that the body must be fully worked and utilized. We dare not ignore it. The spinning wheel is the auspicious symbol of *sharer yajna* - body labor. He who eats his food without offering this sacrifice steals it. By giving up this sacrifice we became traitors, to the country and banged the door in the face of the Goddess of Fortune.

Anyone who has read Mr. Gandhi's booklet on *Hind Swaraj* (Indian Home Rule) will know that Mr. Gandhi is against modern civilization. The book was first published in 1908. But there has been no change in his ideology. Writing in 1921 Mr. Gandhi said :

The booklet is a severe condemnation of 'modern civilization. It was written in 1908. My conviction is deeper today than ever. I feel that, if India would discard 'modern, civilization', she can only gain by doing so.

The second ideal of Mr. Gandhi is the elimination of class war, and even class struggle, in the relationship between employers and employees, and between landlords and tenants. Mr. Gandhi's views on the relationship between employers and employees were set forth by him in an article on the subject, which appeared' in the *Nava Jivan* of 8-June 1921, and from which the following is an extract:

Two paths are open before India, either to introduce the' Western principle of 'might is right', or to uphold the Eastern principle that truth alone, conquers, that truth knows no mishap, that the strong and the weak have alike a right to secure justice. The choice is to begin with the laboring class. Should the laborers obtain an increment in their wages by violence ? Even if that be possible, they cannot resort to anything like violence, howsoever legitimate may be their claims. To use violence for securing rights may seem an easy path, but it proves to be thorny in the long run. Those who live by sword die also by sword. The swimmer often dies by drowning Look at Europe. No one seems to be happy there, for not one is contented. The laborer does not trust the capitalist has no faith in the laborer. Both have a sort, of vigor and strength but even the bulls have it. They fight to the very bitter end. All motion is not progress. We have got no reason to, believe that the people of Europe are progressing. Their possession of wealth does not argue be possession of any moral or spiritual qualities.

What shall we do then ? The laborers in Bombasy made a fine stand. I. was not in a position to know all the facts. But this much I could see that they could fight in a better way. The millowner may be wholly in the wrong. "In the struggle between capital and labor, it may be generally said that more often than not the capitalists are in the wrong box. But when labor

comes fully to realize its strength, I know it can become more tyrannical than capital. The millowners will have to work on the terms dictated by labor, if the latter could command intelligence of the former. It is clear, however, that labor will never attain that intelligence. If it does, labor will cease to be labor and become itself the master. The capitalists do not fight on the strength of money alone. They do possess intelligence and tact.

The question before us is this: When the laborers, remaining what they are, develop a certain consciousness, what should be their course? It would be suicidal if the laborers rely upon their numbers or brute force, i.e., violence. By so doing, they will do harm to industries in the country. If, on the other hand, they take their stand on pure justice and suffer in their person to secure it, not only will they always succeed but they will reform their masters, develop industries and both master and men will be as members of one and the same family....

Mr. Gandhi does not wish to hurt the propertied class. He is even opposed to a campaign against them. He has no passion for economic equality. Referring to the propertied class Mr. Gandhi said quite recently that he does not wish to destroy the hen that lays the golden egg. His solution for the economic conflict between the owners and the workers, between the rich and the poor, between the landlords and the tenants, and between the employer and the employees is very simple. The owners need not deprive themselves of their property. All that they need do is to declare themselves trustees for the poor. Of course, the trust is to be a voluntary one carrying only a spiritual obligation.

Is there anything new in the Gandhian analysis of economic ills? Are the economics of Gandhism sound? What hope does Gandhism hold out to the common man, to the down and out? Does it promise him a better life, a life of joy and culture, a life of freedom, not merely freedom from want but freedom to rise, to grow to the full stature which his capacities can reach?

There is nothing new in the Gandhian analysis of economic ills, in so far as it attributes them to machinery and the civilization that is built upon it. That machinery and modern civilization help to concentrate management and control into relatively few hands, and with the aid of banking and credit facilitate the transfer into still fewer hands of all materials and factories and mill.. in which millions are bled white in order to support huge industries thousands of miles away from their cottages, or that machinery and modern civilization cause deaths, maimings andcripplings far in excess of the corresponding injuries by war, and are responsible for disease and physical deterioration due directly and indirectly to the development of large cities with their smoke, dirt, noise, foul air, lack of sunshine and outdoor life, slums, prostitution and unnatural living which they bring about, are all old and worn out arguments. There is nothing new in them. Gandhism is merely repeating the views of Rousseau, Ruskin, Tolstoy, and their school.

The ideas which go to make up Gandhism are just primitive. It is a return to nature, to animal life. Their only merit is their simplicity. As there is always a large corps of simple people who are attracted by them, such simple ideas do not die, and there is always some simpleton to preach them. There is, however, no doubt that the practical instincts of men-which seldom go wrong-have found them unfruitful and which society in search of progress has thought it best to reject.

The economics of Gandhism are hopelessly fallacious. The fact that machinery and modern civilization have produced many evils may be admitted. But these evils are no argument against them. For the evils are not due to machinery and modern civilization. They are due to wrong social organization,- which has made private property and pursuit of personal gain matters of absolute sanctity. If machinery and civilization have not benefited everybody, the remedy is not to condemn machinery and civilization but to alter the organization of society so that the benefits will not be usurped by the few but will accrue to all.

In Gandhism, the common man has no hope. It treats man as an animal and no more. It is true that man shares the constitution and functions of animals, nutritive, reproductive, etc. But these are not distinctively human functions. The distinctively human function is reason, the purpose of which is to enable man to observe, meditate, cogitate, study and discover the beauties of the universe and enrich his life and control the animal elements in his life. Man thus occupies the highest place in the scheme of animate existence. If this is true what is the conclusion that follows? The conclusion that follows is that while the ultimate goal of a brute's life is reached once his physical appetites are satisfied, the ultimate goal of man's existence is not reached unless and until he has fully cultivated his mind. In short, what divides the brute from man is culture. Culture is not possible for the brute, but it is essential for man. That being so, the aim of human society must be to enable every person to lead a life of culture, which means the cultivation of mind as distinguished from the satisfaction of mere physical wants. How can this happen ?

Both for society as well as for the individual there is always a gulf between merely living and living worthily. In order that one may live worthily one must first live. The time and energy spent upon mere life, upon gaining of subsistence detracts from that available for activities of a distinctively human nature, and which go to make up a life of culture. How, then, can a life of culture be made possible? It is not possible unless there is sufficient leisure. For, it is only when there is leisure that a person is free to devote himself to a life of culture. The problem of all problems, which human society has to face, is how to provide leisure to every individual. What does leisure mean? Leisure means the lessening of the toil and effort necessary for satisfying the physical wants of life. How can leisure be made possible? Leisure is quite impossible unless some means are found whereby the toil required for producing goods necessary to satisfy human needs is lessened.

What can lesson such toil ? Only when machine takes the place of man. There is no other means of producing leisure. Machinery and modern civilization are thus indispensable for emancipating man from leading the life of a brute, and for providing him with leisure and for making a life of culture possible. The man

who condemns machinery and modern civilization simply does not understand their purpose and the ultimate aim which human society must strive to achieve.

Gandhism may be well suited to a society which does not accept democracy as its ideal. A society which does not believe in democracy may be indifferent to machinery' and the civilization based upon it. But a democratic society cannot. The former may well content itself with a life of leisure and culture for the few and a life of toil and drudgery for the many. But a democratic society must assure a life of leisure and culture to each one of its citizens. If the above analysis is correct then the slogan of a democratic society must be machinery, and more machinery, civilization and more civilization. Under Gandhism the common man must keep on toiling ceaselessly for a pittance and remain a brute. In short, Gandhism with its call of back to nature, means back to nakedness, back to squalor, back to poverty and back to ignorance for the vast mass of the people.

15.2 Muhammad Iqbal

Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) was born in the Punjab into a family of devout Muslims. After receiving education at the Government College at Lahore, he went on to study philosophy at Cambridge and in Germany and also to prepare for the bar. On his return to India in 1908 he taught philosophy for a few years at Lahore, but then gave up this position and started a private law practice-an occupation meant to allow him more time for studying and writing poetry. In the ensuing years his literary reputation steadily increased and he was soon recognized as the leading Urdu poet of his generation (as well as an outstanding poet in the Persian language). Iqbal involved himself only intermittently in politics. In 1926 he was elected to the Punjab provincial legislature, but refrained from pursuing a more ambitious political career. Although initially supporting the idea of a separate Muslim community within a larger India, he progressively despaired of the possibility of Muslim-Hindu

co-existence. In the end he came to endorse the creation of an independent Pakistan under the leadership of Jinnah.

For primary and secondary sources see Muhammad Iqbal, *The Secrets of the Self*, trans. R.A. Nicholson, Lahore, Ashraf, 1944; *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Lahore, Ashraf, 1944; *The Mysteries of Selflessness*, trans. Arthur J. Arberry, London, Murray, 1953; *Poems from Iqbal*, trans. V.G. Kiernan, London, Murray, 1955; *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, Lahore, Al-Manar Academy, 1948; Luce-Claude Maitre, *Mohammed Iqbal*, Paris, Segers, 1964. The following selections are taken from *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, pp.7-8, 97, 125-27; *Speeches and Statements*, pp. 3-15, 34-36.

The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam

During the last five hundred years religious thought in Islam has been practically stationary. There was a time when European thought received inspiration from the world of Islam. The most remarkable phenomenon of modern history, however, is the enormous rapidity with which the world of Islam is spiritually moving towards the West. There is nothing wrong in this movement, for European culture, on its intellectual only a further development of some of the most important phases of the culture of Islam. Our only fear is that the dazzling exterior of European culture may arrest our movement and we may fail to reach the true inwardness of that culture. During all the centuries of our intellectual stupor, Europe has been seriously thinking on the great problems in which the philosophers and scientists of Islam were so keenly interested. Since the Middle Ages, when the schools of Muslim theology were completed infinite advance has taken place in the domain of human thought and experience. The extension of man's power over nature has given him a new faith and a fresh sense of superiority over the forces that constitute his environment. New points of view have been suggested, old problems have been restated in the light of fresh experience, and new problems have arisen. It seems as if the intellect of man is outgrowing its own most fundamental categories-time, space, and causality. With the advance

of scientific thought even our concept of intelligibility is undergoing a change. The theory of Einstein has brought a new vision of the universe and suggests new ways of looking at the problems common to both religion and philosophy. No wonder, then, that the younger generation of Islam in Asia and Africa demand a fresh orientation of their faith. With the reawakening of Islam, therefore, it is necessary to examine, in an independent spirit, what Europe has thought and how far the conclusions reached by her can help us in the revision and, if necessary, reconstruction, of theological thought in Islam. Besides this it is not possible to ignore the generally anti-religious and especially anti Islamic propaganda in Central Asia which has already crossed the Indian frontier.

The task before the modern Muslim is, therefore, immense. He has to rethink the whole system of Islam without completely breaking with the past... The only course open to us is to approach modern knowledge with a respectful but independent attitude and to appreciate the teachings at Islam in the light of that knowledge, even though we may be led to differ from those who have gone before us

Now, during the minority of mankind, psychic energy develops what I call prophetic consciousness – a mode of economizing individual thought and choice by providing ready made judgments, choices, and ways of action. With the birth of reason and critical faculty, however, life, in its own interest, inhibits the formation and growth of non-rational modes of consciousness through which psychic energy flowed at an earlier stage of human evolution. Man is primarily governed by passion and instinct. Inductive reason, which alone makes man master of his environment, is an achievement and when once born, it must be reinforced by inhibiting the growth of other modes of knowledge. There is no doubt that the ancient world produced some great systems of philosophy at a time when man was comparatively primitive and governed more or less by suggestion. But we must not forget that this system-building in the ancient world was the work of abstract thought which cannot

go beyond the systematization of vague religious beliefs and traditions, and gives us no hold on the concrete situations of life.

Looking at the matter from this point of view, then, the Prophet of Islam seems to stand between the ancient and the modern world. In so far as the source of his revelation is concerned, he belongs to the ancient world; in so far as the spirit of his revelation is concerned, he belongs to the modern world. In him life discovers other sources of knowledge suitable to its new direction. The birth of Islam, as I hope to be able presently to prove to your satisfaction, is the birth of inductive intellect. In Islam prophecy reaches its perfection in discovering the need of its own abolition. This involves the keen perception that life cannot forever be kept in leading strings; that in order to achieve full self-consciousness man must finally be thrown back on his own resources. The abolition of priesthood and hereditary kingship in Islam, the constant appeal to reason and experience in the Qur'an, and the emphasis that it lays on Nature and History as sources of human knowledge, are all different aspects of the same idea of finality. The idea, however, does not mean that mystic experience, which qualitatively does not differ from the experience of the Prophet, has now ceased to exist.... God reveals His signs in Inner as well as outer experience, and it is the duty of man to judge the knowledge-yielding capacity of all aspects of experience. The idea of finality, therefore, [the belief that Muhammad was the final Prophet] should not be taken to suggest that the ultimate fate of life is complete displacement of emotion by reason. Such a thing is neither possible nor desirable. The intellectual value of the idea is that it tends to create an independent critical attitude towards mystic experience by generating the belief that all personal authority, claiming a supernatural origin, has come to an end in the history of man.... The function of the idea is to open up fresh vistas of knowledge in the domain of man's inner experience, just as the first half of the formula of Islam (There is no god but God') has created and fostered the spirit of a critical observation of man's outer experience by divesting the forces of nature of that divine character with which earlier culture had clothed them. Mystical experience, then, however unusual and abnormal, must now be regarded by a Muslim as a perfectly natural experience, open to critical scrutiny like other aspects of human experience.

This is clear from the Prophet's own attitude towards [on-Sayyad's psychic experiences...

The third source of Mohammedan [i.e. Islamic] Law is *ijma* [consensus] which is in my opinion perhaps the most important legal notion in Islam. It is, however, strange that this important notion, while invoking great academic discussions in early Islam, remained practically a mere idea, and rarely assumed the form of a permanent institution of any Mohammedan country. Possibly, its transformation into a permanent legislative institution was contrary to the political interests of absolute monarchy that grew up in Islam... It is, however, extremely satisfactory to note that the pressure of new world forces and the political experience of European nations are impressing on the mind of modern Islam the value and possibilities of the idea of *ijma*. The growth of republican spirit, and the gradual formation of legislative assemblies in Muslim lands constitutes a great step in advance. The transfer of the power of *ijtihad* [interpretation] from individual representatives of schools to a Muslim legislative assembly which, in view of the growth of opposing sects, is the only possible form *ijma* can take in modern times, will secure contributions to legal' discussion from laymen who happen to possess a keen insight into affairs.-In this way alone we can stir into activity the dormant spirit of life in our legal system, and give it an evolutionary outlook. In India, however, difficulties are likely to arise; for its is doubtful whether a non-Muslim legislative assembly can exercise the power of *ijtihad*.

Presidential Address

It cannot be denied that Islam, regarded as an ethical ideal plus a certain kind of polity-by which expression I mean a social structure regulated by a legal system and animated by a specific ethical ideal has been the chief formative factor in the life-history of the Muslims of India. It has furnished those basic emotions and loyalties which gradually unify scattered individuals and groups

and finally transform them into a well-defined people. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that India is perhaps the only country in the world where Islam, as a people-building force base worked at its best. In India, as elsewhere the structure of Islam as 'a society is almost entirely due to the working of Islam as a 'culture inspired by a specific ethical ideal, What I mean to say is that Muslim society, with its remarkable homogeneity and inner unity, has grown to be what it is under the pressure of the laws and institutions associated with the culture of Islam. The ideas set free by European thinking, however, are now rapidly changing the outlook of the present generation of Muslims both in India and outside India. Our younger men, inspired by these ideas, are anxious to see them as living forces in their own countries without any critical appreciation of the facts which have determined their evolution in Europe....

The conclusion to which Europe is [...] driven is that religion is a private affair of the individual and has nothing to do with what is called man's temporal life, Islam does not bifurcate the unity of man into an irreconcilable duality of spirit and matter, In Islam. God and the universe, spirit and matter, church and state, are organic to each other, Man is not the citizen of a profane world to be renounced in the interest of a world of spirit situated elsewhere. To Islam matter is spirit realizing itself in space and time in. In the world of Islam we have a universal polity whose fundamentals are believed to have been revealed, but whose structure, owing to our legists' want of contact with [the] modern world, stands today in need of renewed power by fresh adjustments. I do not know what will be the final fate of the national idea in the world of Islam. Whether Islam will assimilate and transform it, as it has assimilated and transformed before many ideas expressive of different spirits, or allow a radical transformation of its own structure by the force of this idea, is hard to predict.

What, then is the problem and its implications ? Is religion on private affair ? Would you like to see Islam, as a moral and political idea, meeting the same fate in the world of Islam as Christianity has already met in Europe ? Is it possible to retain Islam as an ethical ideal and to reject it as a polity in favour of

national politics, in which a religious attitude is not permitted to play any part ? This question becomes of special importance in India where the Muslims happen to be in a minority. The proposition that religion is a private individual experience is not surprising on the lips of a European. In Europe the conception of Christianity as a monastic order, renouncing the world of matter and fixing its gaze entirely on the world of spirit led, “by a logical process of thought, to the view embodied in this proposition. The nature of the Prophet’s religious experience, as disclosed in the Qur’an however, is wholly different. It is not mere experience in the sense of a purely biological event, happening inside the experiment and necessitating no reactions on his social environment. It is individual experience creative of a social order. Its immediate outcome is the fundamentals of a polity with implicit legal concepts whose civic significance cannot be belittled merely because their origin is revelational. The religious ideal of Islam, therefore, is organically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection of the one will eventually involve the rejection of the other. Therefore the construction of a polity on national lines, if it means a displacement of the Islamic principle of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim. This is a matter which at the present moment directly concerns the Muslims of India. The unity of an Indian nation, therefore, must be sought, not in the negation but in the mutual harmony and cooperation of the many, True statemanship cannot ignore facts, however unpleasant they may be. The only practical course is not to assume the existence of a state of things which does not exist, but to recognize facts as they are, and to exploit them to our greatest advantage....

Events seem to be tending in the direction of some sort of internal harmony. And as far as I have been able to read the Muslim mind, I have no hesitation in declaring that if the principle that the Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian’ homelands is recognized as the basis of a permanent communal settlement, he will be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India. The Principle that each group is entitled to free development on its own lines is not inspired by any feeling of narrow communalism. There are communalisms and communalisms. A

community which is inspired by feelings of ill-will toward other communities is low and ignoble. I entertain the highest respect for the customs, laws, religions, and social institutions of other communities. Nay, it is my duty, according to the teaching of the Qur'an, even to defend their places of worship, if need be. Yet, I love the communal group which is the source of my life and behaviour and which has formed me what I am by giving me its religion, its literature, its thought, its culture and thereby recreating its whole past as a living factor in my present consciousness...

Communalism in its higher aspect, then, is indispensable to the formation of a harmonious whole in a country like India. The units of Indian society are not territorial as in European countries. India is a continent of human groups belonging to different races, speaking different languages and professing different religions. Their behavior is not at all determined by a common raceconsciousness. Even the Hindus do not form a homogeneous group. The principle of European democracy cannot be applied to India without recognizing the fact of communal groups. The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified. The [1929] resolution of the All Parties Muslim Conference at Delhi is, to my mind, wholly inspired by this noble ideal of a harmonious whole which, instead of stifling the respective individualities of its component wholes, affords them chances of fully working out the possibilities that may be latent in them. And I have no doubt that this House will emphatically endorse the Muslim demands embodied in this resolution. Personally, I would go further than the demands embodied in it. I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self government within the British empire or without the British empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India.....

The idea need not alarm the Hindus or the British. India is the greatest Muslim country in the world. The life of Islam, as a cultural force, in this country

very largely depends on its centralization in a specified territory. This centralization of the most living portion of the Muslims of India, whose military and police service has, notwithstanding unfair treatment from the British, made the British rule possible in this country, will eventually solve the problem of India as well as of Asia. It will intensify their sense of responsibility and deepen their patriotic feeling. Thus, possessing full opportunity of development within 'the body politic of India, the North-West India Muslims will prove the best defenders of India against a foreign invasion, be the invasion of ideas or of bayonets. . . .

I therefore demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim state in the best interests of India and Islam. For India, it means security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power; for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilize its law, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and with the spirit of modern times.

Thus, it is clear that in view of India's infinite variety in climates, races, languages, creeds and social systems, the creation of autonomous states based on the unity of languages, race, history, religion and identity of economic interests, is the only possible way to secure a stable constitutional structure in India.....

In conclusion, I cannot but impress upon you that the present crisis in the history of India demands complete organization and unity of will and purpose in the Muslim community, both in your own interest as a community, and in the interest of India as a whole....

Our disorganized condition has already confused political issues vital to the life of the community. I am not hopeless of an inter-communal understanding, but I cannot conceal from you the feeling that in the near future our community may be called upon to adopt an independent line of action to cope with the present crisis. And an independent line of political action, in such a crisis, is possible only to a determined people, possessing a will focalized by a single purpose. Is it possible for you to achieve the organic wholeness of a unified will?

Yes, it is. Rise above sectional interests and private ambitions, and learn to determine the value of your individual and collective action, however directed on material ends, in the light of the ideal which you are supposed to represent. Pass from matter to spirit. Matter is diversity, spirit is light, life and unity. One lesson I have learnt from the history of Muslims : at critical moments in their history it is Islam that has saved Muslims, and not vice versa. If today you focus your vision on Islam and see inspiration from the ever-vitalizing idea embodied in it, you will be only reassembling your scattered forces, regaining your lost integrity, and thereby saving yourself from total destruction. One of the profoundest verses in the Holy Qur'an teaches us that the birth and rebirth of the whole of humanity is like the birth of a single individual. Why cannot you who, as a people, can well claim to be the first practical exponents of this superb conception of humanity, live and move and have your being as a single individual ? In the words of the Qur'an : 'Hold fast to yourself; no one who erreth can hurt you, provided you are will guided. [5:104]

15.3 Abdul Kalam Azad

Abul Kalam Azad (1888-1958) was born in Mecca, of an Indian father and an Arabian mother. He first received a traditional Islamic education in Calcutta but then devoted himself to intensive English-language studies focused on European culture. Partly under the influence of Sri Aurobindo, the young Azad joined a Hindu revolutionary group devoted to 'extremist' nationalism and was promptly arrested and detained by the British. After World War I he embraced the pro-caliphate Non-Cooperation Movement under Gandhi's leadership, and subsequently remained a faithful member of the National Congress, serving as its president from 1940 to 1946. Believing in the possibility of Hindu Muslim co-existence he did not support partitioning and, following independence, served as India's minister of education from 1947 until his death.

For primary and secondary sources see Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative*, Bombay, Orient Longman, 1959; *Basic Concepts of the Quran*, Hyderabad, Academy of Islamic Studies, 1958; *Speeches of Maulana Azad*, New Delhi, Government of India, Publications Division, 1956; Sankar Ghose, ed., *Congress Presidential Speeches*, Calcutta, West Bengal Pradesh Committee. 1972; Ian Henderson Douglas, *Abul Kalam Azad: An Intellectual and Religious Biography*, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1993. The following selection is taken from Ghose, *Congress Presidential Speeches*, pp. 356-63.

We have considered the problem of the minorities of India. But are the Muslims such a minority as to have the least doubt or fear about their future? A small minority may legitimately have fears and apprehensions, but can the Muslims allow themselves to be disturbed by them? I do not know how many of you are familiar with my writings, twenty-eight years ago, in the *Al-Hilal*. If there are any such here, I would request them to refresh their memories. Even then I gave expression of my conviction, and I repeat this today, that in the texture of Indian politics, nothing is further removed from the truth than to say that Indian Muslims occupy the position of a political minority. It is equally absurd for them to be apprehensive about their rights and interests in a democratic India. This fundamental mistake has opened the door to could misunderstandings. False arguments were built up on wrong premises. This error, on the one hand, brought confusion into the minds of Musalmans about their own true position and, on the other hand, it involved the world in misunderstandings, so that the picture of India could not be seen in right perspective.

If time had permitted, I would have told you in detail how, during the last sixty years, this artificial and untrue picture of India was made, and whose hands traced it. In effect, this was the result of the same policy of divide and rule which took particular shape in the minds of British officialdom in India after the Congress launched the national movement. The object of this was to prepare the Musalmans for use against the new political awakening. In this plan, prominence was given to two points. First, that

India was inhabited by two different communities, the Hindus and the Musalmans, and for this reason no demand could be made in the name of a united nation. Second, that numerically the Musalmans were far less than the Hindus, and because of this, the necessary consequence of the establishment of democratic institutions in India would be to establish the rule of the Hindu majority and to jeopardise the existence of the Muslims.

Thus were sown the seeds of disunity by British imperialism on Indian soil. The plant grew and was nurtured and spread its nettles, and even though fifty years have passed since then, the roots are still there.

Politically speaking, the word 'minority' does not mean just a group that is so small in number and so lacking in other qualities that give strength, that it has no confidence in its own capacity to protect itself from the much larger group that surrounds it. It is not enough that the group should be relatively the smaller, but that it should be absolutely so small as to be incapable of protecting its interests. Thus, this is not merely a question of numbers; other factors count also. If a country has two major groups numbering [one] million and two millions respectively, it does not necessarily follow that because one is half the other, therefore it must call itself politically a minority, and consider itself weak.

If this is the right test, let us apply it to the position of the Muslims in India. You will see at a glance a vast concourse, spreading out all over the country; they stand erect, and to imagine that they exist helplessly as a 'minority' is to delude oneself. The Muslims in India number between eighty and ninety-millions. The same type of social or racial divisions, which affect other communities, do not divide them. The powerful bonds of Islamic brotherhood and equality have protected them to a large extent from the weakness that flows from social divisions. It is true that they number only one-fourth of the total population; but the question is not one of population ratio, but of the large numbers and the strength behind them. Can such a vast mass of humanity have any legitimate reason for apprehension that in a free and democratic India, it might be unable to protect its rights and interest ?

These numbers are not confined to any particular area but spread out

unevenly over different parts of the country. In four provinces out of eleven in India there is a Muslim majority, the other religious groups being minorities.. If British Baluchistan is added, there are five provinces with Muslim majority. Even if we are compelled at present to consider this question on a basis of religious groupings, the position of the Muslims is not that of a minority only. If they are in a minority in seven provinces, they are in a majority in five. This being so, there is absolutely no reason why they should be oppressed by the feeling of being a minority.

Whatever may be the details of the future constitution of India, we know that it will be an all-India federation which is, in the fullest sense, democratic, and every unit of which will have autonomy in regard to internal affairs. The federal center will be concerned only with all-India matters of common concern, such as, foreign relations, defence, customs, etc. Under these circumstances, can any one who has any conception of the actual working of a democratic constitution, allow himself to be led astray by this false issue of majority and minority? I cannot believe for an instant that there can be any room whatever for these misgivings in the picture of India's future. These apprehensions are arising because, in the words of a British statesman regarding Ireland, we are yet standing on the banks of the river and, though wishing to swim, are unwilling to enter the water. There is only one remedy, we should take the plunge fearlessly. No sooner is this done, we shall realize that all our apprehensions were without foundation.....

Do we, Indian Musalmans, view the free India of the future with suspicion and distrust or with courage and confidence? If we view it with fear and suspicion, then, undoubtedly, we have to follow a different path. No present declaration, no promise for the future, no constitutional safeguards, can be a remedy for our doubts and fears. We are then forced to tolerate the existence of a third Power. This third power is already entrenched here and has no intention of withdrawing and, if we follow this path of fear, we must need look forward to its continuance.

But if we are convinced that for us fear and doubt have no place, and that we must view the future with courage and confidence in ourselves, then our course of action becomes absolutely clear. We find ourselves in a new world which is free from the dark shadows of doubt, vacillation, inaction and apathy, and where the light of faith and determination, action and enthusiasm never fails. The confusions of the times, the ups and downs that come our way, the difficulties that beset our thorny path, cannot change the direction of our steps. It becomes our bounden duty, then, to march with assured steps to India's national goal....

I am a Musalman and -am-proud of that fact. Islam's splendid traditions of thirteen hundred years are my inheritance. I am unwilling to lose even the smallest part of this inheritance. The teaching and history of Islam, its arts and letters and civilization are my wealth and my fortune. It is my duty to protect them.

As a Musalman I have a special interest in Islamic religion and culture, and I cannot tolerate any interference with them. But in addition to these sentiments, I have others also which the realities and conditions of my life have forced upon me. The spirit of Islam does not come in the way of these sentiments; it guides and helps me forward. I am proud of being an Indian. I am a part of the indivisible unity that is Indian nationality. I am indispensable to this noble edifice and without me this splendid structure of India is incomplete. I am an essential element which has gone to build India. I can never surrender this claim.

It was India's historic destiny that many human races and cultures and religions should flow to her, finding a home in her hospitable soil, and that many a caravan should find rest here. Even before the dawn of history, these caravans trekked into India and wave after wave of newcomers followed. This vast and fertile land gave welcome to all and took them to her bosom. One of the last of these carnavas, following the footsteps of its predecessors, was that of the followers of Islam. This came here and settled here for good. This led to a meeting of the culture-currents of two different races. Like the Ganga and Jumna, they

flowed for a while through separate courses, but nature's immutable law brought them together and joined them in a *sangam* [confluence]. This fusion was a notable event in history. Since then, destiny, in her own hidden way, began to fashion a new India in place of the old. We brought our treasures with us, and India too was full of the riches of her own precious heritage. We gave our wealth to her and she unlocked the doors of her own treasures to us. We gave her, what she needed most, the most precious of gifts from Islam's treasury, the message of democracy and human equality.

Full eleven centuries have passed by since then. Islam has now as great a claim on the soil of India as Hinduism. If Hinduism has been the religion of the people here for several thousands of years, Islam also has been their religion for a thousand years. Just as a Hindu can say with pride that he is an Indian and follows Hinduism, so also we can say with equal pride that we are Indians and follow Islam. I shall enlarge this orbit still further. The Indian Christian is equally entitled to say with pride that he is an Indian and is following a religion of India, namely Christianity.

Eleven hundred years of common history have enriched India with our common achievement. Our languages, our poetry, our literature, our culture, our art, our dress, our manners and customs, the innumerable happenings of our daily life, everything bears the stamp of our joint endeavor. There is indeed no aspect of our life which has escaped this stamp. Our languages were different, but we grew to use a common language; our manners and customs were dissimilar, but they acted and reacted on each other and thus produced a new synthesis. Our old dress may be seen only in ancient pictures of bygone days; no one wears it today.

This joint wealth is the heritage of our common nationality and we do not want to leave it and go back to the times when this joint life had not begun. If there are any Hindus amongst us who desire to bring back the Hindu life of a thousand years ago and more, they dream, and such dreams are vain fantasies. So also if there are any Muslims who wish to revive their past civilization and

culture, which they brought a thousand years ago from Iran and Central Asia, they dream also and the sooner they wake up the better. These are unnatural fancies which cannot take root in the soil of reality. I am one of those who believe that revival may be a necessity in a religion but in social matters it is a denial of progress.

This thousand years of our joint life has molded us into a common nationality. This cannot be done artificially. Nature does her fashioning through her hidden processes in the course of centuries. The cast has now been molded and destiny has set her seal upon it. Whether we like it or not, we have now become an Indian nation, united and indivisible. No fantasy or artificial scheming to separate and divide can break this unity. We must accept the logic of fact and history and engage ourselves in the fashioning of our future destiny.

I shall not take any more of your time. My address must end now. But before I do so, permit me to remind you that our success depends upon three factors: unity, discipline and full confidence in Mahatma Gandhi's leadership. The glorious past record of our movement was due to his great leadership, and it is only under his leadership that we can look forward to a future of successful achievement.

The time of our trial is upon us. We have already focused the world's attention. Let us endeavor to prove ourselves worthy.

15.4 Mohandas Gandhi

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869-1948), later known as the Mahatma, was born in Porbandar, Gujarat, the son of a Vaishnava family of merchants and small government officials. He went to school in Rajkot, receiving education mostly in the English medium. At age 18 he traveled to London to earn a law degree (after having taken triple vows not to touch meat, wine, or women). Having been admitted to the bar in 1891, he returned to India to start a legal practice, but had little success. On the invitation of a Muslim trading firm

Editor: If they do not take our money away become gentle, and give us responsible posts, would you still consider their presence to be harmful ?

Reader: That question is useless. It is similar to the question whether there is any harm in associating with a tiger if he changes his nature. Such a question is sheer waste of time. When a tiger changes his nature, Englishmen will change theirs. This is not possible, and to believe it to be possible is contrary to human experience.

Editor: Supposing we get self-government similar to what the Canadians and the South Africans have, will it be good *enough* ?

Reader: That question also is useless. We may get it when we have the same powers; we shall then hoist our own flag. As is Japan, so must India be. We must own our navy, our army, and we must have our own splendor, and then will India's voice ring through the world.

Editor: You have drawn the picture well. In effect it means this: that we want English rule without the Englishman. You want the tiger's nature, but not the tiger; that is to say, you would make India English. And when it becomes English, it will be called not Hindustan but *Englistan*. This is not the *swaraj* that I want.

Reader: I have placed before you my idea of *swaraj* as I think it should be. If the education we have received be of any use. if the works of Spencer, Mill and others be of any importance, and if the English Parliament be the Mother of Parliaments, I certainly think that we should copy the English people, and this to such an extent that, just as they do not allow others to obtain a footing in their country, so we should not allow them or others to obtain it in ours. What they have done in their own country has not been done in any other country. It is therefore, proper for us to import their institutions. But now I want to know your views.

Editor [Gandhi]: It is quite possible that we do not attach the same meaning to the term. You and I and all Indians are impatient to obtain *swaraj*, but we are certainly not decided as to what it is. To drive the English out of India is a thought heard from many mouths, but it does not seem that many have properly considered why it should be so. I must ask you a question. Do you think that it is necessary to drive away the English, if we get all we want?

Reader : I should ask of them only one thing, that is: 'Please leave our country'. If, after they have complied with this request, their withdrawal from India means that they are still in India, I should have no objection. Then we would understand that, in their language, the word 'gone' is equivalent to 'remained'.

Editor: Well then, let us suppose that the English have retired. What will you do then?

Reader: That question cannot be answered at this stage. The state after withdrawal will depend largely upon the manner of it. If, as you assume, they retire, it seems to me we shall still keep their constitution and shall carry on the government. If they simply retire for the asking, we should have an army, etc., ready at hand. We should, therefore, have no difficulty in carrying on the government.

Editor: You may think so; I do not. But I will not discuss the matter just now. I have to answer your question and that I can do well by asking you several questions: why do you want to drive away the English?

Reader : Because India has become impoverished by their government. They take away our money from year to year. The most important posts are reserved for themselves. We are kept in a state of slavery. They behave insolently towards us and disregard our feelings.

Editor: If they do not take our money away become gentle, and give us responsible posts, would you still consider their presence to be harmful ?

Reader: That question is useless. It is similar to the question whether there is any harm in associating with a tiger if he changes his nature. Such a question is sheer waste of time. When a tiger changes his nature, Englishmen will change theirs. This is not possible, and to believe it to be possible is contrary to human experience.

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Editor: There is need for patience. My views will develop of themselves in the course of this discourse. It is as difficult for me to understand the true nature of *swaraj* as it seems to you to be easy. I shall therefore, for the time being, content myself with endeavoring to show that what you call *swaraj* is not truly *swaraj*.

The Condition of England

Reader: Then, from your statement I deduce that the Government of England is not desirable and not worth copying by us.

Editor: Your deduction is justified. The condition of England at present is pitiable. I pray to God that India may never be in that plight. That which you consider to be the Mother of Parliaments is like a sterile woman and a prostitute. Both these are harsh terms, but exactly fit the case. That Parliament has not yet, of its own accord, done a single good thing. Hence I have compared it to a sterile woman. The natural condition of that Parliament is such that, without outside pressure, it can do nothing. It is like a prostitute because it is under the control of ministers who change from time to time. Today it is under Mr. Asquith, tomorrow it may be under Mr. Balfour.

Reader: You have said this sarcastically. The term 'sterile woman' is not applicable. The Parliament, being elected by the people, must work under public pressure. This is its quality.

Editor: You are mistaken. Let us examine it a little more closely. The best men are supposed to be elected by the people. The members serve without pay and, therefore, it must be assumed, only for the public weal. The electors are considered to be educated and therefore we should assume that they would not generally make mistakes in their choice. Such a Parliament should not need the spur of petitions or any other pressure. Its work should be so smooth that its effects would be more apparent day by day. But, as a matter of fact, it is generally acknowledged that the members are hypocritical and selfish. Each thinks of his

own little interest. It is fear that is the guiding motive. What is done today may be undone tomorrow. It is not possible to recall a single instance in which finality can be predicted for its work. When the greatest questions are debated, its members have been seen to stretch themselves and to doze. Sometimes the members talk away until the listeners are disgusted. Carlyle has called it the 'talking shop of the world'. Members vote for their party without a thought. Their so-called discipline binds them to it. If any member, by way of exception, gives an independent vote, he is considered a renegade. If the money and the time wasted by Parliament were entrusted to a few good men, the English nation would be occupying today a much higher platform. Parliament is simply a costly toy of the nation. These views are by no means peculiar to me. Some great English thinkers have expressed them. One of the members of that Parliament recently said that a true Christian could not become a member of it. Another said that it was a baby. And if it has remained a baby after an existence of seven-hundred years, when will it outgrow its babyhood ?

Reader: You have set me thinking; you do not expect me to accept at once all you say. You give me entirely novel views. I shall have to digest them. Will you now explain the epithet prostitute'?

Editor: That you cannot accept my views at once is only right. If you will read the literature on this subject, you will have some idea of it. Parliament is without a real master. Under the prime minister, its movement is not steady but it is buffeted about like a prostitute. The prime minister is more concerned about his power than about the welfare of Parliament. His energy is concentrated upon securing the success of his party. His care is not always that Parliament shall do right. Prime ministers are known to have made Parliament do things merely for party advantage. All this is worth thinking over.

Reader: Then you are really attacking the very men whom we have hitherto considered to be patriotic and honest ?

Editor: Yes, that is true; I can have nothing against prime ministers, but what I have seen leads me to think that they cannot be considered really patriotic. If they are to be considered honest because they do not take what are generally known as bribes, let, them be so considered, but they are open to subtler influences. In order to gain their ends, they certainly bribe people with honors. I do not hesitate to say that they have neither real honesty nor a living conscience.

Reader: As you express these views about parliament, I would like to hear you on the English people, so that I may have your view of their government.

Editor : To the English voters their newspaper is their Bible. They take their cue from their newspapers which are often dishonest. The same fact is differently interpreted by different newspapers, according to the party in whose interests they are edited. One newspaper would consider a great Englishman to be a paragon of honesty, another would consider him dishonest. What must be the condition of the people whose newspapers are of this type ?

Reader: You shall describe it.

Editor: These people change their views frequently. It is said that they change them every seven years. These views swing like the pendulum of a clock and are never steadfast. The people would follow a powerful orator or a man who gives them parties, receptions, etc. As are the people, so is their Parliament. They have certainly one quality very strongly developed. They will never allow their country to be lost. If any person were to cast an evil eye on it, they would pluck out his eyes. But that does not mean that the nation possesses every other virtue or that it should be imitated. If India copies England, it is my firm conviction that she will be ruined.

Reader: To what do you ascribe this state of England ?

Editor: It is not due to any peculiar fault of the English people, but the condition is due to modern civilization. It is a civilization only in name. Under it the nations of Europe are becoming degraded and ruined day-by-day.

Civilization

Reader : Now you will have to explain what you mean by civilization.

Editor: It is not a question of what I mean. Several English writers refuse to call that civilization which passes under that name. Many books have been written upon that subject. Societies have been formed to cure the nation of the evils of civilization. A great English writer has written a work called *Civilization: Its Cause and Cure*. Therein he has called it a disease.

Reader: Why do we not know this generally ?

Editor: The answer is very simple. We rarely find people arguing against themselves. Those who are intoxicated by modern civilization are not likely to write against it. Their care will be to find out facts and arguments in support of it, and this they do unconsciously, believes in his dream; he is undeceived only when he is awakened from his sleep. A man laboring under the bane of civilization is like a dreaming man. What we usually read are the works of defenders of modern civilization, which undoubtedly claims among its votaries very brilliant and even some very good men. Their writings hypnotize us. And so, one by one, we are drawn into the vortex.

Reader: This seems to be very plausible. Now will you tell me something of what you have read and thought of this civilization?

Editor: Let us first consider what state of things is described by the word 'civilization'. Its true test lies in the fact that people living in it make bodily welfare the object of life. We will take some examples. The people of Europe today live in better built houses than they did [one] hundred years ago. This is considered an emblem of civilization, and this is also a matter to promote bodily happiness. Formerly, they wore skins, and used spears as .their weapons. Now, they wear long trousers, and; for embellishing their bodies, they wear a variety of clothing, and, instead of spears, they carry with them revolvers containing five or more chambers. If people of a certain country, who have hitherto not been in the habit of

wearing much clothing, boots, etc., adopt European clothing, they are supposed to have become civilized out of savagery. Formerly, in Europe, people ploughed their lands mainly by manual labor. Now, one man can plough a vast tract by means of steam engines and can thus amass great wealth. This is called a sign of civilization. Formerly, only a few men wrote valuable books. Now, anybody writes and prints anything he likes and poisons people's minds:-Formerly, men traveled in wagons. Now, they fly through the air in trains at the rate of four hundred and more miles per day. This is considered the height of civilization. It has been stated that, as men progress, they shall be able to travel in airship and reach any part of the world in a few hours. Men will not need the use of their hands and feet. They will press a button, and they will have their clothing by their side. They will press another button, and they will have their newspaper. A third, and a motor car will be in waiting for them. They will have a variety of delicately dished up food. Everything will be done by machinery. Formerly, when people wanted to fight with one another, they measured between them their bodily strength; now it is possible to take away thousands of lives by one man working behind a gun from a hill. This is civilization.

Formerly, men worked in the open air only as much as they liked. Now thousands of workmen meet together and for the sake of maintenance work in factories or mines. Their condition is worse than that of beasts. They are obliged to work, at the risk- of their lives, at most dangerous occupations, for the sake of millionaires. Formerly, men were made slaves under physical compulsion. Now they are enslaved by temptation of money and of the luxuries that money can buy. There are now diseases of which people never dreamt before, and an army of doctors is engaged in finding out their cures, and so hospital~ have increased. This is a test of civilization. Formerly, special messengers were required and much expense was incurred in order to send letters; today, anyone can abuse his fellow by means of a letter for one penny. True, at the same cost, one can send one's thanks also. Formerly, people had two or three meals consisting of home-made bread and vegetables; now, they require something to eat every

two hours so that they have hardly leisure for anything else. What more need I say? All this you can ascertain from several authoritative books. These are all true tests of civilization. And if anyone speaks to the contrary, know that he is ignorant. This civilization takes note neither of morality nor of religion. Its votaries calmly state that their business is not to teach religion. Some even consider it to be a superstitious growth. Others put on the cloak of religion, and prate about morality. But, after twenty years' experience, I have come to the conclusion that immorality is often taught in the name of morality. Even a child can understand that in all I have described above there can be no inducement to morality. Civilization seeks to increase bodily comforts, and it fails miserably even in doing so.

This civilization is irreligion, and it has taken such a hold on the people in Europe that those who are in it appear to be half mad. They lack real physical strength or courage. They keep up their energy by intoxication. They can hardly be happy in solitude. Women, who should be the queens of households, wander in the streets or they slave away in factories. For the sake of a pittance, half a million women in England alone are laboring under trying circumstances in factories or similar institutions. This awful fact is one of the causes of the daily growing suffragette movement.

This civilization is such that one has only to be patient, and it will be self-destroyed. According to the teaching of Mahomed this would be considered a satanic Civilization. Hinduism calls it the Black Age. I cannot give you an adequate conception of it. It is eating into the vitals of the English nation. It must be shunned; Parliaments are really emblems of slavery. If you will sufficiently think over this, you will entertain the same opinion and cease to blame the English. They rather deserve our sympathy. They are a shrewd nation and I therefore believe that they 'will cast off the evil. They are enterprising and industrious, and their mode of thought is not inherently immoral. Neither are they bad at her. I therefore respect them. Civilization is not an incurable disease, but it should never be forgotten that the English people are at present afflicted by it.

Why was India Lost?

Reader: You have said much about Civilization-enough to make me ponder over it. I do not now know what I should adopt and what I should avoid from the nations of Europe, but one question comes to my lips immediately. If civilization is a disease and if it has attacked England, why has she been able to take India, and why is she able to retain it ?

Editor: Your question is not very difficult to answer, and we shall presently be able to examine the true nature of *swaraj*; for I am aware that I have still to answer that question. The English have not taken India; we have given it to them. They are not in India because of their strength, but because we keep them. Let us now see whether these propositions can be sustained. They came to our country originally for purposes of trade. Recall the Company Bahadur. Who made it Bahadur? They had not the slightest intention at the time of establishing a kingdom. Who assisted the company's officers? Who was tempted at the sight of their silver? Who bought their goods? History testifies that we did all this. In order to become rich all at once we welcomed the Company's officers with open arms. We assisted them. If I am in the habit of drinking *bhang* and a seller thereof sells it to me, am I to blame him or myself? By blaming the seller, shall I be able to avoid the habit? And, if a particular retailer is driven away will not another take his place? A true servant of India will have to go to the root of the matter. If an excess of food has caused me indigestion, I shall certainly not avoid it by blaming water. He is a true physician for the disease of India, you will have to find out its true cause.

Reader: You are right. Now I think you will not have to argue much with me to drive your conclusions home. I am impatient to know your further views. We are now on a most interesting topic. I shall, therefore, endeavor to follow your thought and stop you when I am in doubt.

Editor: I am afraid that, in spite of your enthusiasm, as we proceed further, we shall have differences of opinion. Nevertheless, I shall argue only

when you stop me. We have already seen that the English merchants were able to get *c* footing in India because *we* encouraged them. When our princes fought among themselves, they sought the assistance of Company Bahadur. That corporation was versed alike in commerce and war. It was unhampered by questions of morality. Its object was to increase its commerce or and to make money. It accepted our assistance, and increased the number of its warehouses. To protect the latter it employed an army which was utilized by us also. Is it not then useless to blame the English for what we did at that time? The Hindus and the Muslims were at daggers drawn. This, too, gave the Company its opportunity and thus we created the circumstances that gave the Company its control over India. Hence it is truer to say that we gave India to the English than that India was lost.

Reader: Will you now tell me how they are able to retain India ?

Editor: The causes that gave them India enable them to retain it. Some Englishmen state that they took and they hold India by the sword. Both these statements are wrong. The sword is entirely useless for holding India. We alone keep them. Napoleon is said to have described the English as a nation of shopkeepers. It is a fitting description. They hold whatever dominions they have for the sake of their commerce. Their army and their navy are intended to protect it. When the Transvaal offered no such attractions, the late Mr. Gladstone discovered that it was not right for the English to hold it. When it became a paying proposition, resistance led to war. Mr. Chamberlain soon discovered that England enjoyed a suzerainty over the Transvaal. It is related that someone asked the late President Kruger whether there was gold in the moon. He replied that it was highly unlikely because, if there were, the English would have annexed it. Many problems can be solved commerce; they please us by their subtle methods and get what they want from us. To blame them for this is to perpetuate their power, We further strengthen their hold by quarrelling amongst ourselves. If you accept the above statements, it is proved that the English entered India for the purposes of trade. They remain in it for the same purpose and we help them to do

so. Their arms and ammunition are perfectly useless. In this connection I remind you that it is the British flag which is waving in Japan and not the Japanese. The English have a treaty with Japan for the sake of their commerce, and you will see that if they can manage it their commerce will greatly expand in that country. They wish to convert the whole world into a vast market for their goods. That they cannot do so is true, but the blame will not be theirs. They will leave no stone unturned to reach the goal.

The Condition of India

Reader: I now understand why the English hold India. I should like to know your views about the condition of our country,

Editor: It is a sad condition. In thinking of it my eyes water and my throat gets parched. I have grave doubts whether I shall be able sufficiently to explain what is in my heart. It is my deliberate opinion that India is being ground down, not under the English heel, but under that of modern civilization. It is groaning under the monster's terrible weight. There is yet time to escape it, but every day makes it more and more difficult. Religion is dear to me and my first complaint is that India is becoming irreligious. Here I am not thinking of the Hindu or the Muslim or the Zoroastrian religion but of that religion which underlies all religions. We are turning away from God.

Reader: How so ?

Editor: There is a charge laid against us that we are a lazy people and that Europeans are industrious and enterprising. We have accepted the charge and we therefore wish to change our condition. Hinduism, Islam, Zoroastrianism, Christianity and all other religions teach that we should remain passive about worldly pursuits and active about godly pursuits, that we should set a limit to our worldly ambition and that our religious ambition should be illimitable. Our activity should be directed into the latter channel.

Reader : You seem to be encouraging religious charlatanism. Many a cheat has, by talking in a similar strain, led the people astray.

Editor: You are bringing an unlawful charge against religion. Humbug there undoubtedly is about all religions. Where there is light, there is also shadow. I am prepared to maintain that humbuds in worldly matters are far worse than the humbuds in religion. The humbug of civilization that I am endeavoring to show to you is not to be found in religion.

Reader: How can you say that? In the name of religion Hindus and Muslims fought against one another. For the same cause Christians fought Christians. Thousands of innocent men have been murdered, thousands have been burned and tortured in its name. Surely, this is much worse than any civilization.

Editor: I certainly submit that the above hardships are far more bearable than those of civilization. Everybody understands that the cruelties you have named are not part of religion although they have been practiced in its name; therefore there is no aftermath to these cruelties. They will always happen so long as there are to be found ignorant and credulous people. But there is no end to the victims destroyed in the fire of civilization. Its deadly effect is that people come under its scorching flames believing it to be all good, they become utterly irreligious and, in reality, derive little advantage from the world. Civilization is like a mouse gnawing while it is soothing us. When its full effect is realized, we shall see that religious superstition is harmless compared to that of modern civilization. I am not pleading for a continuance of religious superstitions. We shall certainly fight them tooth and nail, but we can never do so by disregarding religion. We can only do so by appreciating and conserving the latter.

Reader: Then you will contend that the Pax *Britannica* is a useless encumbrance ?

Editor: You may see peace if you like; I see none.

Reader: You make light of the terror that the Thugs, the Pindaris and the Bhils were to the country.

Editor: If you give the matter some thought, you will see that the terror was by no means such a mighty thing. If it had been a very substantial thing, the other people would have died away before the English advent. Moreover, the present peace is only nominal, for by it we have become emasculated and cowardly. We are not to assume that the English have changed the nature of the Pindaris and the Bhils. It is, therefore better to suffer the Pindari peril than that someone else should protect us from it and thus render us effeminate. I should prefer to be killed by the arrow of a Bhil than to seek unmanly protection. India without such protection was an India full of valor. Macaulay betrayed gross ignorance when he libeled Indians as being practically cowards. They never merited the charge. Cowards living in a country inhabited by hardy mountaineers and infested by wolves and tigers must surely find an early grave. Have you ever visited our fields ? I assure you that our agriculturists sleep fearlessly on their farms even today; but the English and you and I would hesitate to sleep where they sleep. Strength lies in absence of fear, not in the quantity of flesh and muscle we may have on our bodies. Moreover, I must remind you who desire Home Rule that, after all, the Bhils, the Pindaris, and the Thugs are our own countrymen. To conquer them is your and my work. So long as we fear our own brethren, we are unfit to reach the goal.

MEDIUM OF INSTRUCTION

The Mother Tongue

I am hoping that this University (Banaras Hindu University) will see to it that the youths who come to it will receive their instruction through the medium of their vernaculars. Our language is the reflection of ourselves, and if you tell me that our languages are too poor to express the best thought, then I say that

the sooner we are wiped out of existence the better for us. Is there a man who dreams that English can ever become the national language of India? (Cries of 'never'). Why this handicap on the nation? Just consider for one moment what an unequal race our lads have to run with every English lad. I had the privilege of a close conversation with some Poona professors. They assured me that every Indian youth, because he reached his knowledge through the, English language, lost at least six precious years of life. Multiply that by the number of students and colleges and find out for your selves how many thousand years have been lost to the nation.

The charge against us is, that we have no initiative. How can we have any if we are to devote the precious years of our life to the mastery of a foreign tongue? We fail in this attempt also.... I have heard it said that after all it is English-educated India which is leading and which is doing everything for the nation. It would be monstrous if it were otherwise. The only education we receive is" English education. Surely we must show something for it. But suppose that we had been receiving during the past fifty years education through our vernaculars, what should we have today? We should have today a free India, we should have our educated men, not as if they were foreigners in their own land, but speaking to the heart of the nation; they would -be working amongst the poorest of the poor, and whatever they would have gained during the past fifty years would be a heritage for the nation (Applause). Today even our wives are not sharers in our best thought.

The Foreign Medium

The foreign medium has caused brain fag, put an undue strain upon the nerves of our children, made them crammers and imitators, unfitted them for original work and thought, and disabled them for filtrating their learning to the family or the masses. The foreign medium has made our children practically foreigners in their own land. It is the greatest tragedy of the existing system. The foreign medium has prevented the growth of our vernaculars. If I had the powers of a despot, I would today stop the tuition of our boys and girls through a foreign

medium, and require all the teachers and professors on pain of dismissal to introduce the change forthwith. I would not wait for the preparation of textbooks. They will follow the change. It is an evil that needs a summary remedy.

But for the fact that the only higher education, the only education worth the name has been received by us through the English medium, there would be no need to prove such a self-evident proposition that the youth of a nation to remain a nation must receive all instruction including the highest in its own vernacular or vernaculars. Surely, it is a self-demonstrated proposition that the youth of a nation cannot keep or establish a living contact with the masses unless their knowledge is received and assimilated through a medium understood by the people. Who can calculate impoverish our own. We can never grow on foreign victuals. I want the nation to have the treasures contained in that language, and for that matter the other languages of the world, through its own vernaculars. I do not need to learn Bengali in order to know the beauties of Rabindranath's matchless productions. I get them thorough good translations. Gujarati boys and girls do not need to learn Russian to appreciate Tolstoy's short stories. They learn them through good translations. It is the boast of Englishmen that the best of the world's literary output is in the hands of that nation in simple English inside of a week of its publication. Why need I learn English to get at the best of what Shakespeare and Milton thought and wrote ?...

The medium of instruction should be altered at once and at any cost, the provincial languages being given their rightful place. I would prefer temporary chaos in higher education to the criminal waste that is daily accumulating. In order to enhance the status and the market value of the provincial languages, I would have the language of the law courts to be the language of the province where the court is situated. The proceedings of the provincial legislatures must be in the language, or even the languages of the province where a province has more than one language within its borders.

The Message of India

I was wondering as to what I was to say to you. I wanted to collect my thoughts but, let me confess to you, I had no time. Yet I had promised yesterday that I would try to say a few words ... You, friends, have not seen the real India and you are not meeting in conference in the midst of real India. Delhi, Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Lahore-all these are big cities and are, therefore, influenced by the West.

I then thought of a story. It was in French and was translated for me by an Anglo-French philosopher. He was an unselfish man. He befriended me without having known me because he always sided with the minorities. I was not then in my own country. I was not only in a hopeless minority but in a despised minority, if the Europeans in South Africa will forgive me for saying so. I was a coolie lawyer. At that time we had no coolie doctors, no coolie lawyers. I was the first in the field.

You know perhaps what is meant by the word coolie.

This friend-his mother was a French woman and his father an Englishman-said: 'I want to translate for you a French story. There were three scientists who went out from France in search of truth. They went to different parts of Asia. One of them found his way to India. He began to search. He went to the so-called cities of those times – naturally this way before British occupation, before even the Moghul period. He saw the so-called high caste people, men and women, and he felt at a loss. Finally, he went to a humble cottage in a humble village. That was the cottage of a *bhangi* and there he found the truth that he was in search of.'

If you really want to see India at its best, you have to find it in the humble *bhangi* homes of such villages. There are 7,000,000 of such villages and 38 crores of people inhabit them.

If some of you see the villages, you will not be fascinated by the sight. You will have to scratch below the dung heaps. I do not say that they ever were heavenly places. Today, they are really dung heaps. They were not like that before. What I say is not from history but from what I have seen myself. I have traveled from one end of India to the other and have seen the miserable specimen of humanity with lusterless eyes. They are India. In these humble cottages, in the midst of these dung heaps, are to be found the humble *bhangis* in whom you find the concentrated essence of wisdom....

[Stating that wisdom had come to the West from the East, Gandhi added :]

The first of these wise men was Zoroaster. He belonged to the East. He was followed by the Buddha who belonged to the East to India. Who followed the Buddha? Jesus, who came from the East. Before Jesus was Moses who belonged to Palestine though he was born in Egypt. After Jesus came Mohammed. I omit any reference to Krishna and Rama and other lights. I do not call them lesser lights but they are less known to the literary world. All the same I do not know of a single person in the world to match these men of Asia. And then what happened? Christianity became disfigured when it went to the West. I am sorry to have to say that. I would not talk any further....

What I want you to understand is the message of Asia. It is not to be learned through the Western spectacles or by imitating the bomb. If you want to give a message to the West, it must be message of love and the message of truth. I want you to go away with the thought that Asia has to conquer the West through we and truth. I do not merely to appeal to your heads. I want to capture of Asia.

**CRITICAL ENGAGEMENT WITH
MODERNITY : PARTHA CHATTERJEE**

Structure**16.1 Introduction****16.2 Partha Chatterjee****16.3 Conceptual Framework****16.4 Sum Up****16.1 Introduction**

With the changes in India over the past 25 years, there is now a new dynamic logic that ties the operations of “political society” (comprising the peasantry, artisans and petty producers in the informal sector) with the hegemonic role of the bourgeoisie in “civil society”. This logic is provided by the requirement of reversing the effects of primitive accumulation of capital with activities like anti-poverty programmes. This is a necessary political condition for the continued rapid growth of corporate capital. The state, with its mechanisms of electoral democracy, becomes the field for the political negotiation of demands for the transfer of resources, through fiscal and other means, from the accumulation economy to programmes aimed at providing the livelihood needs of the poor. Electoral democracy makes it unacceptable for the government to leave the marginalised groups without the means of labour and to fend for themselves, since this carries the risk of turning them into the “dangerous classes”.

16.2 Partha Chatterjee

The first volume of *Subaltern Studies* was published in 1982. I was part of the editorial group 25 years ago that launched, under the leadership of Ranajit Guha, this critical engagement with Indian modernity from the standpoint of the subaltern classes, especially the peasantry. In the quarter of a century that has passed since then, there has been, a fundamental change in the situation prevailing in postcolonial India. The new conditions under which global flows of capital, commodities, information and people are now regulated – a complex set of phenomena generally clubbed under the category of globalisation – have created both new opportunities and new obstacles for the Indian ruling classes. The old idea of a third world, sharing a common history of colonial oppression and backwardness, is no longer as persuasive as it was in the 1960s. The trajectory of economic growth taken by the countries of Asia has diverged radically from that of most African countries. The phenomenal growth of China and India in recent years, involving two of the most populous agrarian countries of the world, has set in motion a process of social change that, in its scale and speed, is unprecedented in human history.

Peasant Society Today

It has become important to revisit the question of the basic structures of power in Indian society, especially the position of the peasantry. This is not because I think that the advance of capitalist industrial growth is inevitably breaking down peasant communities and turning peasants into proletarian workers, as has been predicted innumerable times in the last century and a half. On the contrary, I will argue that the forms of capitalist industrial growth now under way in India will make room for the preservation of the peasantry, but under completely altered conditions. The analysis of these emergent forms of postcolonial capitalism in India under conditions of electoral democracy requires new conceptual work.

Let me begin by referring to the recent incidents of violent agitation in different regions of India, especially in West Bengal and Orissa, against the acquisition of agricultural land for industry. There have also been agitations in several states against

the entry of corporate capital into the retail market for food and vegetables. The most talked about incidents occurred in Nandigram in West Bengal, on which much has been written.

If these incidents had taken place 25 years ago, we would have seen in them the classic signs of peasant insurgency. Here were the long familiar features of a peasantry, tied to the land and small-scale agriculture, united by the cultural and moral bonds of a local rural community, resisting the agents of an external state and of city-based commercial institutions by using both peaceful and violent means. Our analysis then could have drawn on a long tradition of anthropological studies of peasant societies, focusing on the characteristic forms of dependence of peasant economies on external institutions such as the state and dominant classes such as landlords, moneylenders and traders, but also of the forms of autonomy of peasant cultures based on the solidarity of a local moral community.

We could have also linked our discussion to a long tradition of political debates over the historical role of the peasantry under conditions of capitalist growth, beginning with the Marxist analysis in western Europe of the inevitable dissolution of the peasantry as a result of the process of primitive accumulation of capital, Lenin's debates in Russia with the Narodniks, Mao Zedong's analysis of the role of the peasantry in the Chinese Revolution, and the continuing debates over Gandhi's vision of a free India where a mobilised peasantry in the villages would successfully resist the spread of industrial capitalism and the violence of the modern state. Moreover, using the insights drawn from Antonio Gramsci's writings, we could have talked about the contradictory consciousness of the peasantry in which it was both dominated by the forms of the elite culture of the ruling classes and, at the same time, resistant to them. Twenty-five years ago, we would have seen these rural agitations in terms of the analysis provided by Ranajit Guha in his classic 1983 work *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India*.

I believe that analysis would be inappropriate today. I say this for the following reasons. First, the spread of governmental technologies in India in the last three

decades, as a result of the deepening reach of the developmental state under conditions of electoral democracy, has meant that the state is no longer an external entity to the peasant community. Governmental agencies distributing education, health services, food, roadways, water, electricity, agricultural technology, emergency relief and dozens of other welfare services have penetrated deep into the interior of everyday peasant life. Not only are peasants dependent on state agencies for these services, they have also acquired considerable skill, albeit to a different degree in different regions, in manipulating and pressurising these agencies to deliver these benefits. Institutions of the state, or at least governmental agencies (whether state or non-state), have become internal aspects of the peasant community.

Second, the reforms since the 1950s in the structure of agrarian property, even though gradual and piecemeal, have meant that except in isolated areas, for the first time in centuries, small peasants possessing land no longer directly confront an exploiting class within the village, as under feudal or semi-feudal conditions. This has had consequences that are completely new for the range of strategies of peasant politics.

Third, since the tax on land or agricultural produce is no longer a significant source of revenue for the government, as in colonial or pre-colonial times, the relation of the state to the peasantry is no longer directly extractive, as it often was in the past.

Fourth, with the rapid growth of cities and industrial regions, the possibility of peasants making a shift to urban and nonagricultural occupations is no longer a function of their pauperisation and forcible separation from the land, but is often a voluntary choice, shaped by the perception of new opportunities and new desires.

Fifth, with the spread of school education and widespread exposure to modern communications media such as the cinema, television and advertising, there is a strong and widespread desire among younger members, both male and female, of peasant families not to live the life of a peasant in the village and instead to move to the town or the city, with all its hardships and uncertainties, because of its lure of anonymity and upward mobility. This is particularly significant for India where the life of poor

peasants in rural society is marked not only by the disadvantage of class but also by the discriminations of caste, compared to which the sheer anonymity of life in the city is often seen as liberating. For agricultural labourers, of whom vast numbers are from the dalit communities, the desired future is to move out of the traditional servitude of rural labour into urban non-agricultural occupations.

16.3 A New Conceptual Framework

I may have emphasised the novelty of the present situation too sharply; in actual fact, the changes have undoubtedly come more gradually over time. But I do believe that the novelty needs to be stressed at this time in order to ask: how do these new features of peasant life affect our received theories of the place of the peasantry in postcolonial India? Kalyan Sanyal, an economist teaching in Kolkata, has attempted a fundamental revision of these theories in his recent (2007) book *Rethinking Capitalist Development*. In the following discussion, I will use some of his formulations in order to present my own arguments on this subject.

The key concept in Sanyal's analysis is the primitive accumulation of capital – sometimes called primary or original accumulation of capital. Like Sanyal, I too prefer to use this term in Marx's sense to mean the dissociation of the labourer from the means of labour. There is no doubt that this is the key historical process that brings peasant societies into crisis with the rise of capitalist production. Marx's analysis in the last chapters of volume one of *Capital* shows that the emergence of modern capitalist industrial production is invariably associated with the parallel process of the loss of the means of production on the part of primary producers such as peasants and artisans. The unity of labour with the means of labour, which is the basis of most pre-capitalist modes of production, is destroyed and a mass of labourers emerge who do not any more possess the means of production. Needless to say, the unity of labour with the means of labour is the conceptual counterpart in political economy of the organic unity of most pre-capitalist rural societies by virtue of which peasants and rural artisans are said to live in close bonds of solidarity in a local rural community. This is the familiar anthropological description of peasant societies as well as the source of inspiration for many romantic writers and artists portraying rural life. This is also the

unity that is destroyed in the process of primitive accumulation of capital, throwing peasant societies into crisis.

The analysis of this crisis has produced, as I have already indicated, a variety of historical narratives ranging from the inevitable dissolution of peasant societies to slogans of worker-peasant unity in the building of a future socialist society. Despite their differences, the common feature in all these narratives is the idea of transition. Peasants and peasant societies under conditions of capitalist development are always in a state of transition – whether from feudalism to capitalism or from pre-capitalist backwardness to socialist modernity.

A central argument made by Sanyal in his book is that under present conditions of postcolonial development within a globalised economy, the narrative of transition is no longer valid. That is to say, although capitalist growth in a postcolonial society such as India is inevitably accompanied by the primitive accumulation of capital, the social changes that are brought about cannot be understood as a transition. How is that possible?

The explanation has to do with the transformations in the last two decades in the globally dispersed understanding about the minimum functions as well as the available technologies of government. There is a growing sense now that certain basic conditions of life must be provided to people everywhere and that if the national or local governments do not provide them, someone else must, whether it is other states or international agencies or non-governmental organisations. Thus, while there is a dominant discourse about the importance of growth, which in recent times has come to mean almost exclusively capitalist growth, it is, at the same time, considered unacceptable that those who are dispossessed of their means of labour because of the primitive accumulation of capital should have no means of subsistence. This produces, says Sanyal, a curious process in which, on the one side, primary producers such as peasants, craftspeople and petty manufacturers lose their land and other means of production, but, on the other, are also provided by governmental agencies

with the conditions for meeting their basic needs of livelihood. There is, says Sanyal, primitive accumulation as well as a parallel process of the reversal of the effects of primitive accumulation.

Examples of Processes

It would be useful to illustrate this process with some examples. Historically, the process of industrialisation in all agrarian countries has meant the eviction of peasants from the land, either because the land was taken over for urban or industrial development or because the peasant no longer had the means to cultivate the land. Market forces were usually strong enough to force peasants to give up the land, but often direct coercion was used by means of the legal and fiscal powers of the state. From colonial times, government authorities in India have used the right of eminent domain to acquire lands to be used for “public purposes”, offering only a token compensation, if any.¹ The idea that peasants losing land must be resettled somewhere else and rehabilitated into a new livelihood was rarely acknowledged. Historically, it has been said that the opportunities of migration of the surplus population from Europe to the settler colonies in the Americas and elsewhere made it possible to politically manage the consequences of primitive accumulation in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries. No such opportunities exist today for India. More importantly, the technological conditions of early industrialisation which created the demand for a substantial mass of industrial labour have long passed. Capitalist growth today is far more capital-intensive and technology-dependent than it was even some decades ago. Large sections of peasants who are today the victims of the primitive accumulation of capital are completely unlikely to be absorbed into the new capitalist sectors of growth. Therefore, without a specific government policy of resettlement, the peasants losing their land face the possibility of the complete loss of their means of livelihood. Under present globally prevailing normative ideas, this is considered unacceptable. Hence, the old-fashioned methods of putting down peasant resistance by armed repression have little chance of gaining legitimacy. The result is the widespread demand today for the rehabilitation of displaced people who lose their means of subsistence because of industrial and urban development. It is not, says Sanyal, as though primitive accumulation is halted or even slowed down, for primitive accumulation is the inevitable companion to capitalist growth. Rather,

governmental agencies have to find the resources to, as it were, reverse the consequences of primitive accumulation by providing alternative means of livelihood to those who have lost them.

We know that it is not uncommon for developmental states to protect certain sectors of production that are currently the domain of peasants, artisans and small manufacturers against competition from large corporate firms. But this may be interpreted as an attempt to forestall primitive accumulation itself by preventing corporate capital from entering into areas such as food crop or vegetable production or handicraft manufacture. However, there are many examples in many countries, including India, of governments and non-government agencies offering easy loans to enable those without the means of sustenance to find some gainful employment. Such loans are often advanced without serious concern for profitability or the prospect of the loan being repaid, since the money advanced here is not driven by the motive of further accumulation of capital but rather by that of providing the livelihood needs of the debtors – that is to say, by the motive of reversal of the effects of primitive accumulation. In recent years, these efforts have acquired the status of a globally circulating technology of poverty management: a notable instance is the microcredit movement initiated by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and its founder, the Nobel Prize winner Mohammed Yunus. Most of us are familiar now with stories of peasant women in rural Bangladesh forming groups to take loans from the Grameen Bank to undertake small activities to supplement their livelihood and putting pressure on one another to repay the loan so that they can qualify for another round of credit. Similar activities have been introduced quite extensively in India in recent years.

Finally, as in other countries, government agencies in India provide some direct benefits to people who, because of poverty or other reasons, are unable to meet their basic consumption needs. This could be in the form of special poverty-removal programmes, or schemes of guaranteed employment in public works, or even direct delivery of subsidised or free food. Thus, there are programmes of supplying subsidised foodgrains to those designated as “below the poverty line”, guaranteed employment

Twentyfive years ago, the structure of state power in India was usually described in terms of a coalition of dominant class interests.

Pranab Bardhan (1984) identified the capitalists, the rich farmers and the bureaucracy as the three dominant classes, competing and aligning with one another within a political space supervised by a relatively autonomous state. Achin Vanaik (1990) also endorsed the dominant coalition model, emphasising in particular the relative political strength of the agrarian bourgeoisie which, he stressed, was far greater than its economic importance. He also insisted that even though India had never had a classical bourgeois revolution, its political system was nevertheless a bourgeois democracy that enjoyed a considerable degree of legitimacy not only with the dominant classes but also with the mass of the people. Several scholars writing in the 1980s, such as for instance, Ashutosh Varshney (1995) and Lloyd and Rudolph (1987), emphasised the growing political clout of the rich farmers or agrarian capitalists within the dominant coalition.

The dominant class coalition model was given a robust theoretical shape in a classic essay by Sudipta Kaviraj (1989) in which, by using Antonio Gramsci's idea of the "passive revolution" as a blocked dialectic, he was able to ascribe to the process of class domination in postcolonial India its own dynamic. Power had to be shared between the dominant classes because no one class had the ability to exercise hegemony on its own. But "sharing" was a process of ceaseless push and pull, with one class gaining a relative ascendancy at one point, only to lose it at another. Kaviraj provided us with a synoptic political history of the relative dominance and decline of the industrial capitalists, the rural elites and the bureaucratic-managerial elite within the framework of the passive revolution of capital. In my early work, I too adopted the idea of the passive revolution of capital in my account of the emergence of the postcolonial state in India [Chatterjee 1986, 1998 and Chatterjee and Malik 1975].

The characteristic features of the passive revolution in India were the relative autonomy of the state as a whole from the bourgeoisie and the landed elites; the supervision of the state by an elected political leadership, a permanent bureaucracy

and an independent judiciary; the negotiation of class interests through a multi-party electoral system; a protectionist regime discouraging the entry of foreign capital and promoting import substitution; the leading role of the state sector in heavy industry, infrastructure, transport, telecommunications; mining, banking and insurance; state control over the private manufacturing sector through a regime of licensing; and the relatively greater influence of industrial capitalists over the central government and that of the landed elites on the state governments. Passive revolution was a form that was marked by its difference from classical bourgeois democracy. But to the extent that capitalist democracy as established in western Europe or north America served as the normative standard of bourgeois revolution, discussions of passive revolution in India carried with them the sense of a transitional system – from pre-colonial and colonial regimes to some yet-to-be-defined authentic modernity. The changes introduced since the 1990s have, I believe, transformed this framework of class dominance. The crucial difference now is the dismantling of the licence regime, greater entry of foreign capital and foreign consumer goods; and the opening up of sectors such as telecommunications, transport, infrastructure, mining, banking, insurance, etc, to private capital. This has led to a change in the very composition of the capitalist class. Instead of the earlier dominance of a few “monopoly” houses drawn from traditional merchant backgrounds and protected by the licence and import substitution regime, there are now many more entrants into the capitalist class at all levels and much greater mobility within its formation. Unlike the earlier fear of foreign competition, there appears to be much greater confidence among Indian capitalists to make use of the opportunities opened up by global flows of capital, goods and services, including, in recent times, significant exports of capital. The most dramatic event has been the rise of the Indian information technology industry. But domestic manufacturing and services have also received a major spurt, leading to annual growth rates of 8 or 9 per cent for the economy as a whole in the last few years. There have been several political changes as a result. Let me list a few that are relevant for our present discussion. First, there is a distinct ascendancy in the relative power of the corporate capitalist class as compared to the landed elites. The political means by which this recent dominance has been achieved needs to be investigated more carefully, because

it was not achieved through the mechanism of electoral mobilisation (which used to be the source of the political power of the landed elites). Second, the dismantling of the licence regime has opened up a new field of competition between state governments to woo capitalist investment, both domestic and foreign. This has resulted in the involvement of state-level political parties and leaders with the interests of national and international corporate capital in unprecedented ways. Third, although the state continues to be the most important mediating apparatus in negotiating between conflicting class interests, the autonomy of the state in relation to the dominant classes appears to have been redefined. Crucially, the earlier role of the bureaucratic-managerial class, or more generally of the urban middle classes, in leading and operating, both socially and ideologically, the autonomous interventionist activities of the developmental state has significantly weakened. There is a strong ideological tendency among the urban middle classes today to view the state apparatus as ridden with corruption, inefficiency and populist political venality and a much greater social acceptance of the professionalism and commitment to growth and efficiency of the corporate capitalist sector. The urban middle class, which once played such a crucial role in producing and running the autonomous developmental state of the passive revolution, appears now to have largely come under the moral-political sway of the bourgeoisie. It would be a mistake, however, to think that the result is a convergence of the Indian political system with the classical models of capitalist democracy. The critical difference, as I have pointed out elsewhere, has been produced by a split in the field of the political between a domain of properly constituted civil society and a more ill-defined and contingently activated domain of political society [Chatterjee 2004]. Civil society in India today, peopled largely by the urban middle classes, is the sphere that seeks to be congruent with the normative models of bourgeois civil society and represents the domain of capitalist hegemony. If this were the only relevant political domain, then India today would probably be indistinguishable from other western capitalist democracies. But there is the other domain of what I have called political society which includes large sections of the rural population and the urban poor. These people do, of course, have the formal status of citizens and can exercise

their franchise as an instrument of political bargaining. But they do not relate to the organs of the state in the same way that the middle classes do, nor do governmental agencies treat them as proper citizens belonging to civil society. Those in political society make their claims on government, and in turn are governed, not within the framework of stable constitutionally defined rights and laws, but rather through temporary, contextual and unstable arrangements arrived at through direct political negotiations. The latter domain, which represents the vast bulk of democratic politics in India, is not under the moral-political leadership of the capitalist class. Hence, my argument is that the framework of passive revolution is still valid for India. But its structure and dynamic have undergone a change. The capitalist class has come to acquire a position of moral-political hegemony over civil society, consisting principally of the urban middle classes. It exercises its considerable influence over both the central and the state governments not through electoral mobilisation of political parties and movements but largely through the bureaucratic-managerial class, the increasingly influential print and visual media, and the judiciary and other independent regulatory bodies. The dominance of the capitalist class within the state structure as a whole can be inferred from the virtual consensus among all major political parties about the priorities of rapid economic growth led by private investment, both domestic and foreign. It is striking that even the CPI(M) in West Bengal, and slightly more ambiguously in Kerala, have, in practice if not in theory, joined this consensus. This means that as far as the party system is concerned, it does not matter which particular combination of parties comes to power at the centre or even in most of the states; state support for rapid economic growth is guaranteed to continue. This is evidence of the current success of the passive revolution. However, the practices of the state also include the large range of governmental activities in political society. Here there are locally dominant interests, such as those of landed elites, small producers and local traders, who are able to exercise political influence through their powers of electoral mobilisation. In the old understanding of the passive revolution, these interests would have been seen as potentially opposed to those of the industrial bourgeoisie; the conflicts would have been temporarily resolved through a compromise worked out within the party system and the autonomous apparatus of the state. Now, I believe,

there is a new dynamic logic that ties the operations of political society with the hegemonic role of the bourgeoisie in civil society and its dominance over the state structure as a whole. This logic is supplied by the requirement, explained earlier, of reversing the effects of primitive accumulation of capital. To describe how this logic serves to integrate civil and political society into a new structure of the passive revolution, let me return to the subject of the peasantry.

Management of Non-Corporate Capital

The integration with the market has meant that large sections of what used to be called the subsistence economy, which was once the classic description of small peasant agriculture, have now come fully under the sway of capital. This is a key development that must crucially affect our understanding of peasant society in India today. There is now a degree of connectedness between peasant cultivation, trade and credit networks in agricultural commodities, transport networks, petty manufacturing and services in rural markets and small towns, etc, that makes it necessary for us to categorise all of them as part of a single, but stratified, complex. A common description of this is the unorganised or informal sector. Usually, a unit belonging to the informal sector is identified in terms of the small size of the enterprise, the small number of labourers employed, or the relatively unregulated nature of the business. In terms of the analytical framework I have presented here, I will propose a distinction between the formal and the informal sectors of today's economy in terms of a difference between corporate and noncorporate forms of capital.

My argument is that the characteristics I have described of peasant societies today are best understood as the marks of non-corporate capital. To the extent that peasant production is deeply embedded within market structures, investments and returns are conditioned by forces emanating from the operations of capital. In this sense, peasant production shares many connections with informal units in manufacturing, trade and services operating in rural markets, small towns and even in large cities. We can draw many refined distinctions between corporate and non-corporate forms of capital. But the key distinction I wish to emphasise is the following.

The fundamental logic that underlies the operations of corporate capital is further accumulation of capital, usually signified by the maximisation of profit. For noncorporate organisations of capital, while profit is not irrelevant, it is dominated by another logic – that of providing the livelihood needs of those working in the units. This difference is crucial for the understanding of the so-called informal economy and, by extension, as I will argue, of peasant society. Let me illustrate with a couple of familiar examples from the non-agricultural informal sector and then return to the subject of peasants. Most of us are familiar with the phenomenon of street vendors in Indian cities. They occupy street space, usually violating municipal laws; they often erect permanent stalls, use municipal services such as water and electricity, and do not pay taxes. To carry on their trade under these conditions, they usually organise themselves into associations to deal with the municipal authorities, the police, credit agencies such as banks and corporate firms that manufacture and distribute the commodities they sell on the streets. These associations are often large and the volume of business they encompass can be quite considerable. Obviously, operating within a public and anonymous market situation, the vendors are subject to the standard conditions of profitability of their businesses. But to ensure that everyone is able to meet their livelihood needs, the association will usually try to limit the number of vendors who can operate in a given area and prevent the entry of newcomers. On the other hand, there are many examples where, if the businesses are doing particularly well, the vendors do not, like corporate capitalists, continue to accumulate on an expanded scale, but rather agree to extend their membership and allow new entrants. To cite another example, in most cities and towns of India, the transport system depends heavily on private operators who run buses and autorickshaws.

Here too there is frequent violation of regulations such as licences, safety standards and pollution norms – violations that allow these units to survive economically. Although most operators own only one or two vehicles each, they form associations to negotiate with transport authorities and the police over fares and routes, and control the frequency of services and entry of new operators to ensure that a minimum income, and not much more than a minimum income, is guaranteed to all. In my book *The Politics of the Governed*, I have described the form of governmental regulation of

population groups such as street vendors, illegal squatters and others, whose habitation or livelihood verge on the margins of legality, as political society. In political society, I have argued, people are not regarded by the state as proper citizens possessing rights and belonging to the properly constituted civil society. Rather, they are seen to belong to particular population groups, with specific empirically established and statistically described characteristics, which are targets of particular governmental policies. Since dealing with many of these groups imply the tacit acknowledgement of various illegal practices, governmental agencies will often treat such cases as exceptions, justified by very specific and special circumstances, so that the structure of general rules and principles is not compromised. Thus, illegal squatters may be given water supply or electricity connections but on exceptional grounds so as not to club them with regular customers having secure legal title to their property, or street vendors may be allowed to trade under specific conditions that distinguish them from regular shops and businesses which comply with the laws and pay taxes. All of this makes the claims of people in political society a matter of constant political negotiation and the results are never secure or permanent. Their entitlements, even when recognised, never quite become rights. To connect the question of political society with my earlier discussion on the process of primitive accumulation of capital, I now wish to advance the following proposition: Civil society is where corporate capital is hegemonic, whereas political society is the space of management of non-corporate capital. I have argued above that since the 1990s, corporate capital, and along with it the class of corporate capitalists, have achieved a hegemonic position over civil society in India. This means that the logic of accumulation, expressed at this time in the demand that national economic growth be maintained at a very high rate and that the requirements of corporate capital be given priority, holds sway over civil society – that is to say, over the urban middle classes. It also means that the educational, professional and social aspirations of the middle classes have become tied with the fortunes of corporate capital. There is now a powerful tendency to insist on the legal rights of proper citizens, to impose civic order in public places and institutions and to

treat the messy world of the informal sector and political society with a degree of intolerance. A vague but powerful feeling seems to prevail among the urban middle classes that rapid growth will solve all problems of poverty and unequal opportunities.

Organisation of Informal Sector

The informal sector, which does not have a corporate structure and does not function principally according to the logic of accumulation, does not, however, lack organisation. As I have indicated in my examples, those who function in the informal sector often have large, and in many cases quite powerful and effective, organisations. They need to organise precisely to function in the modern market and governmental spaces. Traditional organisations of peasant and artisan societies are not adequate for the task. I believe this organisation is as much of a political activity as it is an economic one. Given the logic of non-corporate capital that I have described above, the function of these organisations is precisely to successfully operate within the rules of the market and of governmental regulations in order to ensure the livelihood needs of its members. Most of those who provide leadership in organising people, both owners and workers, operating in the informal sector are actually or potentially political leaders. Many such leaders are prominent local politicians and many such organisations are directly or indirectly affiliated to political parties. Thus, it is not incorrect to say that the management of non-corporate capital under such conditions is a political function that is carried out by political leaders. The existence and survival of the vast assemblage of so-called informal units of production in India today, including peasant production, is directly dependent on the successful operation of certain political functions. That is what is facilitated by the process of democracy. The organisations that can carry out these political functions have to be innovative – necessarily so, because neither the history of the cooperative movement nor that of socialist collective organisation provides any model that can be copied by these noncorporate organisations of capital in India. What is noticeable here is a strong sense of attachment to small-scale private property and, at the same time, a willingness to organise and cooperate in order to protect the fragile basis of livelihood that is constantly under threat from the advancing forces of corporate capital. However, it appears that these

organisations of non-corporate capital are stronger, at least at this time, in the non-agricultural informal sectors in cities and towns and less so among the rural peasantry. This means that while the organisation of non-corporate capital in urban areas has developed relatively stable and effective forms and is able, by mobilising governmental support through the activities of political society, to sustain the livelihood needs of the urban poor in the informal sector, the rural poor, consisting of small peasants and rural labourers, are still dependent on direct governmental support for their basic needs and are less able to make effective organised use of the market in agricultural commodities. This challenge lies at the heart of the recent controversies over “farmer suicides” as well as the ongoing debates over acquisition of agricultural land for industry. It is clear that in the face of rapid changes in agricultural production in the near future, Indian democracy will soon have to invent new forms of organisation to ensure the survival of a vast rural population increasingly dependent on the operations of non-corporate forms of capital. What I have said here about the characteristics of non-corporate capital are, of course, true only in the gross or average sense. It is admittedly an umbrella category, hiding many important variations within it. Informal or non-corporate units, even when they involve significant amounts of fixed capital and employ several hired workers, are, by my description, primarily intended to meet the livelihood needs of those involved in the business. Often, the owner is himself or herself also a worker. But this does not mean that there do not exist any informal units in which the owner strives to turn the business toward the route of accumulation, seeking to leave the grey zones of informality and enter the hallowed portals of corporate capitalism. This too might be a tendency that would indicate upward mobility as well as change in the overall social structure of capital.

Peasant Culture and Politics

In a recent lecture, the sociologist Dipankar Gupta has taken note of many of these features of changing peasant life to argue that we need a new theoretical framework for understanding contemporary rural society [Gupta 2005]. One of the features he has emphasised is the sharp rise in non-agricultural employment among those who live in villages. In almost half of the states of India, more than 40 per cent

of the rural population is engaged in non-agricultural occupations today and the number is rising rapidly. A substantial part of this population consists of rural labourers who do not own land but do not find enough opportunity for agricultural work. But more significantly, even peasant families that own land will often have some members engaged in non-agricultural employment. In part, this reflects precisely the pressure of market forces that makes small peasant cultivation unviable over time because it is unable to increase productivity. As the small peasant property is handed down from one generation to the next, the holdings get subdivided even further. I have seen in the course of my own field work in West Bengal in the last two years that there is a distinct reluctance among younger members of rural landowning peasant families – both men and women – to continue with the life of a peasant. There is, they say, no future in small peasant agriculture and they would prefer to try their luck in town, even if it means a period of hardship. Needless to say, this feeling is particularly strong among those who have had some school education. It reflects not just a response to the effects of primitive accumulation, because many of these young men and women come from landowning families that are able to provide for their basic livelihood needs. Rather, it reflects the sense of a looming threat, the ever present danger that small peasant agriculture will, sooner or later, have to succumb to the larger forces of capital. If this feeling becomes a general feature among the next generation of rural families, it would call for a radical transformation in our understanding of peasant culture. The very idea of a peasant society whose fundamental dynamic is to reproduce itself, accommodating only small and slow changes, would have to be given up altogether. Here we find a generation of peasants whose principal motivation seems to be to stop being peasants. Based on findings of this type that are now accumulating rapidly, Dipankar Gupta has spoken of the “vanishing village”: “Agriculture is an economic residue that generously accommodates non-achievers resigned to a life of sad satisfaction. The villager is as bloodless as the rural economy is lifeless. From rich to poor, the trend is to leave the village...” [Gupta 2005: 757]. I think Gupta is too hasty in this conclusion. He has noticed only one side of the process which is the inevitable story of primitive accumulation. He has not, I think, considered the other side which is the field of governmental policies aimed at reversing

the effects of primitive accumulation. It is in that field that the relation between peasants and the state has been, and is still being, redefined. I have mentioned before that state agencies, or governmental agencies generally, including NGOs that carry out governmental functions, are no longer an external entity in relation to peasant society. This has had several implications. First, because various welfare and developmental functions are now widely recognised to be necessary tasks for government in relation to the poor, which includes large sections of peasants, these functions in the fields of health, education, basic inputs for agricultural production and the provision of basic necessities of life are now demanded from governmental agencies as a matter of legitimate claims by peasants. This means that government officials and political representatives in rural areas are constantly besieged by demands for various welfare and developmental benefits. It also means that peasants learn to operate the levers of the governmental system, to apply pressure at the right places or negotiate for better terms. This is where the everyday operations of democratic politics, organisation and leadership come into play. Second, the response of governmental agencies to such demands is usually flexible, based on calculations of costs and returns. In most cases, the strategy is to break up the benefit-seekers into smaller groups, defined by specific demographic or social characteristics, so that there can be a flexible policy that does not regard the entire rural population as a single homogeneous mass but rather breaks it up into smaller target populations. The intention is precisely to fragment the benefit-seekers and hence divide the potential opposition to the state. One of the most remarkable features of the recent agitations in India over the acquisition of land for industry is that despite the continued use of the old rhetoric of peasant solidarity, there are clearly significant sections of the people of these villages that do not join these agitations because they feel they stand to gain from the government policy. Third, this field of negotiations opened up by flexible policies of seeking and delivering benefits creates a new competitive spirit among benefit-seekers. Since peasants now confront, not landlords or traders as direct exploiters, but rather governmental agencies from whom they expect benefits, the state is blamed for perceived inequalities in the distribution of benefits. Thus, peasants will accuse officials and political representatives of favouring cities at the cost of the countryside, or particular sections of peasants

will complain of having been deprived while other sections belonging to other regions or ethnic groups or castes or political loyalties have been allegedly favoured. The charge against state agencies is not one of exploitation but discrimination. This has given a completely new quality to peasant politics, one that was missing in the classical understandings of peasant society. Fourth, unlike the old forms of peasant insurgency which characterised much of the history of peasant society for centuries, there is, I believe, a quite different quality in the role of violence in contemporary peasant politics. While subaltern peasant revolts of the old kind had their own notions of strategy and tactics, they were characterised, as Ranajit Guha showed in his classic work, by strong community solidarity on the one side and negative opposition to the perceived exploiters on the other. Today, the use of violence in peasant agitations seems to have a far more calculative, almost utilitarian logic, designed to draw attention to specific grievances with a view to seeking appropriate governmental benefits. A range of deliberate tactics are followed to elicit the right responses from officials, political leaders and especially the media. This is probably the most significant change in the nature of peasant politics in the last two or three decades. As far as peasant agriculture is concerned, however, things are much less clearly developed. Small peasant agriculture, even though it is thoroughly enmeshed in market connections, also feels threatened by the market. There is, in particular, an unfamiliarity with, and deep suspicion of, corporate organisations. Peasants appear to be far less able to deal with the uncertainties of the market than they are able to secure governmental benefits. In the last few years, there have been hundreds of reported suicides of peasants who suddenly fell into huge debts because they were unable to realise the expected price from their agricultural products, such as tobacco and cotton. Peasants feel that the markets for these commercial crops are manipulated by large mysterious forces that are entirely beyond their control. Unlike many organisations in the informal non-agricultural sector in urban areas that can effectively deal with corporate firms for the supply of inputs or the sale of their products, peasants have been unable thus far to build similar organisations. This is the large area of the management of peasant agriculture, not as subsistence production for self-consumption, but as the field of

non-corporate capital, that remains a challenge. It is the political response to this challenge that will determine whether the rural poor will remain vulnerable to the manipulative strategies of capital and the state or whether they might use the terrain of governmental activities to assert their own claims to a life of worth and dignity. It is important to emphasise that contrary to what is suggested by the depoliticised idea of governmentality, the quality of politics in the domain of political society is by no means a mechanical transaction of benefits and services. Even as state agencies try, by constantly adjusting their flexible policies, to break up large combinations of claimants, the organisation of demands in political society can adopt highly emotive resources of solidarity and militant action. Democratic politics in India is daily marked by passionate and often violent agitations to protest discrimination and to secure claims. The fact that the objectives of such agitations are framed by the conditions of governmentality is no reason to think that they cannot arouse considerable passion and affective energy. Collective actions in political society cannot be depoliticised by framing them within the grid of governmentality because the activities of governmentality affect the very conditions of livelihood and social existence of the groups they target. At least that part of Indian democracy that falls within the domain of political society is definitely not anaemic and lifeless. Interestingly, even though the claims made by different groups in political society are for governmental benefits, these cannot often be met by the standard application of rules and frequently require the declaration of an exception. Thus, when a group of people living or cultivating on illegally occupied land or selling goods on the street claim the right to continue with their activities, or demand compensation for moving somewhere else, they are in fact inviting the state to declare their case as an exception to the universally applicable rule. They do not demand that the right to private property in land be abolished or that the regulations on trade licences and sales taxes be set aside. Rather, they demand that their cases be treated as exceptions. When the state acknowledges these demands, it too must do so not by the simple application of administrative rules but rather by a political decision to declare an exception. The governmental response to demands in political society is also, therefore, irreducibly political rather than merely administrative.

I must point out one other significant characteristic of the modalities of democratic practice in political society. This has to do with the relevance of numbers. Ever since Tocqueville in the early 19th century, it is a common argument that electoral democracies foster the tyranny of the majority. However, mobilisations in political society are often premised on the strategic manipulation of relative electoral strengths rather than on the expectation of commanding a majority. Indeed, the frequently spectacular quality of actions in political society, including the resort to violence, is a sign of the ability of relatively small groups of people to make their voices heard and to register their claims with governmental agencies. As a matter of fact, it could even be said that the activities of political society represent a continuing critique of the paradoxical reality in all capitalist democracies of equal citizenship and majority rule, on the one hand, and the dominance of property and privilege, on the other.

Marginal Groups

But the underside of political society is the utter marginalisation of those groups that do not even have the strategic leverage of electoral mobilisation. In every region of India, there exist marginal groups of people who are unable to gain access to the mechanisms of political society. They are often marked by their exclusion from peasant society, such as low-caste groups who do not participate in agriculture or tribal peoples who depend more on forest products or pastoral occupations than on agriculture. Political society and electoral democracy have not given these groups the means to make effective claims on governmentality. In this sense, these marginalised groups represent an outside beyond the boundaries of political society. The important difference represented by activities in political society, when compared to the movements of democratic mobilisation familiar to us from 20th-century Indian history, is its lack of a perspective of transition. While there is much passion aroused over ending the discriminations of caste or ethnicity or asserting the rightful claims of marginal groups, there is little conscious effort to view these agitations as directed towards a fundamental transformation of the structures of political power, as they were in the days of nationalist and socialist mobilisations. On the contrary, if anything, it is the bourgeoisie, hegemonic in civil society and dominant within the state structure as a

whole, which appears to have a narrative of transition – from stagnation to rapid growth, from backwardness and poverty to modernity and prosperity, from third world insignificance to major worldpower status. Perhaps this is not surprising if one remembers the class formation of the passive revolution: with the landed elites pushed to a subordinate position and the bureaucratic-managerial class won over by the bourgeoisie, it is the capitalist class that has now acquired a position to set the terms to which other political formations can only respond.

The unity of the state system as a whole is now maintained by relating civil society to political society through the logic of reversal of the effects of primitive accumulation. Once this logic is recognised by the bourgeoisie as a necessary political condition for the continued rapid growth of corporate capital, the state, with its mechanisms of electoral democracy, becomes the field for the political negotiation of demands for the transfer of resources, through fiscal and other means, from the accumulation economy to governmental programmes aimed at providing the livelihood needs of the poor and the marginalised. The autonomy of the state, and that of the bureaucracy, now lies in their power to adjudicate the quantum and form of transfer of resources to the so-called “social sector of expenditure”. Ideological differences, such as those between the Right and the Left, for instance, are largely about the amount and modalities of social sector expenditure, such as poverty removal programmes. These differences do not question the dynamic logic that binds civil society to political society under the dominance of capital.

Born in 1937 in Bihar, Ashis Nandy is a leading social theorist and social psychologist in post-independence India. Trained in social science and psychoanalysis in Calcutta, Nagpur and Ahmedabad, he is one of the vocal critics of the legacy of colonialism and its embroilment with central features of Western modernity, like centralized state government, worship of reason and science, and disdain of vernacular traditions. In 1965 he joined the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in Delhi under Rajni Kothari's leadership. Having served as Kothari's associate for many years, he is now a senior member and intermittent director of the Centre.

For primary and secondary sources see Ashis Nandy, *At the Edge of Psychology: Essays in Politics and Culture*, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1980; *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism*, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1983; *Traditions, Tyranny and Utopias: Essays in the Politics of Awareness*, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1987; 'Cultural frames for Social Transformation: A Credo', *Alternatives*, Vol. 12, 1987, pp. ~ 13-23; *The Illegitimacy of Nationalism: Rabindranath Tagore and the Politics of Self*, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1994; *The Savage Freud*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995; Fred Dallmayr, 'Global Development? Alternative Voices from Delhi', *Alternatives*, Vol. 21, 1996, pp.259-82. The following is taken from 'Cultural Frames for Social Transformation'.

CULTURE FRAMES FOR SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION : A CREDO

I. Culture, Critical Consciousness and Resistance

Amilcar Cabral, the African freedom fighter, spoke of the 'permanent, organized repression of the cultural life of the people' as the very core of colonialism. 'To take up arms to dominate a people is', he said, 'to take arms to destroy, or at least to neutralize... its cultural life'. Cabral also seemingly recognized the corollary of such an understanding: that the reaffirmation of cultural traditions could not but be the heart of all authentic anti-colonialism. In many ways, however, Cabral borrowed heavily from nineteenth century Europe's world image. He could not be fully sensitive to the other reason why a theory of culture has to be the core of any theory of oppression in our times: a stress on culture reinstates the categories used by the victims, a stress on cultural traditions is a defiance of the modern idea of expertise, an idea which demands that even resistance be uncontaminated by the 'inferior' cognition or 'unripe' revolutionary, consciousness of the oppressed. A stress on culture is a repudiation of the post-Renaissance European faith that only that dissent is true which is rational, sane, scientific, adult and expert-accordi1.lg to Europe's concepts of rationality, sanity, science, adulthood and expertise.

Viewed thus, the links between culture, critical consciousness and social change in India become, not a unique experience, but a general response of societies which have been the victims of history and are now trying to rediscover their own visions of a desirable society, less, burdened by the post-Enlightenment hope of 'one world', and by the post-colonial idea of cultural relativism.

II. Criticisms of Modernity: Internal and External

Cultural survival is increasingly, a potent political slogan in India. When the religious reformers of nineteenth century India spoke of protecting cultures, it remed an obscurantist poly. Today, when the juggernaut of modernity threatens every non-Western culture, the slogan no longer see a revivalist conspiracy. It has become a plea for minimum cultura purity in an increasingly uniformized world.

The plea has been accompanied by a growing concern with native resources and ideas, even though only to the extent they serve causes such as development, growth, national integration, security and even revolution. As if culture were only an instrument ! Perhaps the time has come to pose the issue in a different way. I shall do so here in terms of the binary choices which underlie most responses to modernity in complex non-Western societies.

Unmixed modernism is no longer fashionable, not even in the modem world. The ultra-positivists and the Marxists, once so proudly anti-traditional, have begun to produce schools which criticize, if not the modernist vision in its entirety, at least crucial parts of it. Lionel Trilling and Peter Gay have gone so far as to call such criticisms-and the modernist dislike for modernity a unique feature and a mark of modernity. One can off-hand think of several examples: the 'solar plexus' of D.H. Lawrence; the crypto-Luddite critique of industrialism by Charles Chaplin in *Modem Times*; the 'primitivism' of Pablo Picasso; and the defiance of science and rationality in the surrealist manifestos of Andre Breton, et *al.* They are all indicators of how modernity, at its most creative, cannot do without its opposite: anti-modernity.

However, to the extent these criticisms try to abide by or use as their reference the values of European Enlightenment, and to the extent modernization is an attempt to realize these values, such criticisms are internal to modernity. Let us call them forms of critical modernism. Examples of such critical modernism are: those models of scientific growth or technological transfer in the Third World which do not challenge the content or epistemology of modern science; critiques of the existing world order which take for granted the modern nation state system; and the social criticisms which vend the belief that if you displaced the elites or classes which control the global political economy, you could live happily with the modern urban-industrial vision ever after.

At the other end of the spectrum are the criticisms of modernity from outside. These criticisms reject the Enlightenment values and thus seem insane or bizarre to the modern man. Blake, Carlyle, Emerson, Thoreau, Ruskin and Tolstoy have been some of the better-known external critics of modernity in the West. In our times, Gandhi has been by far the most consistent and savage critic of modernity and of its best-known cultural product: the modern West. Gandhi called the modern culture satanic; and though he changed his mind about many things, on this point he remained firm. Many Gandhians cannot swallow this part of him. Either they read him as a nation-builder who, beneath his spiritual facade, was a hard-headed modernist wedded to the nation state system. Or they see him as a great man pursuing crazy civilizational goals (the way Isaac Newton, when not working on proper mathematical physics, worked on alchemy and on the science of trinity). They divide Gandhi into the normal and the abnormal, and reject the latter either as an aberration or as an embarrassment. 'Bapu, you are far greater than your little books', Nehru once charmingly said.

An unabashed Gandhi, however, took his 'insanity' to its logical conclusion. He rejected the modern innovations such as the nation state system, modern science and technology, urban-industrialism and evolutionism (without rejecting the traditional ideas of the state, science and technology, civic living and social transformation). Not being a Gandhian, I often watch and applaud from a distance the contortionist acts many modernists put up to fit Gandhi and his strange views into the modern paradigm. They can neither disown the Mahatma, nor digest him.

Yet, Gandhi was no Ananda Coomaraswamy. Both hated modernity, but they parted company when it came to traditions. Coomaraswamy theoretically kept open the possibility of assessing or altering traditions from the point of view of traditions. But perhaps because he was single-handedly trying to do for past times what the anthropologists as a community were trying to do for distant cultures, there was no criticism, or at least “0 significant criticism, of traditions in his works. The attitude was unashamedly defensive (examine, for instance, his comments on the concept and practice of *suttee* [Le., *sati*, self-immolation of widows])

Gandhi never eulogized the Indian village, nor called for a return to the past. He supported the ideas of the village and traditions, and India’s traditional villagers, but not the extant Indian villages or traditions. Coomaraswamy, too, at one plane made this distinction, but the tone was different. This would be obvious to anyone who reads Coomaraswamy and Gandhi one. Coomaraswamy defended the pre-modern caste system because he found it more human than the modern class system. Gandhi also did so but went further, Le., he sought to reorder the hierarchy of skills-to re-legitimize the manual and the unclean and delegitimize the Brahmanic al)d the clean. (I remember anthropologist Sinha once saying that while Rabindranath Tagore wanted to turn all Indians into Brahmans, Gandhi sought to turn them into Shudras. This can be read as an indictment of Gandhi; it can be read as a homage. And every Indian social thinker and activist has to make his or her choice some time or other; for, to say glibly that one must in the long run abolish both the categories is to fight in the short run for the Brahmanic world view. Exactly as to work for the future removal of poverty without touching the super-rich, in the present, is to collaborate with the latter.) Such examples can be multiplied. Compare Coomaraswamy’s appraisal of the Indian village-or Nehru’s-with Gandhi’s description of Indian villages as ‘dung-heaps’; compare, Dhariagopal Mukherji’s passionate defense of India against the attack of Catherine Mayo in her *Mother India* with Gandhi’s advice to every Indian to read what he called Mayo’s ‘drain-inspector’s report’. Recently, sociologist T.N.

Madan, analyzing Raja Rao's *Kanthapura*, has shown how the novelist construes Gandhi's movement against the tradition of untouchability as the other side of his struggle against modern imperialism, to stress the point that neither of the two struggles could be conceived of without the other.

Unlike Coomaraswamy, Gandhi did not want to defend traditions; he lived with them. Nor did he, like Nehru, want to museumize cultures within a modern frame. Gandhi's frame was traditional, but he was willing to criticize some traditions violently. He was even willing to include in his frame elements of modernity as critical vectors. He found no dissonance between his rejection of modern technology and his advocacy of the bicycle, the lathe and the sewing machine. Gandhi defied the modern world by opting for an alternative frame; the specifics in his frame were frequently modern. (The modernists find this hypocritical but they do not object to similar eclecticism when the framework is modern. Witness their attitude to the inclusion of Sarpagandha in modern pharmacology as reserpine, even though the drug has been traditionally a part of Ayurveda.)

Today, the battle of minds rarely involves a choice between modernity and traditions in their pure forms. The ravages of modernity are known and, since the past cannot be resurrected but only owned up, pure traditions, too, are a choice not given to us. Even if such a choice were given, I doubt if going back 2,500 years into the past is any' better than going 5,000 miles to the West for ideas, especially in a post-Einsteinian world in which space and time are inter-translatable variables. Ultimately, the choice is between critical modernism and critical traditionalism. It is a choice between two frames of reference and two world views.

II. Oppression, Innocence and Voice

Some scholars object to the foregoing formulation. They find the concept of critical traditionality soft on obscurantism and internally inconsistent. One of them, T.G. Vaidyanathan, has suggested that I should use the expression 'critical insider' instead of 'critical traditionalist'.

Frankly, I have little attachment to the words I use. If by changing them some processes can be described better, I have no objection. I recognize that my descriptive categories are partly the ashes of my long romance with some versions of the critical theory, especially the early influence on me of scholars such as Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse and Erich Fromm. They are not always adequate for non-Western realities. However, my categories are also partly a response to the argument of some scholars-Pratima Bowes being the last in the series-that traditional Indian thought never really developed a true critical component. I argue that (i) Indian thought, including many of its *puranic* and folk elements, can be and has been used as a critical base, because critical rationality is the monopoly neither of modern times nor of the Graeco-Roman tradition; and (ii) that some aspects of some exogenous traditions of criticism can be accommodated in non-Western terms within the non-Western civilizations.

Let me further clarify my position by restating it differently. Critical traditionality refers to the living traditions which include a theory of oppression, overt and/or covert. No tradition is valid or useful for our times unless it has, or can be made to have, an awareness of the nature of evil modern times. If the-term 'evil' seems too Judaeo-Christian to Indian ears-it should not, though; in a civilization which has known and included the Judaeo-Christian traditions longer than Europe has-one can talk of the nature.

Of man-made dukkha or suffering in our times. This is the obverse of the point that no theory of oppression can make sense unless it is cast in native terms or categories that is, in terms and categories used by the victims of our times. As a corollary, no native theory can be taken seriously unless it includes a sub theory of oppression.

This is not an odd restatement of the ideology of instrumentalism which dominates most modern, secular theories of oppression. I am not speaking here of a strategy of mass mobilization which includes certain compromises with the language, or the so-called false consciousness of the a historical societies. I am speaking of the

more holistic or comprehensive cognition of those at the receiving end of the present world system. I am speaking of the primacy that should be given to the political consciousness of those who have been forced to develop categories to understand their own suffering and who reject the pseudo-indigeneity of modern theories of oppression using-merely using-native idioms to conscientize, brainwash, educate, indoctrinate the oppressed or to museumize their cultures. The resistance to modern oppression has to involve, in our part of the world, some resistance to modernity and to important aspects of the modern theories of oppression. The resistance must deny in particular the connotative meanings of concepts such as development, growth, history, science and technology. These concepts have become not only new 'reasons of the state', but mystifications for new forms of violence and injustice. The resistance must also simultaneously subsume and here pure traditionalism fails to meet our needs-a sensitivity to the links between cultural survival and global structures of oppression in our times. The critical traditionality I have in mind is akin to Rollo May's concept of authentic innocence, as opposed to what he calls pseudo-innocence. Authentic innocence is marked by an updated sense of evil; pseudo-innocence is not, for it thrives on what psychoanalysis calls 'secondary gains' for the victim from the oppressive system.

This also means that the living traditions of the non-Western civilizations must include a theory of the West. This is not to make the facile point that the West is a demon, but to recognize that the West and its relationship with the non-West has become deeply intertwined with the problem of evil in our times-according both to the West and to the non-West. Contrary to what the modern world believes, this non-Western construction of the West is not morally naive either. It does draw a line between the Western main stress and the cultural underground of the West, between the masculine West and the feminine-exactly as it draws a line between the authenticity and pseudo-innocence of the non-West.

All said, it is the culturally rooted, non-modern understanding of the civilizational encounters of our times for which I am trying to create a space in public discourse. I am not trying to provide a new theory of oppression from within the social sciences.

IV Language, Survival and the Language of Survival

Is there an Indian tradition with a built-in theory of oppression? The question is not relevant. The real issue is: can we construe a tradition which will yield a native theory of oppression? The issue is the political will to read traditions as an open-ended text rather than as a closed book.

This civilization has survived not only because of the 'valid', 'true' or 'proper' exegesis of the traditional texts (though a sophisticated hermeneutic tradition has always existed in India), but also because of the 'improper', 'far-fetched' and 'deviant' reinterpretations of the sacred and the canonical. If Chaitanya's dualist concept of *bhakti* (evolved partly as '3. response to the pure monism of Advaita that had till then dominated the Indian scene) seems to have been posed too far in the past, there is the instance of the *smarta* text, Gita, acquiring the canonical status of a *shruti* text in the nineteenth and early twentieth century India. And, of course, there is the instance of the first great social and religious reformer of modern India, Ram Mohun Roy (1777-1833), 'legitimately' interpreting Shankara's monism as monotheism, and the instance of Gandhi 'legitimately' borrowing his concept of *ahimsa* or nonviolence from the Sermon on the Mount and claiming it to be the core concept of orthodox Hinduism. Howsoever odd such 'distortions' may seem to the Westernized Indian or to the scholastic, Brahmanic traditionalist, they are the means the Indian civilization has repeatedly used to update its theories of evil and to ensure cultural survival while allowing large-scale social interventions.

To appreciate such reinterpretations, we must learn to acknowledge or decode three languages which often hide the implicit native theories of oppression in many non-Western traditions. These are the language of continuity, the language of spiritualism and the language of self. They may look like aspects of a primitive false consciousness to the moderns, but they continue to be the means of indirectly articulating the problems of survival for the non-modern victims of history.

The language of continuity (which accounts for the image of the savage as change-resisting and stagnant) assumes that all changes can be seen, discussed or

analyzed as aspects of deeper continuities. In other words, the language assumes that every change, howsoever enormous, is only a special case of continuity. The perennial problems of human living and the perennial questions about human self-definition are common to all ages and cultures, and all disjunctions are a part of a continuous effort to grapple with these problems and questions. This position is radically different from the modern Western concept of continuity as only a special case of change or as only a transient period in time which is only overtly continuous or which, if it is truly continuous, is for that reason less valuable. In the dominant Indic tradition, each change is just another form of the unchanging and another reprioritization or revaluation of the existent.

At one plane the difference between the languages is exactly that: a difference in language. Yet, the fact remains that the language of continuity is mostly spoken by the victims of the present global system; the language of disjunction by the powerful and the rich and by those dominating the discourse on cultures. The fact also remains that the language of disjunction today has been successfully, though not wholly, coopted by those who are for the status quo. The Shah of Iran spoke of modernization and social change; his opponents spoke of cultural survival and conservation; the military juntas in South America and in the ASEAN countries speak of changing their societies into powerful nation states; their opponents speak of American indian rights and of the traditions of non-white cultures; Ronald Reagan and Indira Gandhi have spoken of scientific and technical growth, their critics of ecological issues, traditional sciences and rural technologies. For a long time the weights were differently distributed: the language of continuity was mainly used by those who ran the older oppressive systems. Now, development, maturity, scientific temper, revolutionary consciousness-these are key words in the vocabulary of those who see themselves either as deservedly ruling the world or as its future rulers.

The language of spirit, including both its 'respectable' versions and the versions which the spiritually-minded themselves reject as confidence tricks, serves a number of this-worldly purposes of the oppressed. It often expresses, when decoded, an analysis of oppression which rejects the analytic categories popular with the oppressors

and with the modern sectors from which the oppressors come. Such analysis in the language of spirit is seen by us as a the so-called fatalism of the savage and the primitive against which conscientization and other similar processes seem such good medicines. The language of self emphasizes variables such as self-control, self-realization, self-actualization and self-enrichment, and it apparently underplays changes in the non-self or the outer world. The language has been especially emphasized by the humanistic psychologists and others who have tried to base their theories of consciousness, psychological health and human creativity on insights into self processes rather than on insights into psycho-pathologies of social life. I am, however, drawing attention to the language from another vantage ground. The language of self, I want to stress, also has an implicit theory of the not-self-of oppression and social transformation. To borrow words from modern psychology, auto plasticity does in this case include allo-plasticity. In many of the non-Western traditions the self is not only included in 'external' laws of nature and society; nature and society, in turn, are subsumed in the self. Self-correction and self-realization include the principle of intervention in the outside world as we have come to understand the world in post-Galilean and post Cartesian cosmologies. Bhikhu Parekh has drawn my attention to the Gandhian emphasis on purifying the self as a means of serving the world, and serving the world as a means of purifying the self. The emphasis is built into the more sensitive traditional theories of self-in-society.

V. Critiques of Critiques

Modern theories of oppression mayor may not help the oppressed; but they certainly help the theorists a lot. To the extent they speak the language of discontinuity, ultra-materialism or impersonality, they become a part, often a fashionable part, of the modern world and of the valued streams of dissent within that world. To the extent they presume to represent the sanity of the oppressed, these theories sometimes become the livery of a- newelite-whether known as the revolutionary vanguard, the experience demystifier, the trained psychotherapist, or the scientist trying break down the pre-scientific temper of the masses. Perhaps we have reached the point where one must learn to take more seriously other categories used by those victimized by

the modern oppressive systems.. For these systems not only oppress in the way older oppressive systems did-by openly legitimizing violence, greed and dominance. These systems successfully tap the human ingenuity (*i*) to produce systems that are unjust, expropriatory and violent in the name of liberation or freedom; and (ii) to develop a public consciousness which would include an explicit model of proper dissent. In such a world, dissent, unless it seeks to subvert the rules of the game and the language in which the rules are framed, becomes another form of conformity.

George Orwell realized this. He felt that the oppressed, when faced with problems of survival, had no obligation to follow any model or any rule of the game. Now, it is possible to argue that this ‘methodological anarchism’, too, can, in turn, produce over time its own special brand of violence. I have no fool-proof answer to that argument. But I like to believe that perhaps one way of containing such second-order violence is to work with a perspective which (*i*) retains, and persistently struggles to retain, the sense of immediacy and directness of the experience or perception of man-made suffering; and (ii) keeps open the scope for criticism of every criticism.

In the short run, however, one may have to be even less demanding. Protest or dissent cannot, and should not, wait for that golden moment when the protestor or the dissenter gets hold of, or is converted to, the correct theory in the correct way, be that theory modern or traditional. In fact, any theory which believes that such correctness or conversion must come before liberation can be talked about is, to that extent, an incorrect theory, following the Orwellian principle mentioned above. Yet, some stipulations can perhaps be made about the minimum scepticism towards contemporary structures of authority and authoritativeness which an activist or a social critic must show in order to qualify as useful for our times. Such stipulations may give meaning, not only to the resistance of the illiterate savage pitting his naked body against the might of the high technology of his oppressors, but also to the passions of the young activist moved by the plight of his fellow humans and trying to understand that plight in terms of the highly technical modern theories of liberation.

First, scepticism has to be directed at the modern nation state. This, I am

aware, is easier said than done in post-colonial societies. The folk-theories of politics popular among the middle classes in these societies would have us believe that all the ills of these societies are due to their inability to produce or to sustain proper nation states. Once such nation states are built, the argument goes, the first problem of social engineering and collective survival would be solved. Scepticism towards the nation state in such an environment looks, at best, simple-minded; at worst, treacherous. Yet, the fact remains that in most Asian and African societies, the state has increasingly become not only the major instrument of corruption, expropriation and violence towards their own people, but also increasingly ethnocidal. Even if one does not take an anarchist position on the state in such societies, one could at least be wary of the idea of nation state as an end in itself and be sceptical of state-sponsored anxieties about national security, specially when this concept of security is invoked to demand sacrifices from social sectors least able to make them.

Second, there must be scepticism towards modern science. I am not speaking of the usual scepticism about some forms of technology or about the usual criticisms of the control on science exercised by social forces. I am speaking of modern science as the basic model of domination in our times and as the ultimate justification for all institutionalized violence. I am speaking of the criticism of criticism which is aware that the acceptance of the social determination of science and technology can hide the refusal to be sceptical about the philosophical assumptions and texts of modern science, about the modern scientific imagination it self. Unless one builds checks against the basic model of domination in modern science, I doubt if one can have any check on the newer forms of institutionalized violence.

Third, there must be scepticism towards history, specially towards the so-called larger forces of history, unless the awareness of such larger forces is matched by an awareness of their implications in everyday life. I am not very clear here. Let me try again. I have mentioned here and there in this essay the name of Gandhi; and it may be appropriate to end this: statement with a reference to his attitude to history. One reason why Gandhi aroused deep anxieties in Indian middle class *literati* was that he always pushed social analysis to the level of personal lifestyle, to the level of

what can be called the smaller forces of history. Gandhi did not allow the rhetoric of historical awareness to be a substitute for the political morality of everyday life. He was willing to suspend his suspicion of history, but he was unwilling to let anyone forget one's personal responsibility to live out one's understanding of historical and/or perennial truths. This terribly, terribly fuddy-duddy demand for internal consistency-between the public and the private, and between the collective and the personal is particularly anxiety-provoking to those who specialize in speaking the language of making history while only passively living in history. Now, it is possible to argue that all accountability is odious, that ideas are important in themselves and independent of the personal lives of their proponents. But Gandhi was always sceptical of the modern claim that perfect institutions would one day eliminate the social need for individual morality. He therefore believed that accountability should be demanded at least of those whose theories of social intervention demand sacrifices and account ability of others. He believed, too, that accountability should likewise be demanded of those whose theories claim to bridge the private and the public, and the personal and the historical.

For those who feel uneasy with any talk of personal morality in the public realm I can word the issue differently. Many political economists, Immanuel Wallerstein being a recent example, have drawn attention to the fact-uncomfortable to the Third World elites and intellectuals-that the Third World societies usually maintain within their borders exactly the same violent, exploitative, ethnocidal systems which they confront in the larger world: the same center and periphery, the same myth that the sacrifices made by people in the short run will lead to the beatitude of development and scientific advancement in the long run, the same story of over-consuming elites fattening themselves to early death at the center, and starvation, victimhood and slow death at the periphery. Because of this, the demands of the Third World for more equitable and just terms in North-South exchanges often sound dishonest or hollow. I believe that many traditional as well as some modern systems of psychology allow us to extend the argument to the level of the individual. In other words, they allow us to claim (i) that we model our interventions in the world on our interventions in our

own selves; and '(ii) that the world does to us what we do to ourselves. This is the reverse of what I have called elsewhere the principle of isomorphic oppression, according to which each level of an integrated social structure neatly reproduces within it the oppressive dynamics of the whole. The principle of isomorphism says: what you do to others you ultimately do to yourself, for 'the wages of sin is the kind of person you are'. When reversed, the principle becomes: what you do to yourself or to your kind cannot but invite others to do the same to you and to your kind.

It should be obvious that this way of looking at social intervention and culpability dissolves the crude dichotomy between the study of the elites and the study of the masses or, for that matter, between elitism and mass-line. Following traditional wisdom, I like to believe that the story of the prince can never be told without telling the story of the pauper, and that the cause of the pauper can never be independent of the cause of the prince. My life's ambition is to write an interpretation of poverty by focusing entirely on the lifestyle of the super-rich. As Frantz Fanon recognized, the suffering of the victims cannot but be the sickness of their oppressors and the intertranslatability between two sets of life experiences is complete once the rules of translation are identified.

The three scepticisms are tied together in my case-I have a right to end a credo on a personal note-by a general scepticism towards all ideas which are used as sources of legitimacy by the winners of the world. I should like to believe that the task of a person living a life of the mind is to make greater demands on those who mouth the certitudes of their times and are closer to the powerful and the rich, than on the faiths and ideas of the powerless and the marginalized. That way lie freedom, compassion and justice.

16.4 Sum Up

With the continuing rapid growth of the Indian economy, the hegemonic hold of corporate capital over the domain of civil society is likely to continue. This will inevitably mean continued primitive accumulation. That is to say, there will be more and more primary producers, i e, peasants, artisans and petty manufacturers, who

will lose their means of production. But most of these victims of primitive accumulation are unlikely to be absorbed in the new growth sectors of the economy. They will be marginalised and rendered useless as far as the sectors dominated by corporate capital are concerned. But the passive revolution under conditions of electoral democracy makes it unacceptable and illegitimate for the government to leave these marginalised populations without the means of labour to simply fend for themselves. That carries the risk of turning them into the “dangerous classes”. Hence, a whole series of governmental policies are being, and will be, devised to reverse the effects of primitive accumulation. This is the field in which peasant societies are having to redefine their relations with both the state and with capital. Thus far, it appears that whereas many new practices have been developed by peasants, using the mechanisms of democratic politics, to claim and negotiate benefits from the state, their ability to deal with the world of capital is still unsure and inadequate. This is where the further development of peasant activities as non-corporate capital, seeking to ensure the livelihood needs of peasants while operating within the circuits of capital, will define the future of peasant society in India. As far as I can see, peasant society will certainly survive in India in the 21st century, but only by accommodating a substantial non-agricultural component within the village. Further, I think there will be major overlaps and continuities in emerging cultural practices between rural villages and small towns and urban areas, with the urban elements gaining predominance.

I have also suggested that the distinction between corporate and non-corporate capital appears to be coinciding with the divide between civil society and political society. This could have some ominous consequences. We have seen in several Asian countries what may be called a revolt of “proper citizens” against the unruliness and corruption of systems of popular political representation. In Thailand, there was in 2006 an army-led coup that ousted a popularly elected government. The action seemed to draw support from the urban middle classes that expressed their disapproval of what they considered wasteful and corrupt populist expenditure aimed at gaining the support of the rural population. In 2007, there was a similar army-backed coup in Bangladesh where plans for parliamentary elections have been indefinitely postponed

while an interim government takes emergency measures to clean the system of supposedly “corrupt” politicians. Reports suggest that that move was initially welcomed by the urban middle classes. In India, a significant feature in recent years has been the withdrawal of the urban middle classes from political activities altogether: There is widespread resentment in the cities of the populism and corruption of all political parties which, it is said, are driven principally by the motive of gaining votes at the cost of ensuring the conditions of rapid economic growth. There is no doubt that this reflects the hegemony of the logic of corporate capital among the urban middle classes. The fact, however, is that the bulk of the population in India lives outside the orderly zones of proper civil society. It is in political society that they have to be fed and clothed and given work, if only to ensure the long-term and relatively peaceful well-being of civil society. That is the difficult and innovative process of politics on which the future of the passive revolution under conditions of democracy depends.

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Unit- IV**CRITICAL ENGAGEMENT WITH MODERNITY :
ASHISH NANDY**

Ashish Nandy was brought up in Calcutta in the second half of the twentieth century. Nandy graduated and post- graduated in psychology, with strong emphasis on psychoanalysis. He worked clinically until opting definitely for a career as a researcher, at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), New Delhi. Creativity in Science and literature, as well as the articulation between personality and society, were his initial focuses, although from the very beginning he worked on a “political psychology” and the issues of Indian society were at the core of his concerns, partly through the mediation of the figure of Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948), as well as of Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941), the great poet and composer of the first half of the twentieth century. He has increasingly searched for a recovery of Indian tradition, dwelling especially on what would consist of its popular undercurrents, pitting himself against the notions of secularism and development, strongly critiquing the state and the more explicitly modern intellectuals.

For some, Nandy espouses a Brahminical standpoint, since the traditions he supports do not include and are contrary to a radical progressive perspective, with great ambiguity as to feminism and being to some extent complicit with Hindu Chauvinist nationalism, because of his anti-secularization positions, as well as of neo-liberalism, because of his pro-market critique and anti-state critique (Desai, 2002: 78-90). He concentrates, critics argue, his “critical traditionalism”- which we will analyze below, only on attacks against Science, sparing traditions and without understanding that India’s problem is the lack of “Enlightenment”. Nandy was incapable, when he opposed secularism, of grasping the importance of a democratic public sphere for India.

State, nationalism and development, secularism and secularization

Nandy was trained as a psychologist and psychoanalyst, with reasonable knowledge of other areas associated with social and political theory. But it is in his dealings with these other disciplines that, regardless of good insights and a capacity to generally frame some crucial issues, he tends to get lost. It is when one sees his critique of modernity become more strident, with little grasp of its processes, which eventually blocks his vision. This obviously contributes to a political and cultural program even more distant, in principle, from modernity, and hostile to it, rooted otherwise in a voluntarism for which social choices not only have merely a moral character, but also constitute a terrain of wide freedom for agents.

Nandy is perfectly aware that changes of identity in India, under the impact of modernity and modernization, underlie processes that had to do with colonialism, which however refer more broadly to urbanization and industrialization, Hindutva, as well as Indic Islamism and Sri Lanka's Buddhism (all part of the same Indic civilization configuration, which embraces Pakistan and that Island southwest of the subcontinent, with conflicts between Sinhalese and Tamils,) has undergone a rationalizing transformation which demonizes the other, as a form of "exorcism" of their rejected selves, even if the price is self-annihilation-proximity, not distance being responsible for this emotional mobilization as in the "narcissism of small differences" Freud denounced, although he is not quoted in this context. It is exactly to uprooted people, who live a culture of flux and a quest for security and stability at the psychic level, that the idea of an India with cultural continuity and rigidity appeals. Formerly, following a diagnosis shared by the Indian left and Adorno's theory of the authoritarian personality, Nandy identified such processes with Fascism. On the other hand, religious fanaticism stems from floating anger and self-hatred generated in people who saw themselves as religiously defeated in an increasingly secular and desacralized world, created by modernity.

This becomes clear in particular in his discussion about Sati, the widows' ritual suicide. It had always been a "pathology" of Indian Culture, suffering from a perversion with the advance of modernity, which attacked and disorganized traditional lifestyles and delivered religion, including this specific practice, but also festivals and pilgrimages, to market

mechanisms. Already in the eighteenth century there had occurred a “sati epidemics”, forced by momentous social and cultural changes in the life of the babus (Brahmin castes) of Calcutta. The massive recourse to sati surged as an attempt to show conformity with a threatened tradition and because masculine fantasies and fears of feminine aggression were unleashed, with the supposition that death was coming about due to their ritual performance. This could be partly fixed by feminine ritual suicide. It is to be noted that this line of reasoning, although precise in its identification of mechanisms, displaces the responsibility for the answers to causes stemming from modernization, freeing morally those who made recourse- or pushed women to do so- to sati. Voluntarism sometimes is used by Nandy as an argument, on other occasions it is left aside.

On the other hand, although he sometimes recognizes that the middle classes produced criticism of both tradition and modernity, he turns against them when he brings up the issue of loss of roots, of wasting popular traditions and the intolerant radicalism of Hindu nationalism, since from it emerges, he thinks, basically all that is negative in contemporary India. Irrespective of the correction or not of the sociological aspect underlying such statements, we are suddenly transplanted to the plan of morality and voluntary choices, now with a negative signal, though, contrary to what happened with the discussion about the sati “epidemics”. The state and secularism evince even more such a negative appreciation of the middle classes, in opposition to most of the Indian population. Secularism was, he states, introduced in the country by the people who were “seduced or brainwashed” in favor the ethnocidal thesis about social and historical evolution, so as to subvert traditional forms of religious tolerance. Precisely the middle classes would bet on that actually ethnophobic and ethnocidal nation state, except if cultures bow to it.

Nandy has no sympathy for the state, although he is more comfortable with a “moderate” state, shrunken and capable of dealing with a “federation” of cultures. The nation state, the dream of Indian nationalists, was a mere product, the more problematic, of colonialism, starting in the mind to a large extent, even though most people in India had nothing to do with it in daily life. This harks back to an old tradition of aloofness vis-a-vis the state in the subcontinent, an entity which, in addition had no legitimacy, except for a modicum which was lent to it by the generation of independence. In contradistinction democracy has legitimacy now and is expanding, despite many problems and pace of the growing

power of the state apparatus. The mode of “accommodation” that prevailed until recently in the country, nourished by Nehru, by the communists in Kerala and West Bengal, as well as by other leaderships, insofar as after all the state had to deal with non-modern society. Even radical nationalist movements, defeated in the 2009 elections, may have learned something about this tendency to accommodation so typical of India, notwithstanding strong inclinations of the electorate to the left, in which radical diversity, contrary to the watered-down tolerance of politics in the United States, yields an untamed cosmopolitanism (Nandy, 2009b).

Development would be another disgrace that befalls the country and is closely connected to that increasingly stronger state (and which, in Nandy’s view, in quite a confused way, wavers between discontinuity with the Nehruvian state and its extension, which does not make sense). Simply put, this legacy of colonialism and its “civilizing mission” works according to binary oppositions (with an inverted signal, let us note in relation to those now proposed by Nandy himself), in which it is foremost opposed to underdevelopment, whose duplications include however the oppositions between “sanity” (normality) and “insanity” (abnormality), “maturity” (adulthood), and “immaturity” (childhood), besides “rationality” and “irrationality”, everything presented without actual discussion. He argues simply for abandoning development, looking for alternatives rooted in Indian culture- in which traditional forms of environment management come forward as a possibility to be explored.

It is not a matter of dismissing Nandy’s thesis offhand, although he presents them in a way of such that they sound rather implausible. Everything is blamed on modernity as if the history of India showed always a benign coexistence between religions (and ethnicities) that modernity has mutually poisoned. Even if that were true, which medicine should be administered is an issue that cannot simply be settled by disqualifying modern alternatives. More sophistication is required also regarding the concept of secularism, whose pair, secularization, as process, not as an ideology, does not appear in Nandy’s discussions, in particular in the interstices of Indian society. This, however should not imply that the thematic as such, as proposed by him is irrelevant: there is no reason to disregard the possibilities that, against a sort of dogmatism that cancels out respectful coexistence and reflexive debate, can be found in both popular and rationalized forms of religion in the modern world, in which India is irremediably involved, as Nandy himself is forced to recognize,

however grudgingly. No doubt there can be tensions between a process of secularization (loss of importance of religion) and secularism as a world view, on the one hand, and the search for tolerance within religions.

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